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Abstract 
This study of civil control of the military in Zambia was undertaken in order to 
ascertain why in contrast with many other former British colonies in Africa such as 
Ghana and Uganda the military in that country has consistently supported the ruling elite 
and not sought to obtain political power for itself. 
In answering the question why this was the case, this study used the qualitative 
methods and analytical concepts of coercive and consensual measures of control, 
although the two types of measures are often used in combination, as the main tools that 
determined civil control of the military in four periods, namely the colonial period, the 
immediate post-independence period, the period of one-party rule, and the period of 
reinstated multiparty democracy.  
Using either coercive or consensual measures as our tools of analysis, 
comparative profiles were constructed of the nature, character and degree of civil control 
of the military in each period, and how these were reconfigured by the different political 
transitions that ushered in the four periods. This assisted in ascertaining which elements 
of civil control of the military remained constant, and which changed. Data was collected 
from primary and secondary sources, and verified in in-depth interviews with 20 role 
players. 
The main findings are that Zambian governments used two main methods to exert 
civil control over the military. 
During the colonial period (1900–1963), the dominant method was coercive 
measures which was reflected in the policies of racial discrimination and implemented 
through racialised structures like parliament, the executive and the judiciary. 
Consequently, relations between the government, the military, and white settlers were 
harmonious, while those with Africans were antagonistic and explosive. 
Under the Independence Constitution of the First Republic (1964–1972), the use 
of consensual measures  was manifested in the normative frameworks found in non-racial 
multiparty democracies and spelt out in the constitution and other specific legislation. In 
the Zambian case, this was supported by the new government’s motto of  ‘One Zambia, 
One Nation’. 
Under the One-Party Constitution of the Second Republic (1973-1990), the 
dominant method was largely through the use of coercive measures characteristic of one 
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party states in terms of which military and civil intelligence officers monitored the 
political activities of all military personnel as well as ordinary civilians. This helped to 
remove all anti-government elements from the military. 
Under the Multi-Party Constitution of the Third Republic (1991-2004), the 
dominant methods were a combination of all good practices inherited from the previous 
republics but largely through consensual measures which were manifested in the 
reintroduction of strong parliamentary and executive oversight over defence expenditure 
and activities. 
This study concludes that stable civil control of the military in Zambia in the 20th 
century was as a result of effective use of either coercive or consensual measures or the 
mixture of the two and this sets Zambia apart from many other African countries. Further 
more, it is important to emphasize one point on the relevance of this study’s findings for 
the study of civil-military relations. This is that despite that both these types of measures 
worked as a solution for Zambia, upon closer scrutiny, civil control of the military cannot 
be indefinitely secured by coercive means, and that the only sustainable way of securing 
civil control of the military is to maintain consensual relations between the core 
‘triumvirate’ namely: the political authorities/government/ruling elite; the military and 
military elite; and the citizenry.  
 
 
 
 8
Declaration 
I declare that the study entitled ‘Civil Control of the Military in Zambia’ is my 
own unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not 
been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university. 
 
Godfrey Haamweela Nachitumbi Haantobolo 
8th May, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9
Dedication 
I dedicate this work to the past and future leaders of the government of Zambia, 
the men and women in the Ministry of Defence and all security institutions in Zambia, the 
past and future members of the Parliament of Zambia, and the general citizenry of that 
country. Their nationalistic tolerance and democratic consciousness created a peaceful 
country in Central / Southern Africa and among the former British colonies in Africa 
which created effective methods for maintaining civil control of the military. Together, 
they created a Zambia that became the envy of both its enemies and its friends. Hence this 
study. 
 
 10
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Mr Amusaa Mwanamwambwa, Speaker of the National 
Assembly of Zambia, and Ms Doris K Mwinga, Clerk of the National Assembly of 
Zambia, for giving me paid study leave to pursue this programme. I also wish to express 
my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Prof Gavin Cawthra, for his unreserved 
guidance and encouragement during the writing of this thesis. His intellectual 
sophistication in matters related to defence, security and peacekeeping and the 
constructive comments he made in the course of writing the thesis have been extremely 
rewarding. My thanks also go to Prof B J Phiri for his intellectual guidance and provision 
of logistical support in the process of writing this thesis. I would also wish to thank Dr 
Cecile Badenhorst for tutoring me in research methods. The practical applications of 
these methods have enabled me to produce this thesis. 
My special thanks also go to the permanent secretary of the Zambian Ministry of 
Defence, who gave me access to primary and secondary sources at the Ministry of 
Defence Headquarters. The same office gave me clearance to interview eminent 
personalities in the field of the civil control of the military in Zambia. They included 
former president Dr K D Kaunda, Gen Malimba Masheke, first director of the 
Department of Military Intelligence; Lt-Gen Christone Tembo, former army commander, 
diplomat, and vice-president; Brig-Gen Timothy Kazembe, former director of military 
intelligence and army secretary; former members of parliament; and many others. I 
particularly wish to thank all the people who agreed to be interviewed for this study for 
their contributions enriched the study.  
I also wish to thank Prof A W Chanda, Prof M C Musambachime, Mr F 
Chigunta, Dr B Siamwiza, Dr A N Phiri, Dr A van Nieuwkerk, Ms Shirley Magano, Lt-
Gen Solly Mollo, Mr C J Banda, Mr M Mukelabai, and Mr K Kankansa for their 
constructive academic criticisms of my work during the course of my study. I also wish to 
thank Ms C Ngwira for typing the thesis. 
My thanks are also due to the Southern African Defence and Security 
Management network for the scholarship that enabled me to complete this thesis with the 
minimum of financial difficulties. My thanks also go to my wife, Prisca Himakuni, and 
my daughter, Choolwe, for their support and resilience during the process of writing the 
thesis. I am grateful to all the others who contributed to this study in one way or the other. 
 11
List of abbreviations  
ANC  African National Congress. 
AQMG Assistant Quarter Master General. 
BJTT  British Joint Training Team. 
BSAC British South African Company. 
CAFRN Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyansaland. 
CSO  Central Statistics Office. 
DCG Donor Consultative Group. 
DPP Director of Public Prosecutions. 
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States. 
FDD Forum for Democracy and Development. 
GB£  British Pounds Sterling. 
GRZ  Government of the Republic of Zambia. 
GSO General Staff Officer. 
HP  Heritage Party. 
IMF International Monetary Fund. 
MANC  Mozambique African National Congress. 
MMD Movement for Multi Party Democracy. 
MPLA Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola. 
NAZ National Archives of Zambia. 
NAZ National Assembly of Zambia. 
NER  North Eastern Rhodesia. 
NR  Northern Rhodesia. 
NRG Northern Rhodesia Government. 
NWR North Western Rhodesia. 
PAC  Pan Africanist Congress. 
RAAF Royal Rhodesia Air Force. 
RSA  Republic of South Africa. 
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme. 
SR  Southern Rhodesia. 
SWAPO South West African Peoples Organisation. 
UDI  Unilateral Declaration of Independence. 
UP United Party 
 12
UPP                       United Progressive Party 
UPND  United Party for National Development 
UNIP United National Independence Party 
UNDP                     United Nations Development Programme 
USA  United States of America. 
USA$ United States Dollar 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. 
WB World Bank. 
WW1  World War One 
WWII  World War Two 
ZA Zambia Army 
ZAF Zambia Air Force 
ZNS Zambia National Service. 
ZPA  Zambia Privatisation Agency. 
ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union. 
ZAPU  Zimbabwe African People’s Union.
1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
The study of civil control of the military has developed since the 1950s and has 
attracted the attention of scholars such as Huntington (1957, 1968); Perlmutter (1977, 
1980); Welch (1976); Hutchful (1988); Edmonds (1988); Decalo (1991); and Cawthra 
and Luckham (2002). Most of this attention has focused on South America, Africa, Asia 
and the Middle East, where many unstable post-colonial governments have been 
overturned by military coups d’etat. In this context, the maintenance of stable and 
effective civil control over the military in some former colonies – with Zambia a 
prominent example – is regarded as an anomaly. 
Culturally and socially, it is difficult to understand how Zambia has managed to 
unite 73 ethnic groups in a stable political dispensation. It is also difficult to understand 
how successive Zambian governments have managed to maintain a co-operative and 
obedient military organisation that has refrained from intervening in domestic politics, in 
contrast with the military in other former British-ruled African countries such as Uganda, 
Ghana and Nigeria. In these countries, and many others in the third world, the military 
successfully overthrew democratically elected governments shortly after independence, 
and took over the reins of state.  
In view of the foregoing, this study of civil control of the military in Zambia was 
undertaken in order to ascertain why in contrast with many other African countries after 
independence the military in Zambia consistently supported the ruling elite. Before we 
address this question, we need to examine the measures used by various civil political 
authorities to maintain control over the military. The study then finds that Zambia’s 
history falls into four distinct periods, namely, the colonial period between 1900 and 
1964; the immediate post independence era which lasted from 1964 to 1972; the one 
party state era period from 1973 to December 1990; and the re-introduced period of plural 
politics between December 1990 to 2004. The latter three periods are known respectively 
as the First, Second and Third Republics. 
The analysis of civil control of the military in Zambia in the four periods, has 
been carried out using two groups of concepts: namely the dominant use of coercive 
measures for the periods covering the colonial and one party state eras and predominately 
consensual measures for the periods covering the immediate post independence era and 
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that period after the end of the cold war. Little et al (1973: 403) define coercive measures 
as ‘the employment of force by government to suppress political disaffection and 
disorder’. For the purpose of this study, this concept will be applied to the use of the 
policies of racial discrimination and racist structures during the colonial period and the 
embedding of military intelligence in the military structures during the one party state 
eras. Mitchell (1968:41) on the other hand explains that the concept consensual is derived 
and synonymous with the concept consensus. In this study, therefore, consensual 
measures are defined as a democratic system of governance that provides sufficient 
agreement about the legitimacy of the main three institutions of governance, namely, the 
legislature, executive and judiciary visa-a-vis military institutions, more specifically, ‘the 
general rules and particular commands which they promulgate and execute and the 
distribution of roles, rewards and facilities which they influence and are held responsible’ 
(Mitchell 1968: 41). If there is a moderate degree of consensus in the execution of 
accepted tasks and widespread acceptance of allocation of rewards, a peaceful resolution 
of conflicts among institutions of governance, as well as the military and the citizenry, is 
possible, and conflicts can be contained and resolved, including through the maintenance 
of stable civil control of the military.  
In the colonial period the Northern Rhodesia civil political authorities used 
undemocratic coercive measures to maintain control over the military. This was 
characterized by the establishment of discriminatory and racist structures based on the 
principle of divide and rule at legislative, executive and judicial levels. This approach 
then made the colonial authorities create an army with two faces: one white and one 
black. In this environment, the essential role of the military was to protect the interests of 
the white settlers and the colonial regime and ensure the subordination and subservience 
of the indigenous African population. The study then argues that the two-faced nature of 
the colonial army made its relations between the white political and military elite 
harmonious; and those between the military and the African population antagonistic. As 
Welch has remarked, ‘The apolitical nature of the colonial army in fact served a 
profoundly political purpose: maintenance of British rule, in its genesis and continuation 
(1978: 159).  
In the First Republic under the post-independence constitution (1964 to 1972), 
civil control of the military in Zambia was guided by what this study terms ‘consensual 
measures’. These are defined as those created by the normative frameworks found in non-
racial multi-party democracies. These positive and consensual values are normally spelt 
out in the constitution, carried out in more specific legislation and implemented in 
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practice through government policies by most stakeholders in the governance system of a 
country. Under these measures civil control of the military in Zambia took the form of 
fundamental structural reforms involving the careful use of recruitment, training, 
promotion, retirement and budgetary policies by the government of the day, which 
resulted in the development of a military culture that bred loyal and trusted officers. The 
study then argues that this was supported by the effective use of structures such as the 
executive, parliament, Office of the Commander in Chief, Ministry of Defence, Defence 
Counsel and Office of the Command Secretary.  
In the Second Republic under the one-party constitution (1972 to 1990), civil 
control of the military in Zambia reverted to undemocratic coercive measures 
characterized by the introduction of punitive patterns of recruitment and behavioural 
controls over the military similar to those found in a socialist state. However, the study 
argues that these measures changed their nature and characteristics from the 
discriminatory racist structures of the colonial period to embedding intelligence officers 
in military units through party structures for purposes of surveillance of the military’s 
political activities. The study then argues that like in some socialist systems of 
government, security personnel provided the political leadership with information about 
the beliefs and behaviours of each military officer, as well as sentiments among the rank 
and file. This allowed the Defence Council and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces 
to assess the loyalty to the ruling party and government of any military officer before any 
decision was made to promote, demote, suspend or retire them. The same punitive 
institutions were used to defuse any plans for attempted military coup d’etats, as well as 
popular uprisings.  
In the Third Republic, under the multi party constitution (1991-2004) brought 
about by the 1989 end of the cold war era, and characterized by the collapse of most 
socialist states in Eastern Europe, civil control of the military in Zambia took more 
consensual forms. In this period, the study argues that, learning from experience, civil 
control of the military embedded most of the positive aspects of the previous regimes. 
Therefore, civil control of the military depended on a combination of parliamentary 
oversight over defence budgetary allocations and programmes, executive and judicial 
powers, as well as the loyalty of the military to the government of the day.  
In concluding the introductory section, the study argues that the answer to why 
all the political regimes in Zambia in the 20th century managed to stave off successful 
coups in contrast to many African countries after independence lies in the successful, use 
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of a mixture of coercive and consensual measures described in the four periods above. 
Zambia, to a large extent, also managed to diffuse the problem of ethnicity through the 
practical implementation of the motto ‘One Zambia One Nation’ in its recruitment and 
deployment policies in all the sectors including the military. Upon further scrutiny of 
events in both the colonial and one party eras in Zambia the study demonstrates that civil 
control of the military cannot be indefinitely secured by coercive means. The most likely 
sustainable way of securing civil control of the military is to maintain consensual 
relations between the core triumvirate namely, the political authorities/government/ruling 
elite; the military and military elite; and the citizenry.  
In view of the above statements of the core question to be investigated and the 
brief examination of the two concepts that dominated the four periods of study, it is now 
important to contextualize our investigations in terms of the background to and the 
objectives of the study.  
1.2 Background to and objectives of the study 
The history of civil-military relations in the territory later known as Northern 
Rhodesia began in 1891 with its colonisation by Britain, through the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC). In terms of the ideology of modernisation, all precolonial African 
societies in the region were regarded as underdeveloped, and their traditional cultures 
were to be replaced with a superior western one of enlightenment characterised by 
modernity (see Crush 1995:2-6). Traditional or pre-modern societies were characterised 
as ‘largely rural, agricultural, religious, small populations, homogenous, superstitious, 
ignorant or non-scientific, pre-capitalist or early capitalist’ (Clough and Rapp 1975:43). 
Nineteenth-century Europeans believed that 
ignorance and superstition were the mainstays of traditional society and 
were characterised by authoritarian government, customs, the simple 
outlook of farmers and peasants, traditions and myths and were an obstacle 
to freedom, happiness and human progress (Hollinger 1997:2). 
It was believed that the colonisation of these societies by superior western and 
modern societies would replace ‘ignorance with knowledge, scientific power, control and 
prediction which, in turn, would pave the way for endless human progress’ (ibid:7). 
Modern society, on the other hand, was characterised by the ‘late 18th and 19th Centuries 
Enlightenment intellectual movement associated with the growth of urban areas, 
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capitalism, democracy, science, technology, cultural and political heterogeneity’ (Clough 
and Rapp 1975:160).  
Armed with this superior philosophy, the BSAC established a police force in both 
North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia whose purpose was to protect its commercial 
and financial interests. This force consisted of 
one hundred and thirty troops, all of them volunteers raised by the Indian 
Colonial government from India. In 1893, this force was replaced by the 
Makua natives of Mozambique and Atonga natives of West Nyasaland 
with English officers seconded from the English Regiment (Brelsford 
1949: 3-4). 
Following the establishment of this force, the company proceeded to colonise 
Northern Rhodesia by force. African chiefs such as the Litunga of Barotseland, who were 
aware of the power of the Europeans as a result of the conquest of Lobengula in 
Matebeleland in 1894, chose to collaborate. The Litunga accepted the colonisation of his 
area of influence in North-Western Rhodesia by signing the Ware Concession of 1889, 
the Lochner Concession of 1890, and the Corrindon Treaty of 1900 (Hall 1965:64-71). 
These concessions gave the BSAC administrative and mineral rights and powers in the 
territory of the Barotse nation, including all subjects and dependent territory, covering the 
Zambezi-Congo watershed and land further east along the course of the Kafue River (Hall 
1968:71). Chiefs who resisted colonial intrusion, such as Chief Mpezeni of the Ngoni, 
were defeated by company troops in 1898. The Ngoni were required to pay a fine of 
twelve thousand head of cattle. The British Administration was then 
extended to Ngoniland and Fort Jameson, the Capital for North-Eastern 
Rhodesia was built on one of Mpezeni’s Induna’s village formerly known 
as Kapatamoyo and this led to the colonisation of North-Eastern Rhodesia 
by force (ibid:90-91).  
In 1911 the British government combined North-Eastern and North-Western 
Rhodesia into one territory known as Northern Rhodesia. In 1924 it terminated the 
BSAC’s rule in Northern Rhodesia and assumed direct control of the territory. The new 
government established a legislative council, executive, and judiciary. These institutions 
of governance adopted and implemented coercive policies and laws that led to the 
removal of Africans from Crown land to native reserves, the introduction of 
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discriminatory pay for whites and blacks, and many other racist measures. In the face of 
protests from affected sections of the African communities, the colonial regime used the 
Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Police Force to ensure that African communities 
complied with government directives. 
The introduction of colonial rule in the territory resulted in the establishment of a 
colonial military force that derived its legitimacy from the coercive discriminatory 
political, economic and social policies of the colonial system. Civil-military relations 
were controlled by the governor of Northern Rhodesia, who was also commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces. This resulted in the emergence of a police force which performed 
both policing and military functions and whose primary role was to protect the lives and 
property of white settlers. Despite this drastic and invasive role of the military, especially 
its involvement in the conquest of indigenous or native societies, very little has been done 
to investigate the impact of British conquest on civil control of the military, and 
particularly its role in determining the relationships that developed between the colonial 
government, colonial military personnel, and conquered Africans in Northern Rhodesia. 
It is argued here that the coercive discriminatory policies and laws adopted 
during the colonial period in Northern Rhodesia served the interests of white settlers as 
well as the imperial political and military elite. However, the non-recognition of the rights 
of Africans to own land, vote, enjoy freedom of movement, strike, and belong to political 
parties of their choice did not encourage harmonious relations between Africans and the 
political and military elite. Therefore, up to 1964, the relationship between the white 
political and military ruling group on the one hand and the indigenous African population 
on the other was largely antagonistic. 
After attaining political independence in 1964, the new Zambian government was 
faced with the task of reshaping the civil-military relations inherited from British 
imperialism to suit the new dispensation. This called for consensual measures that 
resulted in the introduction of structural changes to the military establishment which were 
commensurate with the creation of a society that provided equal opportunities for all 
regardless of race, tribe, sex and creed. How the new post-independence government 
managed the transition of civil-military relations from colonialism to independence will 
be dealt with in chapter 5. 
The immediate post-independence period is doubly significant, given that it was 
marked by a spate of rebellions and tensions. For example, in 1964 ‘a series of violent 
clashes occurred between the security forces and the followers of Alice Leshina’s Lumpa 
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Sect in the Chinsali, Lundazi, Isoka and Kasama Districts’ (Mulford 1967:165). The 
impact of these disturbances on civil-military relations in Zambia will be investigated. 
Furthermore, the failure by the new government to deliver the fruits of independence to 
the Zambian people led to growing rivalry between the ruling party, the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP), and the opposition African National Congress (ANC). This 
was further exacerbated by growing rivalries within UNIP that resulted in the party losing 
a significant number of seats in the House of Assembly during the 1968 parliamentary 
elections (Chikulo 1997:202-203). In 1972, prompted by fears of being voted out of 
power, UNIP leaders declared Zambia a one-party state. How this changed the mostly 
consensual methods in terms of the nature, character and degree of civil control of the 
military from objective methods tailored by the British independence constitution to more 
coercive subjective methods under a one-party dispensation is examined in chapter 6. For 
the purposes of this study, subjective methods of control are defined as 
non-constitutional-legalistic methods used by both political and civil 
authorities to ensure the ongoing obedience and compliance of armed 
forces. Such methods include party penetration of the leadership echelons 
of the armed forces, and ethnic manipulation of the composition of the 
officer corps (Williams 1998:26).  
 Objective factors, on the other hand, are those that 
refer to the level and legitimacy of formal political and civil organisation 
within a society, the role of parliament and its various committees and 
mechanisms in ensuring civil oversight over both the State in general and 
armed forces in particular, and the existence of formal control mechanisms 
within the government designed to ensure the acquiescence of the armed 
forces (Williams 1998:25-26). 
Immediately after the declaration of a one-party ‘participatory democracy’, a 
rebel group in the North-Western Province known as the Mushala gang rose against the 
government. The government used the defence force to crush the rebellion. Almost no 
research has been done on the causes, course, and results of the Mushala rebellion, 
especially its impact on civil-military relations. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the one-party state experienced economic hardships 
that led to the introduction of new coercive subjective methods for controlling the 
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military. This study examines how the use of coercive controls such as military 
intelligence and party controls at places of work affected the relationship between 
citizens, the military, and government in the period leading to the attempted military 
coups d’etat in 1980, 1988 and 1990, and the food riots in 1986.  
This study also examines how the reintroduction of multiparty politics and 
consensual measures in 1991 affected civil control of the military. First, the consensual 
and coercive controls over the military developed by the first two republics had to be 
amended to suit the new democratic dispensation. The resultant reorganisation, aimed at 
professionalising the military, led to the retrenchment or retirement of some military 
personnel. Moreover, strong executive and parliamentary oversight over defence and 
other security institutions was introduced. Delays in the payment of retirement benefits 
for military personnel, and the general socioeconomic effects of the reintroduction of 
plural politics in the context of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), resulted in 
some junior officers in the military staging an unsuccessful coup in 1997 (Mulenga 
2000:190; Chigunta 2003:200). This study investigates how the Third Republic used the 
re-introduced consensual measures to develop harmonious methods for controlling the 
military. 
The assessment and interpretation of these facts helps to explain why, in each 
period of history in Zambia, the nature, character and degree of civil control of the 
military were reconfigured to suit different political transitions and stave off successful 
coups. 
Against this background, the main objective of this study is to investigate why- in 
contrast with many other African countries after independence – the military in Zambia 
under different constitutional regimes, has largely supported the economic, social and 
political ideals of the ruling elite. 
Its more specific objectives are to: 
1) assess how the coercive measures of racial structures practised by the Northern 
Rhodesian colonial government influenced the oversight of the military by 
parliament, the executive and the judiciary on behalf of the white settler 
community up to 1964; 
2) examine how, in the First Republic, more consensual measures in civil control of 
the military were introduced which suited the new Zambian state;  
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3) assess how, in the Second Republic, the introduction of coercive subjective 
measures such as behavioural control through military intelligence and party 
controls in all military establishments ensured the acquiescence of the armed 
forces; 
4) examine how, in the Third Republic, the re-introduction of consensual measures 
characterised by the good aspects of structural policies; behavioural controls; 
parliamentary, executive and judicial oversight of defence expenditure; and other 
measures contributed to civil control of the military; 
5) assess the role of parliament in ensuring civil oversight over the state in general 
and the armed forces in particular, and how this facilitated civil-military relations 
in the four republics; 
6) examine the role of the judiciary in administering legislation that determined the 
roles and responsibilities of the armed forces, and monitored their activities, in 
the four republics operating; 
7) examine the measures that guided the recruitment of military personnel in the 
four republics, and how these personnel carried out their responsibilities in 
relation to the citizenry; and 
8) examine the roots of the tradition of interaction between the citizenry and the 
political and military elite, and how this helped to ensure relatively harmonious 
civil-military relations in the four periods under review. 
In pursuing these objectives, this study provides a comprehensive assessment of 
how Zambia’s first government after independence used consensual measures to reshape 
the coercive British imperial tradition of civil-military relations to suit the new Zambian 
state. It also shows that Zambia has been relatively peaceful since independence because, 
in contrast with some other former British colonies, it developed stable methods of civil 
control of the military. The non-intervention in domestic politics by the military in 
Zambia could also be explained in terms of concepts and theories of civil-military 
relations developed over the past 60 years. 
1.3 Area and period of study 
This study is rooted in the discipline of civil-military relations, in the context of 
political and social history. It is confined to the Republic of Zambia, a land-locked state 
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in southern-central Africa. This country is bordered to the north by Tanzania and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo; to the east by Malawi and Mozambique; to the south by 
Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia; and to the west by Angola. The climate is tropical, 
modified by altitude, with average temperatures ranging from 18 to 24 degrees centigrade 
(65 to 75 degrees Fahrenheit). The main languages are Tonga, Bemba, Lozi, Nyanja, 
Lunda and Luvale. The official language is English. Christians make up a large 
proportion of the population, and are roughly divided between Protestants and Roman 
Catholics. Most Asians are Muslims, and the rest are Hindus. Some Africans follow 
traditional animist beliefs. The national flag (proportions 3 by 2) is green, with a canton 
in the lower fly having equal red, black and orange vertical stripes, surmounted by an 
osprey in flight. The capital city is Lusaka. 
This study is divided into an examination of four periods. Copans (1978:19) 
points out that ‘periodization aims at bringing to the fore two different kinds of 
phenomena; the historical and social context of the theoretical development, and the 
ideological and theoretical configuration of concepts’. The first period is 1900–1963, 
when the country was under British colonial rule. Civil-military relations caused 
antagonism between European settlers and Africans. This was because the executive and 
the legislative council used coercive policies and laws that favoured the economic and 
political interests of white settlers as against those of Africans. The second period is 
1964–1972, when the country was a multiparty democracy, and civil-military relations 
were governed by consensual measures under the British-tailored independence 
constitution. Politically, after 1968, this period was characterised by 
inter-party rivalry organised along ethnic lines between the ruling party, 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and opposition parties on 
one hand and intra-party rivalry within UNIP itself which threatened the 
very survival of the State (Chikuyo 1975:202).  
For these reasons, the UNIP government decided to introduce coercive methods of civil 
control of the military through a semi-socialist system, and declared Zambia a one-party 
state. Therefore, the third period is 1973 to December 1990, in which Zambia was 
governed as a ‘One-Party Participatory Democracy’ under the 1973 One-Party 
Constitution. In this period, power was concentrated in the hands of the president and 
other party leaders without any significant opposition. By the end of the 1980s, the 
government’s economic policies had led to deteriorating standards of living. These 
problems coincided with the end of the Cold War, which was characterised by the 
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collapse of the communist bloc and other one-party regimes other than Cuba and China, 
and their replacement by the capitalist bloc and its multiparty democratic political system. 
These world-wide political changes and the local economic and political problems made 
the people of Zambia agitate for the abolition of the one-party state and the reintroduction 
of multi-party democracy The fourth period is December 1991 to 2004 when the 
multiparty democracy and consensual methods of civil control of the military were 
reintroduced under a new constitution that abolished the one-party system.  
1.4 Civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1963 
The conquest of what became Northern Rhodesia was influenced by the Berlin 
conference of 1884–5, where European powers decided how to divide Africa among 
themselves. Consequently the British government used the British South African 
Company (BSAC) under John Cecil Rhodes to conquer North-Western Rhodesia through 
collaborative treaties with Chief Lewanika of the Lozi people. In North-Eastern Rhodesia 
the conquest took the form of collaborative treaties as well as the military defeat of the 
Ngoni people under Chief Mpezeni. 
This conquest was followed by the establishment of European institutions of 
governance comprising an executive, a legislative council, and a judiciary, which served 
the interests of the colonial regime and the British Imperial government, and implemented 
coercive discriminatory policies which were enforced by colonial police – the forerunner 
of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. This amounted to an undemocratic dispensation that 
fundamentally violated Africans’ economic, political and social rights. Consequently, 
after attaining independence in 1964, African nationalist movements struggled to replace 
this with a democratic system of government based on more consensual measures. Welch 
(1978) examines the nature of civil control over the military and the role played by the 
colonial armies in the former African British colonies. He argues that, since colonial rule 
in Africa was undemocratic by nature, character and degree, 
the colonial armies mixed police and military roles. Their responsibilities 
were primarily domestic, although the world wars resulted in a temporary 
change of duties. Particularly in Africa, border protection was less 
important than subduing internal dissent (Welch 1978:157). 
He also points out that the  
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apolitical character of colonial armies in former British colonies in Africa 
served a profoundly political purpose of the maintenance of external rule. 
The military supported British rule in its genesis and in its continuation. 
This led to a profound chasm between armed forces and the society. As a 
result of this, very different civil-military relations exited from those in 
Great Britain and Africa (ibid:160). 
How the use of the military to enforce coercive colonial policies and laws 
impacted on civil control over the military in the colonial period is relevant to our 
research, and is the subject of this investigation. 
1.5 Civil control of the military in Zambia: The First Republic, 1964–72 
As noted earlier, Zambia’s geopolitical position at the time of independence was 
precarious in that it was surrounded by hostile colonial states that detested the new 
government’s foreign policy of providing bases to liberation movements fighting for the 
independence of their countries. Hall (1969:25-26) explains that there were reports in  
the South African newspapers that the South African Army was drawing 
up plans for ‘Israeli-type strikes’ against guerrilla holding camps in 
Zambia, and Vorster, the Prime Minister of South Africa, said he might hit 
Zambia hard, [and] that Zambians would not forget it.  
Sir De Villiers Graaff, leader of the United Party, the official parliamentary 
opposition in South Africa, also urged Zambia and Tanzania to stop providing refuge to 
guerrillas operating against the colonial regimes in Mozambique, Angola, and Southern 
Rhodesia. The Zambian president, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, responded to Vorster’s threats by 
advising him that the Zambian government would not change its principles (ibid:26). In 
this situation, in the period 1964 to 1972, the Zambian government was compelled to take 
the threats of its hostile neighbours seriously, and thus embarked on an expansion of its 
military institutions and forces. 
The consensus-based measures that led to structural changes in the military 
establishment were also part of a broader effort to introduce effective administration, and 
address the challenges of new nationhood. The government sought to assume effective 
control over Zambia’s geographic, linguistic, ethnic, and military challenges in order to 
maintain external and internal stability, law and order, national coherence, and the 
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legitimacy of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) government, led by 
Kaunda. The situation was complicated by an internal rebellion led by Alice Lenshina 
(Regina) Mulenga’s Lumpa Sect Church that had wide support in the Chinsali, Lundazi, 
Kasama and Isoka districts. Acting in accordance with Article 265 (Section 7) of the 
independence constitution, the president declared a state of public emergency. 
Four other steps were taken. The first was to implement constraints facilitating 
civil control of the military enshrined in the new constitution. For instance, Article 49 
provided for the  
command of the armed forces in Zambia by the President who has had 
formal control over appointments and promotion of military officers to the 
highest ranks and the designation of elected civilians as constitutional 
heads of the Ministry of Defence (GRZ 1964:44).  
The second was the expansion of the Zambian army and air force. Thirdly, the 
president assumed direct control over the defence budget, which was therefore not subject 
to parliamentary debate and oversight. The fourth was to send Zambian defence personnel 
to socialist countries for training in addition to opportunities offered by the British 
government. 
 The introduction in 1971 of voluntary and compulsory military training through 
the Zambia National Service enabled Zambia ‘to tap the most intelligent and energetic 
population through partial military training’ (Welch 1976:12). This enabled the 
government to develop an effective nationwide defence system consisting of citizens who 
could be called on at any time to assist the military in the defence of the state as and when 
the need arose. It further broadened the widened the sphere of responsibility assigned to 
the military.  
Between 1968 and 1971, governance was complicated by two main factors. The 
first was the country’s severe inter-party and intra-party rivalries and secondly, Zambia’s 
provisions of bases and other logistics to nationalist movements from neighbouring 
countries struggling to get their independence and end apartheid rule in South Africa. On 
22nd August 1971 Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe and other senior Bemba speaking 
politicians and ministers resigned from UNIP and formed the United Progressive Party 
(UPP). The formation of UPP resulted in intra-party rivalry within UNIP with ‘Senior 
Bemba ministers accusing non-Bemba colleagues of tribalism, embezzlement and rape’ 
(Sardanis 2003: 261). In order to save UNIP from collapse, on 4 February 1972, Kaunda 
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used his powers under the ‘Preservation of Public Security Regulations to ban UPP and 
detained its president Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe and 122 others bringing the total 
number of detainees to 238’ (Sardanis 2003: 202). These detentions were used by the 
party and government leadership as solutions to intra-party rivalries. In order to avoid 
these problems becoming a reason for domestic military intervention, as had happened in 
Ghana and Nigeria, the Zambian government decided in 1973 to introduce a one-party 
participatory democracy. This will be examined in the next section. 
1.6 Civil control of the military in Zambia: the Second Republic (1973-91) 
In December 1972 a one-party participatory democracy was introduced in 
Zambia. The, then, existing legal opposition political parties such as the African National 
Congress under Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula were outlawed, and any future initiatives to 
establish opposition parties were prohibited. This meant that the ruling party controlled 
all government institutions, including parliament and the military. The rationale for this 
step was that at regional level one-party state rule would give the Zambian leadership 
undivided attention to its support for liberation movements in the neighbouring countries 
(Kaunda, Interview, 2005). At local level one party state rule would enhance popular 
participation in the country’s economy, thereby accelerating peace, economic progress, 
and stability. However, Mushingeh (1991:4), for example, argues that  
in Zambia, architects of one-party rule sought to establish democracy by 
removing political choice, eliminating political contestation, eroding the 
significance of Parliament and the Judiciary, and stifling of press. Instead, 
arrangements were put in place that greatly contradicted the official 
rhetoric about popular participation and democracy.  
In the light of this argument, this study examines the implications of the new 
dispensation for military governance, and particularly steps taken to ensure continued 
civil control of the military. 
By 1980 the country was experiencing endemic shortages of essential 
commodities such as soap, cooking oil, maize meal, and milk. Supplies for the military 
were also affected. As a result, two unsuccessful military coups d’etat were staged in 
1980 and 1990, and food riots occurred which spread from Lusaka to the Copperbelt. 
This study will investigate the causes of these events and their impact on civil control of 
the military. 
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The attempted coups called for a serious re-examination of relations among the 
ruling party, the government, and the military. As outlined by Kolkowicz (1982), the 
government reacted by creating Soviet-style controls over the military, including a 
military intelligence unit and parallel party organs in the defence and security 
establishments comprising officers of all ethnic groups. These organs were not under 
military control; their role was to oversee, report on, and control the activities of the 
military on behalf of the UNIP Central Committee and the president, who was also the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. These organs strongly influenced the interaction 
between the civil government and the military. 
This study examines in detail how the party used these coercive measures and 
structures as its ‘eyes and ears’ within the military, and also to ensure that the military 
remained under civil control. It further establishes that the appointment of a number of 
senior army officers by the president as high commissioners, ambassadors, cabinet 
ministers, members of the central committee, governors, and heads of parastatal 
organisations was influenced by the positive relationship between the military and the 
government, and enabled the latter to survive all attempted coups d’etat. This section 
concludes by examining how these control mechanisms turned into anti-democratic 
practices that undermined relations between the government, the military, and the 
citizenry. Following the end of the Cold War, the coercive measures that defined civil 
control of the military in the one-party era had to be redefined to suit the new consensual 
measures in a multiparty era, which is the subject of our investigation in the next section. 
1.7 Civil control of the military in Zambia: the Third Republic 
(1991–2004) 
Following the abolition of the one-party system of government and the 
reintroduction of multiparty democracy, this period saw the reorganisation of measures 
for controlling the military, including the reinstatement of parliamentary oversight. All 
the previous colonies surrounding Zambia had attained majority rule. Zambia now began 
introducing security sector reform programmes aimed at the creation of a professional 
army.  
Research for this period was aimed at investigating how the hostility and 
competition between the military and party-controlled instruments of control were 
dissipated by the new consensual measures in the process of creating a professional army, 
and how this influenced civil–military relations. It is also important to note that the state 
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of emergency in Zambia was lifted in 1991. The National Assembly regained formal 
control over the military, and was allowed to debate and vote on budgetary allocations to 
the Ministry of Defence. This study concludes by examining how the new consensual 
measures have effectively made the National Assembly use its oversight functions over 
the defence budget, and the impact of this on Zambia’s civil–military relations. 
1.8 Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one comprises an introduction, 
and a section setting out the background to the study. Chapter two contains the statement 
of the problem, and sets out the research methodology. Chapter three reports on the 
literature review. Chapter four examines the colonial period of Northern Rhodesia, 1900-
1963 in which the country was governed under coercive measures that determined its 
antagonistic civil–military relations. Chapter five examines the period 1964-1972 in 
which Zambia was governed under a British-tailored Independence Constitution that 
ordered civil–military relations in terms of the British model using mainly consensual 
measures. Chapter six covers the period 1973-1991 in which Zambia was governed under 
a one-party constitution. Chapter seven covers the period 1991-2004 during which 
Zambia was governed under a new constitution that reintroduced a multiparty system of 
government. During this period, the nature of civil control over the military changed 
significantly as a result of structural reorganisation, the reintroduction of democratic 
methods of control, and institutional changes. Chapter eight provides a conclusion as well 
as recommendations for future civil control of the military, and some suggested areas for 
further research. 
2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Statement of the problem 
This study examines the control mechanisms introduced by various governments 
in Zambia to manage the relationship between the military, the government, and the 
citizenry. The period covered includes the colonial era, marked by discriminatory laws 
and policies; the immediate post-independence era, under a democratic constitution; the 
era of one-party rule; and the era of the reintroduction of the multiparty democracy after 
the end of the Cold War. During all these periods the Zambian military consistently 
worked to support the economic, political, and social ideals of the ruling elite. Any 
deviation from this ideal by military leaders via attempted military coups d’etat was 
consistently exposed by military intelligence, and crushed by loyal troops. This made the 
country experience relatively harmonious civil–military relations as compared to other 
former British colonies in the four periods under review. Hence the need for this study to 
ascertain why civil control of the military in Zambia was such that in contrast with many 
other African countries after independence the military in Zambia consistently supported 
the ruling elite.  
2.2 Significance of the study 
It is argued that this study is significant for four main reasons. First, as Decalo 
(1991:67-68) points out, while the literature pays much attention to civil–military strife in 
Africa, academics have spent far less time on analysing civil–military stability in some 
African countries. While coups d’etat have taken place in many African countries, some 
states have managed to avoid them. The question of how these states have managed to 
avoid coups is far more significant than asking why coups have taken place in others. 
Furthermore, ‘not a single book on a case study from Africa has yet addressed in depth 
the generic issue of the sources of stable civilian rule in Africa, and only indirectly have a 
number of articles explored the area’ (ibid:67). Hence the significance of the study of the 
Zambian case as argued in the introduction. 
Secondly, given the widespread interstate and intra-state conflicts in southern and 
central Africa, especially after the Cold War, Zambia, with its four distinct periods of 
governance, is an excellent case study of civil–military relations. It is important for 
Zambians themselves to record their history by examining the measures used by civil 
C I V I L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I T A R Y  I N  Z A M B I A  
 30
governments in civil control over the military adopted during the different periods noted 
earlier, establishing how successful they were, and also why the state decided to adopt 
them. It has also become important to examine how Zambia’s experiences in civil–
military relations could be used to resolve future conflicts. Moreover, the relative peace 
the country has enjoyed cannot be taken for granted. Hence the peculiarity of the 
Zambian case. 
Thirdly, not much has been written about how the Zambian government and other 
role players managed to maintain relatively orderly civil–military relations under 
conditions of encirclement and bombardment by minority regimes pursuing guerrilla 
fighters based in Zambia. This study will seek to fill this gap by explaining how the 
government and military in Zambia complemented one another  in managing foreign and 
domestic economic, political and other policies, reflected in the recognition of the 
principle of concordance, or high a high level of integration between the political 
authorities/government/military elite; the military and military elite; and the citizenry. 
Last but not least, given its pioneering research on civil control of the military in 
Zambia, the study will provide a scholarly foundation on which other scholars can build 
in conducting further research in this field, especially with respect to Zambia’s 
contribution to the liberation struggle in the Southern Sub-Region in the face of apartheid 
South Africa’s destabilisation campaign of post independence States. 
2.3 Research methodology 
Qualitative methods, using the concepts of coercive and consensual measures for 
the four different periods that were used for this study. This approach was chosen because 
the researcher was able to quantify essentially political issues that manifested themselves 
over a long period using the above concepts. More specifically, this method enabled the 
researcher to conduct interviews with key role players such as the first republican 
president, some former army commanders, and members of parliament.  
 Leedy and Ormrod (1989:147) define qualitative research as ‘research that 
encompasses two things in common. First, the methodology focuses on phenomena that 
occur in natural settings - that is, the real world. Second, the methodology involves 
studying those phenomena in all their complexity.’ Creswell (2003:18; 181-183) also 
defines qualitative research methods as ‘research that takes place in natural settings, uses 
data collection methods based on open ended observations, interviews, documents, 
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sounds and the research questions are emergent and are not tightly prefigured like in 
quantitative approach’. Creswell (2003:18; 181-183) further defines qualitative research 
methods as those that are fundamentally interpretative where the researcher makes an 
interpretation of the data, drawing conclusions about its meaning personally and 
theoretically, stating the lessons learnt and offering further questions to be learnt. This 
means that the researcher examines data as it was recorded during a specific social 
political and historical moments, and the method uses strategies of inquiry such as 
narratives, case studies etc. 
This study explores the coercive and consensual methods used by the Zambian 
government to exercise civil control over the military in some depth. According to 
Denzin et al (2000:646), case studies should include: 
1) an exposition of the ‘nature of the case’; 
2) its historical background; 
3) its physical setting; 
4) other contexts, including economic, political, social and legal dimensions; and 
5) interviews with key role players. 
Case studies can also be classified as illustrative, exploratory, cumulative, and 
critical instance. Illustrative case studies are primarily descriptive, and typically focus on 
one or two instances of a certain type of event of situation. Exploratory case studies help 
to identify relevant questions and select types of measurement prior to a main 
investigation. Cumulative case studies rely on information about several sites at different 
times, and thus allow for greater generalisation. A typical example of a cumulative case 
study is Kiwanuka (1970). A critical instance case study provides information from one 
or more particularly significant sites. Its purpose is usually to examine a situation or 
instances of unique interest, or call into question some generalised or universal assertion. 
The study of Zambia is an illustrative case study. 
2.4 The origins of qualitative methodology 
Qualitative methods (or interpretative social science) originate from the German 
sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) and the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey 
(1833–1911), who argued that there were ‘two fundamentally different types of science – 
one based on abstract explanation and the other rooted in an emphatic understanding of 
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the everyday lived experience of people in specific historical settings’ (Neuman 1997:68). 
Neuman further notes that 
Interpretative Social Science is related to Hermeneutics, a theory of 
meaning that originated in the nineteenth Century. Hermeneutics means 
making the obscure plain and is largely found in the humanities. It 
emphasises detailed reading or examination of text in which the researcher 
gets the inside view of what is presented as a whole, and then develops a 
deep understanding of how its parts relate to the whole (Neuman 1997:68).  
2.5 Data collection 
Data for this study was collected from primary as well as secondary sources. 
Primary sources included material studied in the National Assembly of Zambia Library, 
the National Archives of Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters of Zambia. Secondary sources included material in books, journals and 
magazines. 
2.5.1 Primary sources 
Primary sources include documents such as letters, memoranda, agendas, study 
reports, or any items that could add to the database. The validity of the documents should 
be carefully reviewed so as to avoid incorrect data being included in the database. Tellis 
(1997:8) notes that ‘one of the most important uses of documents is to corroborate 
evidence gathered from other sources’ even though one has to be careful to balance up 
reliance on documents and other sources when doing case studies. The potential for over-
reliance on documents as evidence in case studies has been criticised.  
Archival records consulted include service records, maps, survey data, personal 
records such as diaries, telegrams, and other documents written by both civil and military 
authorities on the daily relationship between the defence forces and the civil arms of 
government with regard to the implementation of government policies such as the 
alienation of land, industrial labour relations, and other relevant issues in the period under 
review. 
Other archival sources include legal records, parliamentary motions, and 
questions related to defence matters tabled in the National Assembly by cabinet ministers 
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and members of parliament and printed in the Parliamentary Hansard during sessions 
between 1925 and 2004. 
For security reasons, between 1964 and 2004 the Ministry of Defence did not 
deposit either confidential or open files with the National Archives of Zambia. These are 
kept at the Ministry of Defence Headquarters, and access is restricted. However, the 
permanent secretary of defence and the director of the research department in the 
Ministry of Defence Headquarters gave this researcher access to these primary sources 
for all three periods under review. This material included letters, minutes, cabinet memos, 
Defence Council minutes, bills, reports by the Auditor-General’s Office, and annual 
estimates of expenditure by the Ministry of Defence by the members of the Defence 
Council and the commander-in-chief. Confidential documents, including minutes of 
Defence Council meetings, were made available to this researcher on the understanding 
that a copy of this thesis would be deposited with the Ministry of Defence in Zambia. 
2.5.2 Secondary sources 
Secondary sources included Brelsford (1949) who provided a practical insight 
into the origin and functions of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment up to the end of World 
War Two. Huntington (1968) and Perlmutter and Plave (1980) provided a theoretical 
interpretation of the nature and characteristics of potentially praetorian states in the Third 
World that have often led to domestic military intervention (‘Third World’ is used here to 
refer to poor or developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Horny 
2000:1246)). Others include Schiff (1996), Mandaza (1996), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), 
Hutchful (1988), Cawthra (1997), Luckham (1998), Williams (1998), Omari (2003), 
Kolkowicz (1967), Welch (1976), Phiri (2003), and others who are all cited in the 
introduction or the literature review. These authors provide empirical and theoretical 
analyses of specific countries or regions. This gave this study a firm theoretical basis and 
conceptual framework for understanding the problems and dynamics surrounding civil 
control of the military in transitional states in Africa. It also contributed to formulating 
the research question of why Zambia, despite being a Third World country with the same 
problem as others in Africa, has enjoyed relatively stable civil–military relations and has 
never experienced successful military interventions in domestic politics. 
The availability of both primary and secondary sources enabled the researcher to 
begin ‘coding and categorising data according to appropriate periods and themes’ (Ely et 
al 1997:165), and eventually to begin analysing the data according to the study’s 
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conceptual distinction and chapter outline. This is in line with the interpretative type of 
research which ‘is based on conceptual analysis and understanding and describing 
meaningful social action in accordance with the laws and policies passed by that 
government’ (Neuman 1997:83). 
2.6 The interview process 
An open-ended interview method was adopted in which informants were allowed 
to comment freely on government decisions that affected civil oversight over the military 
in the period under review. When conducting productive interviews for a qualitative 
study, Leedy and Ormrod (1989:159) suggest that ‘the researcher must make sure that 
interviewees are representative of the group and written permission for the interview is 
obtained. The interview should record responses verbatim’. 
In line with this method, interviews were conducted with one former president, 
four former vice-presidents in their capacity as chairmen of the Defence Council, three 
former army commanders, three former military secretaries who worked as both military 
and intelligence officers, and five parliamentarians who served under different regimes. 
These interviews were aimed at establishing how they formulated and implemented 
policies relating to civil control of the military. The officers were chosen because they 
could provide a valuable perspective from the military side (see appendix 1). The 
interviews were conducted in the homes of the interviewees, where they were not 
distracted. The author first wrote to the interviewees, explaining the nature of the study 
and underlining its importance. Apart from asking specific questions related to the study, 
and also asking for clarifications where this was deemed necessary, the author behaved 
like a good listener. This enabled him to capture most of the responses. Hand-written 
notes and a tape recorder were used to capture the responses. Written or verbal consent 
for participation in the study and permission to record the interviews were obtained from 
the informants beforehand (see appendix 2). Each informant received a consent form that 
spelled out the nature and purpose of the study, the means of data collection, and his/her 
rights to privacy and confidentiality (appendix 2). Only those who signed the consent 
form were interviewed. The interviews were also authorised by the Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters and the University of Zambia Research and Ethics Committee (see 
appendix 3). The recordings were transcribed and used as primary data. 
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2.7 Data analysis and interpretation 
Qualitative methods were used to organise, interpret, and analyse data collected 
from primary and secondary sources as well as the interviews, as described by Leedy and 
Ormrod (1989:160-161) and Creswell (1998:153-154). Leedy and Ormrod propose a 
four-step framework for analysing qualitative data. These involve: 
First, organising the data using index cards. Second, reading through the 
entire data set several times to get a sense of what it contains as a whole. 
Third, identifying general categories or themes, and subcategories or 
subthemes as well, and then classifying each piece of data accordingly. 
Fourth, packaging the data into an organisational scheme chronologically 
and thematically (Leedy and Ormrod 1989:160-161). 
Creswell (1998:153-154) proposes four additional frameworks for analysing 
qualitative data, namely, ‘First, a detailed description of the case and its setting in which 
multiple sources of data to determine evidence for each phase in the evolution of the case 
could be examined as in the case of Zambia that presents a chronology of events.’ 
Second, direct interpretation of events in different periods which gave our case study 
research an opportunity to draw meaning from the events. Third, from this the study 
established patterns and looked for correspondence between two or more categories. And 
lastly, the study developed naturalistic generalisations and concepts from analysing the 
data, which explained why the Zambian case is different or similar to others. 
The principles outlined by these two sets of authors were used to organise, 
analyse and interpret the three types of data, and were applied as described below. 
Interpretation of the data further involved exploring the main and secondary objectives of 
the thesis. The analysis was also linked to the results of the literature review for each 
period of study.  
2.8 Advantages and disadvantages of using qualitative methodology in case 
studies 
The advantages of using a qualitative methodology for case studies are that the 
researcher obtains detailed information from all the sources mentioned above. Therefore, 
the use of interpretative methodology supported by concepts, themes and appropriate data 
provides a more complete picture of the subject matter than quantitative statistical 
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analysis, which simply tries to prove a hypothesis. Furthermore, qualitative methodology 
enables researchers to deal with complex issues using one or two concepts that are 
usually analysed in their historical context. 
The disadvantages of qualitative methodology are that it is difficult to generalise 
because of subjectivity and a dependence on context; that it gives rise to questions about 
the value of the data; and that, when dealing with sensitive issues such as the relationship 
between the government, the military, and civilians in a country such as Zambia, which 
hosted liberation movements, the authorities may regard the research as a threat to 
national unity and security. The research may therefore ‘face sanctions, political threat 
and even physical threats to the researcher’ (Scheurich 1995:1-17). 
In conclusion, this researcher firmly believed that qualitative methodology, using 
the concepts of coercive and consensual measures would add significantly to the study of 
civil control of the military in Zambia in the four different periods. This is because it 
provided a clear theoretical framework, and effective methods of data collection and 
analysis. The author also sought to contribute to the knowledge of civil control of the 
military in Africa more broadly. However, this could only be done in the context of the 
current relevant literature published by various scholars at the international and regional 
levels. Therefore, the literature relevant to this case study will be reviewed in the next 
chapter.
3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Since this study of Zambia is a pioneering one, this literature review relies 
heavily on works about civil-military relations in developed and other developing 
countries.  
This chapter examines a number of works on the theory of civil-military 
relations. It first looks at the existing literature on Zambian civil-military relations. 
Secondly, it examines the theory of civil-military relations and civil control of the 
military as developed in political science literature since the 1950s. It cites works by 
Huntington, Perlmutter, and others that give precise definitions of a professional army, 
praetorian states, and professional revolutionary soldiers. Thirdly, it examines the 
relevance of these works to the study of civil control of the military using concepts of 
either coercive or consensual measures in analysing Zambia’s four different periods of 
study. Fourthly, it moves from general theory to the studies of civil-military relations and 
control in Africa since independence. Here it contextualises the concept of civil control of 
the military in Africa, as spelled out by scholars such as Nwabueza (1981), Shillington 
(1992), Mandaza (1996) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003). Fifthly, it cites authorities such as 
Hutchful (1998), Bathily and Hutchful (1998), Luckham (1998), Cawthra (1997), and 
Williams (1998) who explain the problems of post-colonial states and the reasons why 
some countries have experienced military coups and civilian dictatorships such as that of 
apartheid South Africa. The chapter concludes by examining the literature on civil-
military relations in democratic transitions, and cite Kolkowicz (1982) in respect of 
communist states, Cawthra (1997) in respect of the South African Defence Force, 
Cawthra and Luckham (2002) in respect of transitional states, and Omari (2003) in 
respect of Tanzania. 
3.2 Existing literature on civil-military relations in Zambia 
Except for papers written for the African Civil-Military Relations Project 2000-
2002, Network III, co-ordinated by Prof Abillah A Omari of Tanzania, no major study 
has yet been produced on the nature, character, and degree of civil control of the military 
in Zambia. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa has since published 
some of these papers (Williams et al: 2003). B J Phiri has published three articles on the 
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same subject. Phiri (2003:4) argues that ‘civil control of the military in Zambia has been 
premised on the military leadership’s acceptance and recognition of the civil control of 
the defence forces since the colonial period’. He states that since Zambia’s independence 
in October 1964, a conviction developed that the majority, subject to the rule of law, 
should decide public policy. Therefore, civil control of the military has developed a 
culture that ensures that ‘decisions concerning defence policy do not compromise 
fundamental democratic values’ (Phiri 2003:4).  
Like this study, Phiri divides his study into four periods, namely the colonial 
period and the First, Second, and Third Republics. He then gives an overview of how the 
Zambian government, using objective and subjective instruments of governance, has 
managed civil control of the military in a way that has prevented domestic military 
intervention. This study acknowledges Phiri’s contribution to the study of civil control of 
the military in Zambia, since his is the first published work. However, it is important to 
note that first, Phiri’s journal and book articles were constrained in terms of number of 
words and scope of research. The result is that the articles have not been extensively 
researched as has been done in this thesis. Second, while Phiri provided a narrative of 
some events as they affected civil control of the military in Zambia in the four different 
periods, our study distinguishes itself in that it developed an original conceptual analysis 
which identifies the colonial and one party state eras as periods in which coercive 
measures became the dominant mode used by the state in civil control of the military in 
Zambia.  The study also identifies the first post colonial period and the post cold war era 
in Zambia as periods that dominantly used consensual measures in the civil control of the 
military. It is the identification of these two elements that appeared in various ratios or 
mixes in the various eras under review, with one dominant in one era, and the other in 
others, which makes the study a pioneer of thought on civil control of the military in 
Zambia and why in contrast with many other African countries after independence the 
military in Zambia consistently supported the ruling elite.  
3.3 The concept of civil-military relations: definitions 
The definition of civil control of the military is highly contested in the literature. 
Welch (1976:35) defines it as a ‘continuum of interactions that exists between civilians 
and members of the armed forces, with the result that civilian control of the military is 
never absolute, nor military control of politics ever total’. This definition suggests a civil 
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regime that keeps itself in power with clearly defined policies towards and a clear legal 
and institutional understanding with the military. 
Huntington (1957:86), on the other hand, defines civil control of the military as 
‘governmental control of the military in which the armed forces accept subordinate roles 
in the political system’. This definition emphasises the subordinate role of the armed 
forces – that is, the civil government makes policies, legalises these policies by passing 
laws, creates a Ministry of Defence and armed forces, and decides when the military 
should go for war.  While Huntington’s definition explains civil-military relations as they 
existed in developed Western States, especially in the United States of America, the same 
concepts failed to work for many African States shortly after they got their independence 
from their colonial masters in the 1960’s. Furthermore, for those countries that quickly 
realized the deficiencies of relying mainly on objective factors in civil control of the 
military, they adopted subjective methods of control under one party state which 
prevented domestic military intervention. This disproved Huntington’s definition as the 
classical one for all countries. 
Chuter (2000:27) defines civil control of the military as 
the obedience which military owes to the civis, the State. This is because 
the military is one of a number of instruments of the State, of which other 
examples are the police, the fire service, the diplomatic service and, in 
many countries, the medical service. Like these other services, the military 
has a duty of loyalty to the state, which employs it on behalf of the citizens 
and the taxpayer. The military, among its other functions, thus advises on 
the formulation of defence policy and helps to carry it out. But, it does not 
make defence policy. 
This study uses Chuter’s definition as its operational definition because it 
recognises the rule of law and the existence of civil institutions such as the executive, 
legislature, and the judiciary, staffed by public officers who are empowered by voters and 
the constitution to decide how the country should be governed. Under this democratic 
arrangement the subordination of military views to the political will is the principal issue. 
 For the purposes of this study, Chuter’s definition is further compartmentalised – 
as Huntington did – by dividing civil control of the military into objective and subjective 
mechanisms. Objective mechanisms examined include constitutional, legal, budgetary, 
parliamentary oversight, the Office of the Auditor-General, and other measures adopted 
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by parliament and the executive and enforced by the judiciary that ensured the 
acquiescence of the armed forces and the effective monitoring of their activities by the 
civil authorities. The study examines the extent to which these measures were aimed at 
ensuring that the directives issued by civil institutions in respect of the military were 
implemented. It then examines how the military authorities report back to the civil 
authorities. It takes note of the fact that although objective factors are external to the 
military establishment, they have always embodied the political and constitutional 
agreement entered into between the state and the armed forces. 
 The use of Chuter’s definition in the study of the civil control of the military in 
Zambia is complemented by the theory of ‘concordance’ as expounded by Schiff who 
challenged the practical application of Western theories of civil-military relations in the 
developing world. The predominant Western theory, as argued by Huntington (1957), 
emphasised the ‘subordination of the armed forces to a diversity of more traditional 
Western-styled checks and balances emanating from regulations, military procedures, and 
military command and control patterns and legislative oversight’. 
However, Schiff challenged this tradition with her alternative theory of 
concordance, arguing that 
‘a major conclusion of current civil-military relations theory is that the 
military should remain physically and ideologically separated from the 
political institutions. By contrast, the alternative theory argues that three 
partners, namely the military, the political elite and the citizenry should 
aim for a co-operative relationship that may or may not involve separation 
but does not require it’ (1995:7-24). 
Schiff (1995:7-24) further argued that ‘concordance theory considers the 
importance of context in studying the military and society. Some indicators, such as the 
military style and the inclusion of the citizenry as a partner, deal with the norms, customs 
and values of particular nations.’ The theory explains which 
major aspects of nations should be in agreement in order to prevent 
domestic military intervention. How a particular society achieves such an 
agreement is largely dependent upon the nature of that society, its 
institutions and its culture. That is what makes concordance theory unique: 
it causally predicts conditions for domestic military intervention without 
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superimposing a particular historical or cultural context upon a nation 
(Schiff 1995:7-24). 
In the Zambian geographical and cultural context, Schiff’s theory of concordance 
complements Chuter’s definition in two main ways in this study. First, is the general 
principle on the obedience which the military owes to the state (Chuter 2000: 27). Second 
unlike in Nigeria where the dominant ethnic group used its dominance in the military to 
overthrow civil governments, this study points out that either under coercive or 
consensual measures, the government of the day used the heterogeneous composition of 
its military personnel recruited from all its 73 ethnic groups to prevent military 
interventions, which is in line with Schiff’s arguments in her theory of concordance. 
These issues are further clarified by analysing the general theory of civil-military 
relations, to which we now turn. 
3.4 General theory of civil-military relations  
Huntington (1957) argues that the theory of civil-military relations in a developed 
Western State such as the United States implies that since the military is an instrument of 
the state, civil control of the military is premised on the effective use of objective other 
than subjective methods of control by the civil authorities. He stresses the professionalism 
of the armed forces as an objective form of control rather than a subjective means of 
maximising civilian authority over them. He cites objective methods of control as 
parliamentary oversight, budgetary provisions, and civil society operating externally to 
the military establishment and embodying the practical and constitutional pact between 
the state and the armed forces in terms of which formal control mechanisms within 
government are designed to ensure the obedience of the armed forces, and the activities of 
the armed forces are effectively monitored. 
 He further stresses that ‘it was better for the armed forces themselves to be 
prompted to promote military efficiency whilst recognising their subservience to the state, 
than impose civil values and directives to the probable detriment of military efficiency 
and ultimately national security’ (cited in Edmonds 1988:79). He further states that in 
terms of this relationship the institutional dimension of civil-military relations should be 
based on the premise that the military should remain physically and ideologically 
separated from political institutions, which he refers to as the ‘institutional separation 
model’ (ibid).  
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Under these arrangements the creation of harmonious civil-military relations is 
based upon the existence of objective instruments employed by parliament, the executive 
and the judiciary. Importantly, Huntington was writing about the factors that provided 
harmonious civil-military relations in the United States of the 1950s.  
It is important to note that shortly after independence, most African countries 
such as Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria and others that attempted to apply Huntington’s 
objective instruments of civil control of the military experienced frequent military coups. 
This means that this model of civil-military relations did not prove all that useful to the 
above countries. However, in the case of Zambia, this study argues in chapter 5 and 7 that 
the dominant application of objective (mostly consensual) measures as expounded by 
Huntington and the diffusion of the problem of ethnicity through the National motto of 
‘One Zambia One Nation’ enabled the Zambian government develop strong civil control 
over the military. This, therefore, largely differentiated the Zambian case from other 
African countries who suffered military coup d’etats.  
Perlmutter (1977) looks at the relationship between praetorianism and military 
professionalism. He rejects the determinist and idealist view of distinctions between the 
military and the civil functions of state that previously characterised the analysis of the 
relationship between the armed services and society. He appeals to a ‘fusionist theory, 
which recognised an overlap based on a symbiotic relationship between armed services 
and other state institutions in the determination of national security policy’ (ibid:4). He 
stresses that  
the old vertical relationships between governments and armed services 
have been replaced by horizontal ones, and conflicts occur not between the 
services and civilians but between corporate organisations in contention 
over the direction on national policy, resource allocation and political 
orientation (ibid:5). 
He concludes by observing that whatever the prevailing political regime or 
ideology, armed services are involved in the political affairs of all nations. Depending on 
the nature of their involvement, they can be classified into three broad groupings: ‘the 
strictly professional, the praetorian, and the revolutionary. Each rises in response to the 
type of civilian institutional authority’ (ibid:9).  
Perlmutter’s fusionist theory with its three types of military forces is relevant to 
this study, because it provides an effective conceptual framework for describing and 
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analysing potentially praetorian states such as Zambia from the time of independence to 
the reintroduction of the multiparty democracy after the end of the Cold War. However, 
in the transition from one party state to multipartism after the end of the cold war era, 
Perlmutter’s fusionist theory becomes useful as the Zambian government adopted all the 
good practices of the colonial period, first and second republics and added a strong aspect 
of parliamentary oversight in its consensual methods of civil control of the military. The 
detailed analysis on how and why these measures were implemented are explained in 
chapter 7.  
Perlmutter (1977) also argues that, true to the colonial legacy, military forces in 
the European colonies in Africa were oriented towards external conquest and domination. 
‘The military type represented two extreme faces; one of separation between the military 
organisation and the colonial subjects, and that of integration with the white settler 
community’ (ibid:92). In his analysis of the praetorian army and the praetorian state, 
Perlmutter further argues that praetorianism occurs in a state that lacks social cohesion, 
where personal desires and group aims frequently diverge. This critical analysis of how 
the colonial government used the military in the management of its racist structures 
through coercive measures is fundamental in understanding the methods of civil control 
of the military in Zambia during this period. The above analysis by Perlmutter of the use 
of coercive measures as a means of civil control of the military by the government and 
how it affected both the African and European settlers in Northern Rhodesia has been 
explained in details in chapter 4. The results of these coercive measures produced a 
synthesis which enabled the oppressed people gain their independence through the 
democratic governance.  
Perlmutter and Bennett (1980:9) define a praetorian state as one that ‘lacks stable 
and sustaining political institutions, structures and procedures, and collapse of executive 
power is imminent when the civilian government comes to a standstill in its efforts to 
achieve such goals as unification, order, modernisation and urbanisation’. They further 
state that an organised political force, one of which might be the military, may exploit the 
above regime’s vulnerability (Perlmutter and Bennett 1980:9). 
These officers intervene in politics as a result of the politicisation of a significant 
segment of the officer corps, in three main ways. First, 
a few politically or ideologically committed officers or civilians may 
infiltrate the military in search of army collaborators for a ‘civilianistic’ 
coup. Second, a new global ideology such as fascism, socialism or 
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communism may be sweeping the world and become a cause for a coup. 
And third, dramatic events that tend to politicise entire generations, such as 
anti-colonial struggles or independence movements also become major 
causes of military coups (ibid). 
In this situation the decision to intervene in politics or perform a coup d’etat is 
both political and tactical, depending on factors internal and external to the group 
involved. Here Perlmutter and Bennett’s interpretation of a potentially post-colonial 
praetorian state like Zambia is fundamental in understanding how and why the Zambian 
government’s manipulation of both coercive and consensual measures in civil control of 
the military during attempted coup d’etats and the transition to multipartism were 
fundamental to the stability of the civil government. As is explained in chapter 6, the use 
of coercive measures in the one party state era came as a result of the leadership’s lack of 
unifying solutions to the problems of the intra-party and inter-party rivalries. The study 
explains in chapter 6, as Perlmutter and Bennett do above, how a few ideologically 
committed civilians infiltrated the military in search of army collaborators for civilianistic 
coups.  
Perlmutter and Bennett’s above analysis of the relations between a praetorian 
state and coup d’etats and dramatic events that tends to politicize the entire generations 
such as the independence movements become more relevant when this study looks at the 
events leading to the re-introduction of multipartism in December 1990. In Chapter 6 this 
study demonstrates that the twin forces of the 1990 attempted coup d’etat and people’s 
pressure through food riots and pro-democracy activists to change the government 
through violent means were defused using peaceful although coercive measures. This 
enabled the government to manage the transition from a one party state system to 
multipartism peacefully as compared to other African countries such as the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.  
Perlmutter and Bennett (ibid:199-208) also argue that the ‘existence of fratricidal 
social classes, coupled with an unconsolidated middle class, is frequently considered a 
pre-condition for praetorianism. This is because the middle classes are small, weak, 
ineffective, divided and politically impotent.’ In these types of States a weak middle class 
emerges because the top group is usually divided between the rich peasants and 
commercial farmers and the ‘corporate manager who have adopted modern technology 
and manage large foreign owned industrial enterprises where the urban worker elite are 
employed’ (Perlmutter and Bennett 1980:199-208). 
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Because of the benefits that this elite receives from the system, it is little inclined 
to suffer the deprivations that the political actions designed to benefit its less privileged 
brethren may entail. Yet it is precisely these elite workers, concentrated in large 
enterprises, who are not well ‘organised’ who are responsible for the creation of a weak 
middle class and widened the gap between the rich and the poor (ibid). 
Perlmutter and Bennett conclude their analysis by pointing out that in a 
praetorian state cohesiveness, articulateness and social-economic power constitutes the 
foundation for the political influence of middle class. A struggle for power among the 
different strata of the middle class - the class, which historically has acted as the stabiliser 
of civilian governments during modernisation, creates conditions beneficial to 
praetorianism (ibid). 
This analysis of the role of the middle class in creating stable civil control of the 
military in a transitional state such as Zambia is relevant to our study. This is because at 
the time of independence the country did not have a viable middle class. This study 
therefore investigates how the post-colonial state addressed the problems of illiteracy 
among its people, including those employed in the defence force. It further examines how 
the government solved the dichotomy between educational outputs and employment 
opportunities through the nationalisation of private companies. How this helped to build a 
viable middle class between 1964 and 1991 is investigated. After 1991 the new 
government privatised three-quarters of the former nationalised parastatal organisations, 
which led to massive retrenchments. The economic hardships that the middle class went 
through brought cohesiveness of this class in Zambia who campaigned to prevent 
president Chiluba from going for his third term of office as president contrary to the 
provisions of the constitution. This point is argued in chapter 7. 
Huntington (1968:194-197) also argues that in praetorian states social groups and 
social institutions are highly politicised. He states that ‘those societies in these states lack 
political autonomy, coherence, complexity and adaptability. All sorts of social forces and 
groups become directly engaged in general politics’ (Huntington 1968:194-197). He cites 
studies of the military in modernising countries that naturally focus on its active political 
role, which distinguishes it from the military in more advanced societies. He also points 
out that ‘studies of labour unions highlight “political unionism” as the distinguishing 
feature of labour movements in modernising societies’ (ibid). Huntington’s coining of the 
concept of political unionism in the study of the political activities of labour unions is 
relevant to the study of the political pressure that the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 
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(ZCTU) leadership put on the leadership in Zambia which lead to the abolition of the one 
party state and the re-introduction of plural politics in 1990. Larmer (2006: 296) explains 
in detail the prominent role trade unions played in the Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD) whose leadership took the reins of power in Zambia in November 
1991. In chapter 6, this study explains in detail the events that led to the collapse of the 
one party state system  
Huntington further argues that ‘studies of religious organisations stress the extent 
to which the separation of church and state remains a distant goal’ (ibid). This 
observation is important for this study in the sense that after the reintroduction of 
multiparty democracy in 1991, the government declared Zambia a Christian nation. The 
government even established religious departments headed by military chaplains in all the 
security institutions in the country. The use of these personnel in the military intelligence 
units in the third republic and how this affected civil control of the military under plural 
politics has been thoroughly investigated in chapter 7.  
Huntington further states that the involvement of these interest groups is not 
peculiar to the military or any other social group, but is pervasive throughout society. 
This is because in a praetorian system social forces confront each other ‘nakedly: no 
viable political institutions or corps of professional political leaders is accepted as the 
legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflicts. Equally important no agreement 
exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving 
conflicts’ (ibid). He further observes that in these states ‘not only are the actors varied, 
but so are the methods used to decide upon office and policy. Each group employs means 
that reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities: the wealthy bribe; students riot; workers 
strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military stage coups’ (ibid). The techniques of ‘military 
intervention are more dramatic and effective than the others because, as Hobbes put it, 
when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps’ (ibid). 
Huntington concludes his analysis by observing that in a praetorian state, 
authority over the system as a whole is ‘transitory, and the weakness of political 
institutions means that authority and office are easily acquired and lost. Consequently, no 
incentive exists for a leader or group to make significant concessions in the search for 
authority’ (ibid). The transfer of ‘allegiance from one social group to another thus 
imposes the changes which individuals make, rather than by broadening of loyalty from a 
limited social group to a political institution embodying a multiplicity of interests’ 
(Huntington 1968:194-197).  
C I V I L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I T A R Y  I N  Z A M B I A  
 47
Again, while this is true of those post-colonial states in Africa that experienced 
successful military coups (such as Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo), and those that destroyed their governments (such as Somalia), this study seeks to 
demonstrate the extent to which the Zambian case was different. In all four periods under 
review, government authority over the system was managed using either coercive or 
consensual measures. Civil rulers never lost their authority; instead, it was passed on to 
the next group after each presidential and parliamentary election. 
Stepan (1980:254) argues that in the case of Brazil and most Latin-American 
countries, ‘societies are semi-elitist, semi-mobilised and semi-developed. The Church, 
labour movements and students are highly politicised. Political institutions are weak and 
the military is highly politicised.’ Therefore, since the society is praetorian, various 
groups attempt to co-opt the military in order to augment their political power. Under 
what he terms the 
moderating pattern of civil-military relations, this constant co-option of the 
military into politics rules out Huntington’s concept of a professional army 
as developed in Western countries even if hierarchical structure, internal 
differentiation and promotion patterns have been retained in these armies 
(ibid). 
Under this model, military intervention is not seen as representing the 
decomposition of the political system as expounded by Perlmutter, but a normal method 
of composition in political life. It is a system that has ‘evolved, is open and characterised 
by dual responses of civilian and military elites to particular political crises, in which both 
civilians and the military look to the military for the resolutions of the crisis’ (Stepan 
1980:257). He justifies the moderator concept by citing the Brazilian constitutions of 
1891,1934 and 1946 which stated that the role of the military in the Brazilian politics was 
twofold: Firstly, the military was a permanent, national institution specifically charged 
with the 
task of maintaining law and order in the country and of guaranteeing the 
continued normal functioning of the three constitutional powers: the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Secondly, the military was 
obedient to the executive, but significantly stated that they should only be 
obedient ‘within the limits of the law (ibid:260). 
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Stepan’s constitutionally backed moderator model of civil-military relations for 
most praetorian Latin American states is important to note. However, the study of civil 
control of the military in Zambia in the period 1964 to 1972 will take into consideration 
that Zambia was a British colony and that constitutions in Commonwealth countries 
provide for the supremacy of civil authorities over the military.  
Welch and Smith (1974) argue that the following principles are at play in 
exploring the concept of civil-military relations:  
First, no armed services are apart from a nation’s politics. Second, every 
State has armed services and a police force. Third, the needs of armed 
services for resources to fulfil their tasks are extensive, which make them 
powerful political actors. Fourth, armed services in order to fulfil their 
custody tasks are organised, cohesive, and disciplined. Fifth, the political 
influence of armed services differs between states but in each the critical 
question is not whether there is influence, but how much, or what kind, 
when it is exercised (Cited in Edmonds 1988:91).  
Using five main variables, Welch and Smith categorise and explain the relations 
between armed services and society in different states. The five variables are the extent of 
popular participation in decision-making; the strength of civil institutions; the political 
strength of the armed services; and the relationship between the military and civil 
institutions, expressed in terms of the degree to which they are separate, with integral 
boundaries, or overlap, with fragmented boundaries.  
Welch and Smith are then able to construct a matrix by cross-referencing levels 
of political participation and the political strength of the military against the relationship 
of civil-military institutions in both praetorian states, with weak civilian institutions, and 
states with civil politics where civilian institutions are strong. The strength of their theory 
lies in its ability to explain the whole spectrum of armed services’ role in politics, from 
the exercise of influence along recognised channels to the overt, direct and total 
replacement of government by military violence. Welch and Smith ‘achieved a general, 
comprehensive theory of armed services and society’ (Edmonds 1988:91).  
Welch (1976:1-38) then suggests that the five means of civilian control of the 
military have been devised and successfully utilised by various states as follows: 
1) maintaining relatively small armed forces with narrow responsibilities, where 
geographic and historical factors allow this; 
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2) exploiting ascriptive factors (eg class and ethnicity) affecting relationships 
between civilian and military leaders; 
3) utilising party controls, possibly by creating parallel hierarchies of commands; 
4) introducing constitutional constraints on the political impact of the military; and 
5) delineating a clear sphere of military responsibility, leading to the widespread 
acceptance within the armed forces of an ethic of subordination (Welch 1976:5-
6). 
Welch (1976) above matrix of the five means of civilian military control of the 
military from selected case studies in the world is used for this study for three main 
reasons. First, this study establishes the fact that during the colonial and one party state 
eras in Zambia, one of the coercive measures that were used by these governments as 
weapons for civil control of the military were the requirements for the qualifications to be 
recruited into the military. In chapter 4, this study points out that during the colonial 
period, ethnicity determined one’s qualification for recruitment into the Northern 
Rhodesia regiment. The chapter, then, explains the coercive roles the regiment played in 
civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia during this period. Similarly, during the 
one party state era, recruitment into the Zambia army depended on whether one had a 
party membership card regardless of which ethnic origin one came from. Therefore, 
exploiting ascriptive factors as a factor in civil control of the military has been 
fundamental in the study of civil control of the military in Zambia.  
Second, the concept on the utilization of party controls by creating parallel 
hierarchies of commands has also been useful in understanding the coercive measures 
used by the Zambian government in the control over the military. Chapter 7 explains how 
the establishment of military intelligence units in the military in Zambia facilitated civil 
control of the military in this period. Third, the concept of the introduction of 
constitutional constraints on the political impact of the military has also been found to be 
a useful consensual measure that determined civil control of the military in the First and 
Third Republics as explained in chapter 5 and 7. In these chapters the study spells out 
how parliament executed its legislative function of law making which in turn delineated 
the powers and responsibilities of both the civil authorities and the military. The 
observance of these constitutional obligations in turn facilitated effective use of 
consensual measures of civil control of the military in Zambia in these periods. This led 
to the wide spread acceptance within the armed forces of an ethic of subordination to the 
civil authorities. For these reasons, this study found Welch’s interpretation of some 
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methods of civil control of the military useful and uses them in interpreting the Zambian 
case.  
In the case of the Soviet Union, Kolkowicz (1967:19) argues that the dynamics 
between the Communist Party and the military establishment were characterised by 
severe curtailment of professional freedom and authority. Protect the State and the regime 
and to put down challenges to the Party’s hegemony within and without. Accept and to 
tolerate the presence of party functionaries in its midst even at the expense of interference 
with military efficiency and authority. 
As a result of these policies, substantive disagreements emerged between the 
military and the party. These were that while the  
party maintained multiple control networks in the military establishments 
with the aim of securing information, indoctrinating and manipulating the 
military with the communist ideology, controlling the professional and 
private activities of anti-party officers, the military resented and sometimes 
directly opposed any excessive pressure that substantially interfered with 
the military performance of professional duties (ibid:21).  
Whereas, during Stalin’s era, 
politically aligned military officers were appointed to sit in the highest 
party councils such as the Political Bureau, Central Committee and the 
Central Auditing Committee, during Khrushchev’s era these were reserved 
for professional officers who had demonstrated courage and ability during 
wars and were close to Khrushchev (Kolkowicz (1967:21).  
Since these officers came from different ranks, the party leaders created elements 
of uneasiness and distrust by allowing low-ranking officers to publicly criticise senior 
officers during party meetings. 
The party also maintained military intelligence units in all military forces, tasked 
with preparing daily reports on the private and professional activities of every soldier. 
These reports were used to determine the promotion, demotion, suspension, or expulsion 
of military officers. Kolkowicz concludes by pointing out that while the party attempted 
to place political military officers in commanding positions, it also recognised the 
importance of military professionalism. 
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Kolkowicz’s analysis of the relationship between the Communist Party and the 
military authorities in the Soviet Union is relevant to our study because, after Zambia 
became a one-party state in 1973, the government changed its policies on military 
training and weapons procurement. More officers were sent for military training to the 
Soviet Union, China, and other Communist countries. At the same time the Communist 
countries supplied Zambia as well as the liberation movements based in that country with 
sophisticated military equipment. This relationship, amongst other domestic factors,  
made Zambia adopt measures of civil control of the military that were similar to 
communist ones, as we explain in chapter 6.  
In line with Kolkowicz’s observations, we will examine the use of coercive 
measures by the ruling party to extend its political control over the military and its 
officers during the one-party era. The impact of the Zambian government’s shift from 
alignment with the West to the East on party-military relations during that era will also be 
investigated. Kolkowicz’s observations in respect of the Soviet Union, where he recorded 
the creation of paramilitary organs within the military, such as the military intelligence 
and party organs, which acted as eyes and ears of the civil political authority, will be used 
as a guide to analysing the Zambian situation in the one-party era, during which the 
government survived three military coups, due largely to the activities of military 
intelligence, which supplied the president with timely information. 
Having examined the applicability of the professional, communist, liberal and 
aristocratic models as expounded by Huntington (1957), Kolkowicz (1967), Welch 
(1976) and Perlmutter (1977) respectively, the next section of the literature review 
examines the relevance of Zambia’s civil-military relations to Africa. 
3.5  Civil-military relations in Africa 
The nature of civil-military relations in transitional African states since the 
beginning of decolonisation has been based on the premise that military intervention 
frequently outweighs the electoral process as a means of regime change. As such, every 
African post-colonial leader had to ‘grapple with the complex and delicate process of 
nation building, since the post-colonial State itself was a nation in the making’ (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2003:21). 
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The post-colonial state was also fragile and based on poor political, economic, 
and social foundations. As such, its first priority was its ‘security, or rather the security of 
those who assumed power’ (ibid). Moreover, the post-colonial state faced the 
challenge of constructing a nation state from people of diverse ethnic, 
cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. This meant that it had a 
mammoth task of facilitating a situation where hitherto previous enemies 
could co-exist and identify themselves with the new nation in the making. 
The poignant reality is that the post-colonial state is prone to conflict by its 
very nature, particularly intra-state conflict … Given this fragility and 
insecurity where the security of the state itself rather than the people was 
the priority, it would have been over-ambitious to expect genial civil-
military relations (ibid).  
This study takes note of the fact that Mandaza and Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s analysis of 
a post independence state was viewed largely through the political developments that 
have characterized the post independence Zimbabwean state under President Robert 
Mugabe. Some of these developments were the post -independence massacre of the 
Ndebele people by the Zimbabwe Shona-dominated army in 1983.  The forceful removal 
of Zimbabwe’s whites from their farms since 1998 is also a point in mind. In this case, 
therefore, Mandaza and Ndlovu-Gatsheni should have also emphasized the continued 
abuse by President Robert Mugabe of security and land legislation inherited from the 
colonial regime which negatively affected civil control of the military in the case of the 
postcolonial Zimbabwean government.  
Our analysis of the case study of Zambian’s civil control of the military is 
different from that of Mandaza and Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s above despite the fact that the two 
countries experienced similar challenges. This is because in our opinion, whilst the 
Zimbabwean government continued using colonial coercive measures in finding solutions 
to its ethnic problems, the Zambian government adopted consensual measures in 
harmonising it 73 ethnic groups in the immediate post colonial period. While the 
Zimbabwean army was largely dominated by the Shona ethnic group, under consensual 
measures, recruitment into the Zambia army reflected the ethnic composition of the 
country’s 73 tribes. The successful harmonization of the political elite, the military and 
the citizenry in Zambia, as argued in chapter 5, in terms of political power and civil 
control of the military through consensual measures makes the study of the Zambian case 
fairly unique to a large extent, in Africa. 
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Decalo (1991:72-74) provides an understanding of the sources of stable civilian 
rule in 12 African countries, including Zambia, between 1960 and 1990. He explains that 
the dynamics of civil-military stability were determined by seven concrete control 
strategies. The first was the continued use of the colonial policy of the preferential 
recruitment of certain ethnic groups into the armed forces. The second was the 
establishment of armed paramilitary structures that monitored the activities of the regular 
army. The third was the ‘appointment to key military and police command posts of 
members of the head of state’s direct family’ (ibid:72). The fourth was the appointment of 
expatriates to structures monitoring the loyalty of the armed forces, or to serve as a buffer 
against military intelligence and presidential guards (ibid:73). The fifth was external 
guarantees of military support in case of domestic military intervention, especially in 
former Franco-phone countries. The sixth was systemic legitimacy on the basis of 
economic and political achievements. The seventh was economic ‘payoffs’ to the military 
as a corporate group and to key individual officers within it (ibid:74). This study notes 
Decalo’s contribution to the holistic understanding of the sources of stable civilian rule in 
both Francophone and former British colonies in Africa. However, in the case of Zambia,  
this study disproves Decalo’s first point, on the continued use of the ‘colonial policy of 
the preferential recruitment of certain ethnic groups in the armed forces’ through the use 
of consensual measures. The non-application of this policy makes the Zambian case 
different from some other African countries. The study also disapproves of the French 
government’s practice of providing external guarantees of military support in their former 
colonies in cases of domestic military intervention. This is because external guarantees of 
military support has sometimes prevented these governments from developing indigenous 
solutions to problems of ethnicity which has been one of the major causes of military 
coup d’etats and civil wars in some African states. This is despite the fact that, whereas 
the British supported Nigeria during the Biafran war and intervened shortly after 
independence in Tanzania to put down a coup, at the invitation of President Nyerere, the 
same gesture has not been widely practiced in other former British colonies including 
Zambia.  
Hutchful and Bathily (1998:i-xiii) provide conceptual definitions of a state and 
regime. They demonstrate that in Africa the variety of political military relations in 
transition from colonialism to independence or self-government has brought out three 
major scenarios.  
The first consists of independent governments where civilians have successfully 
retained control over the military and the state through parliamentary, judiciary and 
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executive civil controls, and have maintained their monopoly over the instruments of 
force. The second involves cases where the state retains its monopoly over the 
instruments of violence, but where control over these instruments has shifted from civil to 
military hands. The third occurs when the state has lost its ability to claim a monopoly 
over the instruments of force, bringing the very integrity of the state into dispute (ibid).  
They then conclude that the management of different policies and political 
responses to institutional-cum-political crises in various African countries as a result of 
domestic military interventions made scholars realise that ‘the management of intra-
military relations and accommodation among different military divisions was probably as 
important as accommodation between civil and military power blocs in the successful 
management of the civil control of the military’ (Hutchful and Bathily 1998:i-xiii).  
Like Welch and Smith, Hutchful and Bathily manage to provide a holistic 
analysis of the nature and character of civil-military relations in states under both military 
rule as well as those under civilian governments in Africa. Previous examples of Ghana, 
Nigeria, Congo-Kishansa, Zimbabwe and Tanzania are sufficient to illustrate these 
authors’ analysis. In some countries – such as Zambia and Tanzania – led by civilian 
regimes, coercive subjective control mechanisms such as military intelligence officers in 
all military units were utilised, helping those regimes to prevent any military intervention 
in domestic politics. In those countries – such as Ghana – that strictly followed the 
Western professional military ethos, the military took advantage of the lack of military 
intelligence officers and overthrew civilian regimes. 
Luckham (1998:1-8) argues that the analysis of civil-military relations in African 
states in transition requires ‘an integrated approach, drawing on the empirical strengths 
and analytical insights of both mainstream and critical or neo-Marxist modes of enquiry’. 
He criticises analyses that characterise the military in African states as ‘managers of 
modernity’, in line with attempts by Eastern and Western countries during the Cold War 
era to either contain imperialism or communism; these attempts, he argues, only served to 
politicise armies and hinder the development of effective democratic methods of civil 
control of the military. 
He states that ‘primitive accumulation by both the military and political 
leadership in Africa led to the non-implementation of the promises and expectations of 
independence’ (ibid). This situation therefore changed the focus of civil-military relations 
in Africa from the military as managers of modernity towards Third World praetorianism, 
political decay, and a political order characterised by crumbling military establishments 
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and derailed development. He further argues that notions of the state ‘as a repressive 
apparatus, monopolies of force, and practices of power can help scholars explain the 
evolution of civil-military relations in a broader sense in African states’ (ibid:8). 
Using this approach, Luckham suggests that a focus on the notion of authoritarian 
rather than simply military rule, and on the purpose (such as an accumulation of surplus 
worth or of power and hegemony) for the entire ensemble of repressive apparatuses, such 
as the police, paramilitary, military, and military intelligence, and not the military alone  
can advance an analysis beyond the limited concerns of forces of the civil-
military relations approach to deal with fresh issue such as the armed 
forces under non-military and military autocracies; violent transitions other 
than coups; and the factors persuading authoritarian regimes to transfer 
powers back to democratic governments (Luckham 1998:8).  
This method of analysis is relevant especially when one contextualizes it into this 
study’s concepts of coercive and consensual measures in determining the democratic 
nature of a State. Despite the fact that a state might be under civilian control, its methods 
of governing some ethnic groups might be so ruthless that it can be worse than a military 
government. An example of such a state in Southern Africa is Zimbabwe under President 
Robert Mugabe, and its treatment of the Ndebele people in Matebeleland in 1983 and the 
eviction of white settlers from their farms after 1998. Zambia’s situation differs from 
those in other former British-ruled African countries such as Ghana, Congo and Nigeria 
where, shortly after independence, the military successfully intervened or overthrew 
democratically elected governments and assumed power. Despite the fact that similar 
tensions emerged in Zambia immediately after independence the effective use of 
consensual measures provided solutions to these problems. We will therefore briefly 
examine some of the literature relating to these countries’ experiences of civil control, as 
well as the case of Botswana where democratic, consensual measures of control were 
exerted.  
3.5.1  Botswana 
Another African country that has experienced stable civil-military relations is 
Botswana. Molomo et al (2007: 61-79) have argued that Botswana has been a functional 
stable liberal democracy since independence. Its involvement in regional security co-
operation comprised the use of ‘peace means diplomacy and negotiations to the use of 
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force’ and this changed depending on the president who was in power.  Therefore during 
president Seretse Khama’s period the government concentrated on the economic 
development of Botswana through its customs co-operation with South Africa. He, 
therefore, to a large extent did not provide active support to the liberation movements and 
‘avoided military confrontations’ (ibid: 76). However, with the establishment of the 
Botswana Defence Force in 1977, president Masire’s government developed civil-
military relations that involved the country in direct military intervention in regional 
affairs and peace-keeping activities. President Mogae’s government on the other hand 
examined the country’s geo-political situation and developed a civil-military policy that 
promoted the common principle of stability and prosperity in the region as the basis of 
security. Hence Botswana’s use of peaceful methods in settling the Botswana-Namibia 
dispute over the ‘ownership of the shifting sands of the Sedudu Island in the Chobe river 
through both countries acceptance of the decision of the international court of justice’ 
(ibid: 1976). Similarly at regional level, Botswana’s involvement of the Southern Africa 
Development Community intervention in Lesotho in both 1994 and 1998 in response to 
the deteriorating political situation in that country was done to ensure Botswana’s own 
security and that of its neighbours.  
The study of Zambia’s civil control of the military has taken note of the context 
of security developments as they evolved in Botswana. However, as stated above 
Botswana’s civil-military relations can largely be studied in the context of liberal 
democracy which this study terms as consensual measures. Zambia’s case is different 
from that of Botswana in many ways. This is because the country was not only an active 
supporter of liberation movements but used both coercive and consensual measures in its 
civil control of the military in the four different periods under study.  
3.5.2 Ghana 
Shillington (1992:6-7) argues that Kwame Nkrumah’s efforts to build a new 
Ghanaian state were guided by the ultimate ‘aim of universal education and health 
facilities, combined with high-quality water and sanitation, affordable housing for all, 
wide access to electricity, and rapid industrialisation combined with agricultural 
expansion’. Despite the Nkrumah government’s achievements, which made Ghana the 
envy of much of independent Africa, the problems of a transitional state were reflected in 
high levels of corruption, inter-party and intra-party rivalries, a personality cult, and the 
detention of political rivals. Other coercive tendencies that characterised the Nkrumah 
regime included abuses of the independence of the judiciary, parliamentary reduction of 
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the military budget in 1966, and a failure to transform the leadership of the military from 
a Western to a socialist orientation. These tendencies led to antagonistic relations between 
the military, the political elite, and the citizenry, with the result that, on 24 February 
1966, senior police and military officers overthrew Nkrumah’s regime. 
 Price (1971), on the other hand, examines the role of foreign factors in the coup, 
and argues that the training of the African officer corps at military academies such as 
Sandhurst in Britain and St Cyr’s in France resulted in the problem of emulation that 
affected these officers’ relations with post-colonial civilian political authorities as well as 
in their capacity as government leaders (Price 1980:323-330). This resulted in the 
creation of a praetorian state, and antagonistic civil-military relations.  
Price (1980:327) points out that ‘when the officer corps of a nation’s military 
organisation, its symbol of independence and sovereignty, identifies itself strongly with a 
political unit other than the one it officially serves, serious consequences for the stability 
of the state are likely to ensure’. He states that in the former colonial state, the officer 
corps is most likely to share the disdain for politicians, as taught at Sand Hurst and other 
metropolitan military academies but also is likely to ‘share its contempt for leaders of the 
anti-colonial movement, men who subsequently become the leaders of the governments 
under which these officers serve’ (ibid). 
He further states that this breeds tension in civil-military relations if the leaders of 
the ‘new state are oriented toward nationalistic policies as opposed to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Western oriented dictated policies’. He further points out that since 
nationalist policies are likely to ‘conflict with the officers’ psychological commitments to 
foreign reference groups, the officers have usually been influenced to organise coups 
against their governments’ (ibid). 
He then adds that, in the Ghanaian case, this phenomenon was responsible for the 
breach between Nkrumah and his officer corps. On three occasions, Nkrumah’s major 
policies of supplying Ghanaian troops to solve the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence problem in Southern Rhodesia and participate in the United Nation’s 
mission in the Congo crisis as well as accept military aid from communist countries  were 
opposed by senior Ghanaian military officers (ibid).  
Bennett (1980:344-354) explains that ‘Ghana, between the 1966 coup and the 
1972 coup d’etat, was governed by a civilian government led by Kofi Busia who received 
the reigns of power in a smooth handover of power from the military in October 1969’. 
He points out that, except for a strike in September 1971 by port workers in protest 
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against the ‘introduction of a development levy and a new Trade Union Act, this 
leadership did not experience any incidents of violence, riots, student demonstrations nor 
open quarrels among the leading political figures’ (ibid:347). However, the main cause of 
the military take-over appeared to be the ‘refusal by the government, in the face of the 
deepening economic crisis, to accede to the financial demands of the military in the July 
1971 budget tabled in the House by the Minister of Finance’ (Bennett 1980:347).  
The budget did not provide sufficient allocations for the navy and the air 
force. The result was that half of the total number of military vehicles was 
not roadworthy. ‘Free water, electricity and telephone allowances 
previously enjoyed by officers were discontinued. As a result of these 
measures the military overthrew the Busia civilian Government on 22nd 
January 1972’(ibid:349). 
It is clear from the foregoing that even if the prerequisites for a praetorian state 
were absent in the Busia government, the economic crisis alone, caused by the 
conditionalities attached to IMF loans, pushed the military into a corner. The situation 
was worsened by the failure of the military to co-operate with the civilian government on 
the need to meet the IMF conditionalities. This led to the coup of 1972. 
3.5.3 Congo 
Williame (1980:356) argues that at the time of independence Congo (Kinshasa) 
was ruled by a ‘political bourgeoisie who used public offices as major sources of wealth 
and prestige through the control over the instruments of power such as the legislative 
assemblies, administration and government’. However, civil control of the military could 
not be achieved and eventually collapsed in 1965, leading to the overthrow of Patrice 
Lumumba’s government by Lieut-Col Joseph Mobutu. The coup had various causes. 
Firstly, Lumumba’s government had failed to contain tribal nationalism which was 
characterised by ‘urban groups and communities competing against each other over 
economic and other employment opportunities other social economic differentiation 
originated by the process of colonisation itself’ (Williame 1980:360). 
Secondly, the country lacked one or two strong political parties with widespread 
support. Instead, ‘one hundred and fifty political parties organised along ethnic lines all 
competed to form a government in one country’ (ibid:361). And thirdly, the army – the 
Force Publique, later renamed the National Congolese Army, which during the colonial 
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period was the ‘most integrated and efficient repressive body – mutinied in July 1960 and 
later broke up into five different fragments’ (ibid:360). These were the South Kasai State 
Constabulary, the army of the independent state of Katanga, the National Congolese 
Army of Stanleyville, the National Congolese Army of Leopoldville, loyal to its 
Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Joseph Mobutu, and numerous military units who formed 
private bodyguards receiving orders directly from the local ruler (ibid:361).  
Finally, a political shift to the left led by President Joseph Kasavubu after 
attending the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) conference October 1965 made 
military officers fear that the ‘government could be strong enough and decide to fire all 
the officers who participated in the army mutiny in 1960. For these reasons the army 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Mobutu overthrew Lumumba’s regime in November 
1965’ (ibid:368). The case of Congo again is important for our study because Congo’s 
ethnic composition was almost similar to Zambia. However, lack of a clear national 
policy on the unity of all Congolese ethnic groups resulted in the overthrow of the Patrice 
Lumumba regime. Why this did not happen in Zambia as explained in chapter 5 makes 
the Zambian case a special one to examine. 
3.5.4 Nigeria 
In the case of Nigeria, Nwabueze (1981:161-200) argues that a military 
intervention in domestic politics was prompted by a struggle for power between the 
federal government and regional states; the dominance of the northern Hausa-Fulani 
ethnic group in the federal government; religious rivalries between Moslems, Christians 
and animists; and the unequal distribution of oil revenues.  
This was manifested in the ‘assassination of the Northern and Western Regional 
States Prime ministers as well as Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Federal Prime 
Minister, in 1960’. Despite this action the loyal forces under the General Officer 
Commanding the Nigerian Army (G.O.C), Major General Aguiyi-Aronsi, quickly rallied 
the rest of the army against the coup organisers and crushed the coup (Nwabueze 
1981:161). 
However, the lack of a federal prime minister which could hold the government 
together as well as problems of regionalism and tribalism prevented remaining ministers 
from electing a new federal prime minister who could effectively crush the coup d’etat. 
The result was that on  
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16th January 1960, Dr Nwafor Orizu, the Acting President, informed the 
nation that acting on behalf of the Council of Ministers surrendered the 
administration of the country to the armed forces of the Republic under 
Major General Ironsi. He wished the new administration would ensure the 
peace and stability of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that all citizens 
would give them their full co-operation (ibid:162).  
This amounted to a voluntary abdication of power by the civil government and an 
abrogation of the republican constitution, which led to the replacement of a civilian 
government by a military regime with absolute authority. 
Events in Ghana, Nigeria and the former Zaire clearly demonstrated the 
inadequacy of conventional western models for maintaining civil control over the military 
in most African countries. In the immediate post-independence period, and the one-party 
state era, the Zambian government survived all attempted military coups d’etat. It 
managed to do so by learning from the governance mistakes of Ghana and Nigeria, and 
carefully manipulating both coercive and consensual measures of control over the 
military. However, despite this, most one-party states and military regimes in Africa did 
not escape the post-Cold War collapse of socialist states. The reintroduction of plural 
politics required a new approach to controlling the military. How the new governments in 
Africa and Latin America managed civil-military relations during their democratic 
transitions and the relevance of these transitions to Zambia is the subject of our analysis 
in the next section. 
3.6 Civil-military relations in democratic transitions 
Silva (2003) argues that the reordering of government-military relations in post-
authoritarian Chile faced historical, constitutional and political obstacles. Remaining 
ideological divisions among the left and right made it difficult to restructure government-
military relations in line with democratic values. Investigations of abuses by the former 
military regime under Gen Augusto Pinochet were opposed by 40 percent of the right-
wingers, as well as their parliamentary representatives (Silva 2003:118). Similarly, the 
constitution inherited from the Pinochet regime ‘guaranteed a tutelary role for the armed 
forces in the country’s political development’ (ibid:102). For instance, the 1978 amnesty 
law does not allow the criminal prosecution of military personnel; the National Security 
Council, made up of military officers, supervises government performance; And the 
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president has no power to change the chief of the armed forces (ibid:103). Silva’s analysis 
of the Chilean obnoxious constitutional provisions that worked as obstacles to the 
implementation of harmonious civil-military relations in Chile is relevant to the study of 
civil control of the military in the Zambian case. This is because this study demonstrates 
that from the colonial period up to 2001 when president Chiluba handed over power to 
president Mwanawasa, all the governments returned the constitutional provisions related 
to the preservation of public security as passed by the Northern Rhodesia legislative 
council. The study explains that all the Zambian presidents that ruled this country except 
president Mwanawasa abused the use of these constitutional provisions to prosecute 
political opponents. This, therefore, makes Silva’s analysis of the Chilean situation 
relevant to the study of the Zambian case. 
Luckham (2002:1) argues that in a ‘transitional state, democratisation, especially 
after the end of the Cold War, introduced new forms of militarism, violent conflicts and 
insecurity and globalised violence’. He qualifies this by stating that 
before the end of the Cold War the nature of the civilian control of the 
military was such that civilian autocracies had often depended just as much 
upon military and police repression and surveillance by intelligence 
agencies as did military dictatorships (ibid:7). 
He then cites reasons why some attempted democratic transitions slip into violent 
conflict. These are  
a loss of state (and military) legitimacy that lead to public disorder, and 
contradictions of development, including structural violence that have also 
caused conflicts rooted in conditions of poverty and social exclusion. Other 
reasons have been the misuse of ethnic mobilisation and the tribalisation of 
security as makers of economic, social and political exclusion and this has 
caused conflicts (ibid:24-26). 
These are the coercive factors that Perlmutter, Bennett and Huntington define as 
the features of the praetorian state. This study’s examination of coercive measures used in 
the study of civil control of the military during the colonial and one party state  eras in 
Zambia makes Luckham’s analysis relevant to the study of civil control of the military in 
Zambia.  
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Omari (2003) notes that Tanzania provides one example of an African country in 
which favourable civil-military relations facilitated a smooth democratic transition. He 
argues that key influences over civil-military relations in Tanzania had nothing to do with 
the established ‘aristocratic (or feudal), liberal (or traditional), communist (or penetrating 
or totalitarian), or professional models, but was as a result of a coherent and flexible 
policy that has been able to adjust to the prevailing political circumstances’ (ibid:90-91). 
He explains that harmonious civil-military relations in Tanzania following 
independence resulted from the involvement of a large section of the population in 
defence and security matters – a process he describes as ‘total national defence and 
security’ (Omari 2003:102). He further explains that the government averted military 
coups by co-opting army officers into civilian spheres of administration. The ruling party 
also took steps to penetrate the army (ibid). Continued use of this practice under 
democratic governments has placed Tanzania and most former socialist countries in an 
interesting position. Meanwhile, Omari contends that this ‘bureaucratisation of the 
military or militarisation of the bureaucracy’ by former socialist countries in Africa has 
continued under plural politics, and has helped to stabilise civil-military relations. He 
concludes by asking whether the continued application of Tanzania’s ‘total national 
defence and security is viable in the current multi-party setting’ (ibid:105). 
Omari’s analysis of the evolution of harmonious civil-military relations is 
relevant to our understanding of the Zambian case since both countries have had similar 
systems of governments to date. However, what makes the Zambian case different from 
that of Tanzania is the system of governance and analytical tools used to describe the 
method of civil control of the military in each country in the different periods of study. 
Our opinion is that first, both countries used coercive and consensual measures in civil 
control of the military during the colonial and the immediate post independence periods 
respectively. Second, during the one party state period, both countries again used coercive 
measures characteristic of socialist regimes in this era, in civil control of the military. 
Hence Omari’s conceptualization of Tanzania’s civil-military relations has been 
determined by the process of ‘total national defence and security.’ However, the 
fundamental difference between the Zambian case and that of Tanzania can be observed 
in the nature, character and practice of civil control of the military in the post cold war 
era. In this period, the nature of regime change was such that, unlike in Tanzania, where 
the former ruling party won the first multiparty elections and remained in government, in 
Zambia the former ruling party lost the first election. The retention of the former ruling 
party in Tanzania did not necessarily compel the new leaders to drastically change the 
C I V I L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I T A R Y  I N  Z A M B I A  
 63
coercive measures of civil control of the military as practiced in the one party state era. 
Hence Omari’s classification of the stable post cold war era civil- military relations in 
Tanzania as ‘total national defence and security interpreted as bureaucratisation of the 
military or militarisation of the bureaucracy under plural politics.’ In Zambia, contrary to 
the Tanzanian situation in this period, the party and government adopted consensual 
measures and introduced professionalism in the military by separating the military and 
party functions, while maintaining a formal interaction among the political and military 
elite as well as the citizenry.  Hence this study contends that while Tanzania continued to 
a large extent to use the one party state coercive measures in civil control of the military 
in the post cold war multiparty era, the Zambian government to a large extend used 
consensual measures with strong input from the executive and the legislature as argued in 
chapter 7, which makes the study of the Zambian case a special one. 
Hutchful (1998) argues that little attention has been paid to the military 
dimensions of the democratisation process in Africa. He points out that if democratising 
regimes and societies in Africa are to retain successful civil control of the military, with 
newly elected governments re-establishing civil supremacy, inculcating respect for 
democratic values, and improving military efficiency and capability, there is a need to: 
restore and sustain civil supremacy over the military through legislative 
and executive powers following periods of military rule; issues of military 
privileges and prerogatives ranging from the political and constitutional 
powers must be clearly defined; the role and mission of the military 
including functions in relations to internal security must be redefined in the 
military doctrine, force levels, appropriate institutional structures and 
relationships, and equipment types and levels (Hutchful 1998:600). 
Hutchful’s argument is important as it implies that, given the traumatic 
transitional political experiences of African states such as Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Uganda, all African states should clearly specify status and internal and external roles 
of their national defence forces in their constitutions, as was done in South Africa after 
the transition to democracy in 1994. The study of civil control of the military in Zambia 
shows that both the external and internal roles of the military were clearly defined in 
Article 101 Part VII of the 1991 constitution. 
Cawthra and Luckham (2002:2), on the other hand, point out that in 
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 transitional states, democratic control of military and security institutions 
is strategic to democratisation because these institutions have a peculiarly 
intimate relationship to political power. Secondly, their security functions, 
including the management of insecurities that may be generated by 
democratisation, are essential for the survival of any democratic state.  
They further argue that  
standard policy and governance recommendations falling under the 
security sector reform rubric only stand a chance of success where the State 
has remained functional during the transition, and its security institutions 
have remained largely intact, even if degraded by authoritarian imperatives 
or complex transitions (ibid:4). 
They summarise the challenges of security sector reform in the transition from 
authoritarianism as: 
1) Depoliticisation of the military and its subordination to civilian authority, 
including the establishment of an effective defence ministry, and effective 
parliamentary oversight. 
2) Reorienting and reprofessionalising the military, including redefining its mission 
and roles. 
3) Demilitarisation of public order policing and police reform, including 
reorientation of the police towards civil crime fighting. 
4) Balancing the demands of the national defence with those of development. 
5)  Ensuring that the military, police and security agencies operate under the 
constitution and within the rule of law, and are held accountable for human rights 
violations. 
6) Engaging the international community in the security sector reform programme 
(Cawthra and Luckham 2002:7). 
Cawthra and Luckham’s above observations were to a large extent incorporated 
as part of the consensual measures that were implemented by Zambia’s post cold war era 
democratic government under the security sector reform program. As argued above when 
comparing the Tanzanian case from that of Zambia, Cawthra and Luckham’s analysis of 
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democratic control of the military and security institutions in post cold war era 
transitional states assisted this study to analyse this period in chapter 7. 
Cawthra (1996:33) also provides a history of the South African defence forces 
and then clearly explains the military reforms that facilitated the transition from apartheid 
period to the new South Africa. He states that the  
new reforms categorically stated that the nature and composition of the 
security forces and control by civilians was to be bound by the principle of 
civil supremacy and subject to public scrutiny and open debate and be 
accountable and answerable to the public through a democratically elected 
Parliament (ibid:33-35). 
He goes on to state that political control over the military was established through 
a collaborative relationship between civilians and the military. In this relationship, the 
constitution provided for the 
President to be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces even if his 
powers to deploy the defence forces, and declare the State of National 
Emergency, have to be approved by parliament. Political responsibility for 
defence became the responsibility of the Minister of Defence. Parliament 
was given powers to approve the defence budget, review its expenditure, 
consider and authorise major policy decisions such as those relating to 
arms trade, weapons procurement, international treaties, doctrine, 
deployment and the system of personnel procurement (Cawthra 1996:60-
65).  
Parliament was also given power to constitute the combined 
Senate-National Assembly Joint Standing Committee on Defence 
composed of all parties holding more than ten seats in the National 
Assembly, and with places allocated proportionately according to the 
national vote. This Committee had powers to investigate and make 
recommendations regarding the budget, functioning, organisation, 
arrangement, policy, morale, and state of preparedness of the National 
Defence Force (ibid). 
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Each time the committee met, it called upon senior officers and managers in the 
defence industry to reply to questions about the implementation of government policies. 
Cawthra’s study (1996) demonstrates that South Africa developed one of the most 
comprehensive transitional programmes in defence, and that its civil control of the 
military is one of the best in the Commonwealth. This study examines the South African 
government’s transitional programme for defence, and implications for civil control of 
the military. Since both countries followed consensual measures, the study of the South 
African case helps this study to identify gaps in Zambia’s transitional strategy, and 
consequently make recommendations on how civil control of the military in Zambia may 
be improved in the third republic. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this literature survey and synthesis was to examine the relevance 
of these theories and interpretation of civil military relations to the understanding of the 
core focus statement of this study. This is ‘to ascertain why in contrast with many African 
countries after independence-the military in Zambia consistently supported the ruling 
elite.’ Using the analytical concepts of coercive and consensual measures, the study has 
ably argued the relevance of each author cited here to the study of the Zambian case in 
the four different periods under examination. We have also explained why the Zambian 
study of civil control of the military is a special case that is worthy studying and 
contributes substantially to the understanding of civil-military relations as they developed 
in the world and Africa in particular. 
As noted earlier the most appropriate method of understanding civil control of the 
military during the colonial period in British colonies is through the analytical concept of 
coercive measures. The antagonism that the same measures caused became a synthesis 
that stimulated nationalist struggle and attainment of independence. The analysis of the 
colonial period begins by explaining that in this era the military was oriented towards 
external conquest and domination, and ‘the military type represented two extreme faces; 
one of separation between the military organisation and the colonial subjects and that of 
integration with the white settlers’ (Perlmutter 1977:92). This clearly demonstrates that 
the European colonies were aimed at strategic and material conquest. Consequently, 
whether in Africa, Australia or the United States, civil-military relations demonstrated 
high level of integration between the white settler communities, European powers, and 
the colonial army, but a high level of separation with the conquered indigenous 
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communities. In countries where the white settler community outnumbered the 
indigenous people – such as the Australia and the United States – civil-military relations 
resulted in complete domination by the white settler community, military, and 
government. When these settler communities unilaterally declared independence, as in 
the United States in 1876, retained the colonial coercive measures as they related to civil-
military relations. Hence the dominance of the liberal-aristocratic model of civil-military 
relations, as expounded by Huntington (1957), in these countries. 
However, the creation in Africa of independent white settler states that 
discriminated against Africans through coercive measures provoked anti-colonial 
struggles against those minority regimes. In those countries, civil-military relations had 
two faces: a high level of integration between the government, white settlers and the 
military on the one hand, and highly antagonistic relations with Africans on the other. 
The undemocratic nature of the colonial regime in Northern Rhodesia and its use of 
coercive measures is ably argued in chapter 4 and summarized in the taxonomy chart at 
the end of this chapter. 
 Where anti-colonial struggles were intensified, resulting in those countries being 
granted independence, the colonial powers did not adequately train nationalist leaders to 
assume oversight of defence and security. As our taxonomy chart at the end of this 
chapter demonstrates, the white civilian regime in colonial Northern Rhodesia made 
effective use of the military to enforce the racially discriminatory policies passed by 
parliament, implemented by the executive, and interpreted by the judiciary in favour of 
the white settler community. This in turn bred anti-colonial struggles by Africans, 
resulting in the constitutional abolition of colonial rule in 1964. This ushered in the 
immediate post-independence era in Zambia – that of the First Republic – to which we 
now turn. 
After gaining their independence, countries such as the United States, New 
Zealand and Australia continued following the liberal model of civil-military relations. In 
Africa, however, civil-military relations assumed different forms in different countries. 
The bulk of the literature surveyed shows a fundamental shift from the culture of liberal 
democratic tradition or what this study terms as consensual measures to coercive military 
coups in most West, Central and North African countries. This was as a result of what 
Price (1980:323-330) terms the ‘emulation paradox by the African officer corps of 
Western military institutions and policies in comparison to those of the new African 
states’. In these countries, therefore, civil-military relations have mainly been 
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characterised by the military’s systematic erosion of democratic values; blatant violations 
of human rights (Shillington 1992:6-7); and disrespect for the institutions of parliament, 
the judiciary, and other national constitutions. The situation is even worse in stateless 
countries like Somalia, where the military has completely lost control over the institutions 
of governance. However, Decalo (1991:67-68) points out that literature on political 
stability in countries with relatively stable civil regimes, such as Zambia, Tanzania and 
Kenya, is scanty. In these countries, not only have civilian authorities resumed or 
entrenched their control over the military, but civil-military relations have changed 
peacefully, without necessitating a violent military takeover. This study ably argues that 
the systematic use of either coercive or consensual measures in the immediate post 
independence or one party state eras was responsible for these countries stability in civil 
control of the military. Hence the choice of Zambia for this case study, and its potential 
contribution to the study of civil control of the military in Africa. The study further draws 
attention to Welch’s five means of civilian control of the military that have been 
successfully utilised by various states throughout the world (1976:56). In this chapter we 
analyse Welch’s three of the five  means of civilian control of the military to either fall 
under coercive or consensual measures. The taxonomy chart at the end of this chapter 
shows the adaptability and changing patterns of Zambia’s methods of civil control of the 
military, along the lines suggested by Welch and this study. It demonstrates – as 
explained in chapter 5 – that civil-military relations were guided by consensual measures. 
For example, when parliamentary oversight over defence expenditure threatened local 
and regional interests, this parliamentary oversight was curtailed in favour of direct 
presidential resource allocation. These measures were followed by a transition away from 
the consensual liberal-democratic model of civil-military relations to coercive controls in 
a one-party state, via the establishment of the a department of military intelligence that 
gathered information at all military establishments. This brings us to an examination of 
control over the military in one-party states, and the relevance of this analysis to Zambia. 
Literature on civil-military relations in one-party states includes Kolkowicz’s 
analysis of communist-style leadership in the Soviet Union (1967:19-21). This was 
marked by the introduction of coercive controls of the military as well as the general 
citizenry, via military intelligence as well as party representatives in all military 
establishments. These policies were vigorously pursued because of the Cold War tensions 
between the two superpowers, namely capitalist America and communist Russia. Given 
this tension, it did not matter whether an African country has a military, liberal, or 
socialist regime, as long as it aligned itself with one of the superpowers. Consequently, 
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civil-military relations took three forms. The first was those countries that followed the 
consensual liberal model as expounded by Huntington (1957), such as Botswana as 
explained by Molomo et al (2006: 61-79). The second was those countries that adopted 
the coercive socialist model as expounded by Kolkowicz (1967), such as Zambia. The 
third was those countries that adopted hybrids of both the communist and capitalist 
models and became centres of Cold War-sponsored civil wars, such as Angola and 
Mozambique. Zambia adopted the socialist approach between 1973 and December 1990, 
largely due to its foreign policy position of providing bases to liberation movements 
fighting right-wing minority regimes elsewhere in Southern Africa. Hence its adoption of 
coercive controls of the military as the most appropriate way of surviving as a civil 
government in the Cold War era. 
Therefore, in the taxonomy chart and our findings in chapter 6, we demonstrate 
that in the one-party state, parliamentary oversight over defence and security was not 
effective. As in the Soviet Union, executive control of the military was guided by one 
party, UNIP, and this was done via coercive controls. The civil authority had eyes and 
ears in the military and among the general citizenry that helped it to foil all attempted 
military coups d’etat. Consequently, the policing and judicial system also played an 
effective role in arresting, prosecuting, and sentencing coup plotters. These measures 
enabled the one-party state to maintain good relations between the ruling politicians, the 
military, and the citizenry. This situation continued until the end of the Cold War when 
most one-party states in Africa, including Zambia, changed their system of governance to 
consensual plural politics. This brings us to core issues in the literature on civil-military 
relations in the post-Cold War era, characterised by democratic transitions. 
Analysts have focused on three main aspects of civil-military relations in the 
post-Cold War era. Decalo (1991) and Omari (2003) examine how former one-party 
states with civil governments managed the transition from the coercive controls over the 
military typical of those regimes to those of plural politics. The study argues that in 
countries like Zambia and not Tanzania major factors include the abolition of party 
controls over the military and replacing them with an ethos of professionalism, via the a 
process of depoliticisation. Second, Hutchful (1998) examines how former military 
dictatorships – such as Ghana and Nigeria – managed transitions to plural politics. Major 
factors included returning uniformed men to their barracks, and establishing strong 
executive, parliamentary, and judicial oversight over defence and security. Third, 
Cawthra (1996:33) examines the unique case of South Africa, a white settler colony 
granted independence by Britain in 1910. However, it had to manage a transition from 
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white minority rule to an inclusive democracy. Major factors were the particular nature of 
this transition as against those in other African and Latin American states, and even the 
United States. 
Drawing on these, we demonstrate that, in the case of Zambia’s third republic, 
the core issues were the introduction of strong consensual measures through the 
executive, parliamentary and judicial oversights over defence and security, supplemented 
by reforms of the structural and behavioural policies inherited from the last two republics. 
These had to be adapted to suit civil-military relations under plural politics. 
These are the policies, we argue, that enabled Zambia to remain under civil 
control in the period under review. On the basis of this literature review, and the 
conceptual frameworks extracted from it as outlined above, we now proceed to our 
detailed examination of the situation in Zambia in each of the four periods under review. 
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TABLE 1: CHANGING PATTERNS OF CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN ZAMBIA: 1900-2004 
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 Parliamentary oversight Executive control Judicial control Structural reforms Behavioural controls Nature of civil control 
Colonial Period 
1900-1963  
Effective for whites  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Effective for whites 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Effective against Africans and 
breeds anti-colonial struggles 
 
  
Policy of racial discrimination 
establishes formal institutions 
that determine civil control of 
the military.  
 Policies of racial 
discrimination breeds anti-
colonial struggles among 
Africans 
 
 
  
Relationship between whites, government 
and military harmonious while that with 
Africans antagonistic as determined by 
coercive measures. 
First Republic 
1964-1972 
Multiparty Constitution 
 Effective up to 
January 1970 
When defence 
expenditure put 
Under presidential 
control for regional 
security reasons 
  
Effective since Office of the 
President determined 
allocation of resources to all 
Defence and Security 
Institutions 
  
 Not effective Determined by the executive 
 
 
Begin to be established 
through the department of 
Military Intelligence  
  
Relationship between government, military 
and citizens harmonious as determined by 
consensual measures . 
 
 
Second Republic 
1973-Dec 1990 
State Constitution 
 Not effective 
 
 
  
Guided by the One Party 
UNIP 
 
  
 Effective against the 1980 and 
1990 coup plotters  
  
 Reinforced by the one party 
state policies and 
supplemented by behavioural 
controls  
  
Party penetration through  
(i) Military Intelligence 
(ii) Party functionaries in 
military 
(iii) Defence and Security 
Committees at National, 
Provincial & District levels.  
Relationship between government, military 
and citizens harmonious through 
implementation of one party state coercive 
measures. 
 
 
 
  
Third Republic 
1991-2004 
Multiparty Constitution 
Very effective 
 
Leads to 
professionalisation of 
the army 
 
  
Very effective 
 
Leads to professionalisation 
of the Army 
 
 
 
  
Very effective against Zero option 
plan and 1997 coup plotters & 
plunderers of Defence resources. 
Leads to accountability over 
Defence and security expenditure 
  
Restructured to suit plural 
politics and 
professionalisation policies in 
the Defence force 
 
  
 Restructured to suit plural 
politics & professionalisation 
policies in the Defence force 
 
 
  
Relationship between government, military 
and citizens harmonious relations through 
combination of strong consensual 
executive and parliamentary controls . 
 
 
4 CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN BRITISH-RULED 
NORTHERN RHODESIA, 1900-1963  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we argue that civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia 
was based on coercive measures through racial structures applied to political, economic 
and social affairs which gave the military two faces: one white and one black. One was 
white in the sense that the interaction between white settlers, the ruling political elite, and 
the military was a harmonious one, and served the interests of the colonial settlers and the 
British Imperial government. The other was black in the sense that the economic, political 
and social interaction between the ruling elite and the military on the one hand and 
indigenous Africans on the other was an antagonistic one, that endured up to 1963. This 
discriminatory system was administered by four institutions: the governor, who was the 
executive head of government, commander of the armed forces, and imperial 
representative in the colony; an executive council, that made government policies; a 
legislative council, that made laws; and the judiciary, that enforced and interpreted those 
laws. 
The nature of the colonial dispensation in Northern Rhodesia was largely 
determined by the way in which the British South Africa Company (BSAC) conquered 
and colonised the territory, and the system of administration it introduced.  
4.2 The conquest and colonisation of Northern Rhodesia by the British South 
Africa Company (BSAC), 1900-1924 
The conquest of North-Western Rhodesia (NWR) by the British government 
through the BSAC was done on the basis of collaboration by the Litunga of Barotseland, 
who signed the 1889 Ware Concession, the 1890 Lochner Treaty, and the 1900 Coryndon 
Treaty. Based on these, the British government granted the BSAC a charter to extend its 
rule from Southern Rhodesia to Northern Rhodesia. North-Eastern Rhodesia (NER), on 
the other hand, resisted colonial intrusion by force of arms until 1897 when Chief 
Mpezeni’s impis were crushed by superior British military forces. Following the complete 
conquest of both NER and NWR, the two territories were amalgamated into Northern 
Rhodesia in 1911. 
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4.3 Establishment of the BSAC Police Force 
The establishment of a BSAC Police Force in both North-Western and North-
Eastern Rhodesia followed the British colonial policy of differentiation and divide and 
rule. Welch argues that British colonial strategies generally centred on the recruitment of 
soldiers from so-called ‘martial peoples, not necessarily drawn from the territory they 
were to defend. These groups became closely linked with the maintenance of British 
power, which they upheld without questioning the external government control of the 
military’ (1976:15). He attributes this loyalty to the British government to four factors, 
namely the 
dominance of British soldiers in the commissioned and non-commissioned 
ranks; the recruitment of the rank and file from areas untouched by 
‘Nationalist agitation’; rotation of units to reduce ties with the local 
population; and the isolation of politically conscious natives within the 
armed forces (ibid). 
He further describes the plight of the colonial soldiers as  
one of armed and somewhat privileged helots compelled by circumstances 
to serve their foreign masters in conquering and subjugating their fellow 
Africans, usually from other ethnic groups. Consequently, the local civilian 
populace often regarded members of such armies as hated and despicable 
tools of the white conquerors. The civilian control thereby maintained 
rested in the hands of foreign minority benefiting from the coercive 
strength of soldiers schooled in obedience and often little else (ibid:16).  
All these legacies worked to create a conflict situation between the white settlers, 
their government, and the military on one hand, and the African population on the other. 
Under these circumstances, civil control of the military firmly favoured the interests of 
the white settlers in Northern Rhodesia.  
Under BSAC rule, Sir Harry Johnson, Imperial Commissioner in Nyasaland and 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, created the basis for the effective colonisation 
of Northern Rhodesia by crushing slavery and the slave trade in what later became North 
Western and North Eastern Rhodesia (see Hall 1968:83; Gibbons Report 1900:23; 
Brelsford 1949:3). This was done after the British government had recruited volunteers 
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from the Indian colonial government to serve in the Nyasaland military force. Upon 
arrival in Nyasaland, the Indian forces were used to stop the slave trade and subject 
Northern Rhodesia to British administration. In this way the commercial and financial 
interests of the BSAC in Northern Rhodesia were effectively entrenched and protected. 
The Indian forces slowly began to infuse the Northern Rhodesia police force with 
the doctrines and control mechanisms they had learnt from their colonial masters in India. 
The gradual indigenisation of the police force, supervised by Indian Sikhs, and 
commanded by English officers, was a combination of the  
British colonial military tradition followed in British India of recruiting 
from the ‘warrior race’ or ‘martial people’ or ‘non use of the locals’ and 
also the need for reliability, loyalty, and subordination among African 
infantry soldiers and carriers led by British colonial officers (Perlmutter 
1977:118). 
In July 1895 Nyasaland became the British Central Africa Protectorate, and was 
separated from the BSAC areas. The Sikh forces were withdrawn from ‘Northern 
Rhodesia even if the Nyasaland police force were still required to do gendarmerie type 
roles and the territorial defence of all the BSAC’s spheres of influence north of the 
Zambezi river’ (Brelsford 1949:4). It is important to note that the Nyasaland military 
police forces acted on the instructions of the Board of Directors of the BSAC, with the 
permission of the British High Commissioner in South Africa, relayed to Sir Harry 
Johnson, Resident Commissioner in Nyasaland, who was also commander-in-chief of the 
police forces. Therefore, right from the outset, all the forces that carried out gendarmerie-
type roles in BSAC-ruled territory fell under civil control. 
After the separation of Nyasaland, and for ease of administration, the area 
remaining under BSAC control was divided into two areas: North-Eastern and North-
Western Rhodesia. 
4.4 Establishment of the North-Eastern Rhodesia Police Force 
In North-Eastern Rhodesia BSAC officials began to ‘recruit their own police as 
soon as the Nyasaland forces withdrew and some of the Nyasaland forces joined the new 
North-Eastern Rhodesia constabulary, as the force was called’ (Brelsford 1949:5). 
Numbering some 210, this force was tasked with protecting tax collectors. It also 
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‘guarded the property of the government and native prisoners, escorted caravans, carried 
messages from the administration officials to native Chiefs, and effected any arrests of 
natives that was required’ (Codrington 1901:75-76).The police were only stationed at 
posts manned by a European official. These included Serenje, Fife, Nyala and Mirongo in 
Chambezi district; Abercorn, Katwe, Mporokoso and Sumbu in Tanganyika district; 
Kalungwishi, Choma and Kazembe in Mweru district; Kasama in Awemba district; and 
Fort Jameson (Codrington 1901:75-76). These posts established effective BSAC 
administrative control in North-Western Rhodesia.  
 In April 1903 the BSAC decided to recruit 
75 Ngoni young men to take up appointment as police officers under the 
North-Eastern Rhodesia Constabulary. However, after graduation, instead 
of serving in North- Eastern Rhodesia, these officers were posted for 
service to North-Western Rhodesia (NAZ 1903).  
This was in line with the British military policy of using officers from one ethnic 
group to police others, thus reducing their ties with the local populace. Similarly, some 
white and native police officers recruited in North-Western Rhodesia were posted to 
North- Eastern Rhodesia. The was aimed at avoiding the problem of revolt and resistance 
experienced in 1897 when the native police force failed to suppress the Ngoni people’s 
uprising against BSAC rule. 
Brelsford (1954:65) also notes that 
as a principle, Angoni from the Eastern Province were always posted to 
Kasama in the Northern Province and Bemba from the north to Fort 
Jameson in the east. This was to ensure that in the event of trouble, Askari 
would not have to fire on fellow tribesmen.  
Also in 1903, the ‘BSA Company further recruited 300 Ngoni men as police 
officers and sent them for service in the Mashonaland Native Police’ (Clark 1904:1). 
4.5 Establishment of the North-Western Rhodesia Police Force 
The establishment of police posts and administrative centres at Lealui in Mongu, 
Monze, and Kaunga in Kaleya was undertaken by white officers commanded by Col 
Colin Harding. However, the successful establishment of administrative centres in North-
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Western Rhodesia ran into problems because most white officers suffered or died from 
tropical diseases such as malaria. Further, the costs of maintaining 50 white officers was 
far higher than that of maintaining 220 native policemen (Harding 1899). Harding 
estimated the cost of maintaining 50 white police officers in North-Western Rhodesia in 
1900 as 12 800 pounds sterling. This included salaries; rations and transport; uniforms; 
horse, forage and saddles; the transport of canteen goods; and hospital comforts. 
In the same year, Harding estimated the cost of maintaining 220 Native police in 
North-Western Rhodesia in 1900 as 5 327 pounds sterling. This included salaries, rations, 
salt, and uniforms (Harding 1899). He pointed out that the Native police could live 
mainly on local produce, thereby saving transport costs of two pounds ten shillings per 
100 pounds of foodstuffs. Natives required no horses, were more disease-resistant, and, in 
case of emergency, could walk through the whole country without transport or provisions 
of any kind, obtaining their food from kraal to kraal (ibid). He further advised that ‘apart 
from police duties the natives could be utilised to carry the mail to and from Bulawayo, 
do fatigues in and about their camp, make roads and thus, to a great extent, save the 
employment of native labour’ (ibid). 
In 1899, on the basis of Harding’s advice, the BSAC phased out detachments of 
white officers in North-Western Rhodesia and established a force consisting of 
predominantly indigenous people who were accustomed to local weather conditions and 
could eat local foodstuffs. Named the Barotse Native Police, the force was authorised by 
proclamation of 1901 by the then High Commissioner for South Africa. In the 
proclamation, the Barotse Native Police was ‘established, officers were authorised, 
powers of punishment and jurisdiction laid down, and officers were empowered to adopt 
such measures as could have been necessary for the safe custody and conveyance of all 
prisoners’ (Brelsford 1949:5). 
Recruitment for the Barotse Native Police followed was British colonial policy of 
divide and rule. Out of 73 ethnic groups in North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia, 
recruitment was restricted to the Barotse, Tonga Plateau, Bemba and Ngoni tribes. These 
men were supervised by Indian Sikhs and commanded by British officers. 
The Barotse, Tonga and Bemba were selected for recruitment to reward them for 
collaborating with the colonists during the in conquest of North-Western and North-
Eastern Rhodesia. The Ngoni, on the other hand, were selected because they were thought 
to be good warriors (Brelsford 1954:20).  
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 Members of the Barotse Native Police were trained as soldiers, and proved that 
they could obey military instructions in respect of the handling of weapons; preserving 
peace, order, and the rule of law among native communities; and the conduct of warfare. 
The force successfully took over the duties previously performed by white BSAC police, 
and enforced law and order among the native communities. The BSAC in turn continued 
its administrative and developmental duties in North-Western and North-Eastern 
Rhodesia using minimum resources and without any serious resistance from local people. 
Despite being paid less than their Indian and white colleagues, the native military 
police forces in Northern Rhodesia observed the British and Indian military tradition of 
carrying out effective operations as ordered by the civilian commanders of the armed 
forces. These were the BSAC representatives, the British High Commissioner in South 
Africa, and his representative in Northern Rhodesia. As in North-Eastern Rhodesia, the 
BSAC representative continued to account to the BSAC administration and the colonial 
office in London for the estimates, procurements, and expenditures incurred by the force 
(NAZ 1926). 
These native policemen became the backbone of colonial rule. They enforced 
colonial regulations such as hut, dog, and bicycle taxes, and recruited able-bodied men 
for migrant labour in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. They also enforced the 
movement of Africans from land alienated for white settlement to native reserves. Given 
this, they were hated by many Africans. 
4.6 The amalgamation of North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia 
In August 1911 the Proclamation of Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council, 1911 
amalgamated North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia into one territory known from 
then on as Northern Rhodesia. Section 20 of the order provided for the 
raising and constitution of a police force for Northern Rhodesia by 
proclamation. the High Commissioner [then] published the 1912 
proclamation and recognised the North- Western and North-Eastern 
Rhodesia police forces as the official forces for the territory (Northern 
Rhodesia Government 1911:1). 
The 1912 Proclamation provided for the ‘establishment and maintenance of a 
new force of police known as the Northern Rhodesia Police’ (Northern Rhodesia 
C I V I L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I T A R Y  I N  Z A M B I A  
 
 79
Government 1912:1). Brelsford (1954:25) notes that ‘the fact that the Northern Rhodesia 
Police was a military organisation was borne out by section 7 of the Northern Rhodesia 
Proclamation No. 17 of 1912’. The 1912 Proclamation provided that 
in case of any war or other emergency, members of the force could perform 
either police or military duties within the limits of the Northern Rhodesia 
Order-in-Council 1911, or within the limits of the Southern Rhodesia 
Order in Council, 1898 and when so employed, was subject to such terms 
and regulations as the High Commissioner could determine (Northern 
Rhodesia Government 1912:1).  
The 1912 Proclamation further provided that: 
The limits of the 1911 Order in Council, Section 4, envisaged military 
action only within the boundaries of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. All 
members of the Barotse Native Police and North- Eastern Rhodesia 
Constabulary were automatically transferred to and enrolled as members of 
the Northern Rhodesia Police (Northern Rhodesia Government 1912:2).  
The Administrator of Northern Rhodesia was given the power to appoint the 
commandant, inspectors, and other officers of the Northern Rhodesia police, with the 
approval of the High Commissioner. The Administrator was also given the power to alter 
or rescind regulations related to the enrolment, promotion, reduction, transfer, discharge 
or dismissal of any member of the force (ibid:16). All the other responsibilities of the 
civil administrators, from those that the BSAC administration instituted in the military 
police forces, under its administration, were inherited and continued to be used by 
successive governments in the colonial period. These included the British colonial 
administration between 1924 and 1953 and that of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963. 
4.7 Impact of BSAC land and labour policies on civil control of the military in 
Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1924 
While the BSAC governed Northern Rhodesia in the period 1900–1924, it 
introduced a range of coercive measures such as the land and labour policies that 
favoured the economic interests of white settlers and discriminated against Africans, 
preventing them from utilising the same facilities for their own economic advancement. 
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The separation of the economic and social interests of white settlers and Africans was 
enforced by the Company police, who also had military responsibilities, and were 
authorised to use firearms.  
By 1920 colonial policies in respect of labour, land, and economic development 
in Africa were already formulated, and widely applied throughout the continent. British 
colonies were no exception. In Kenya, South Africa, and Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia, Africans provided a reservoir of labour in ‘agriculture, industry, railway and 
road construction. In East Africa the African was the agricultural producer who was paid 
low wages which were fixed by the government and the Indian middleman’ (Kiwanuka 
1970:47). In these colonies the ‘settler had the most violent laws in terms of land 
expropriation and segregation. Africans were forced to move into the reserves as if they 
were a peculiar species of mankind’ (ibid:41). The key question for the present study is 
what effect the policies of land alienation had on Africans in Northern Rhodesia, and how 
this impacted on civil control of the military. Kiwanuka argues that: 
These land policies had little difference in the overall effect upon the 
African peoples. Whether in Kenya, Rhodesia or the Belgian Congo, it was 
the least productive part of the land that was left to the African. Nothing is 
more misleading than when statistics of acres of or square miles of 
alienated lands are dangled before our eyes. This is because large areas of 
African land were unsuitable for cultivation. Not only were they infested 
with tsetse fly but were either deficient in water or were located in semi 
desert or rocky areas (Kiwanuka 1970:41-44).  
In conjunction with land alienation, Kiwanuka argues that ‘colonial regimes with 
European settlers operated their compulsory labour laws on the basis that the government 
had an obligation to the settler farmers because land was no good without labour’ 
(ibid:37). Therefore, settlers wanted their governments to recruit labour for them. ‘Lord 
Demere argued at the Assembly in 1908 that all government officers be directed and be 
strictly required to encourage the native to seek labour and to do their utmost to assist 
those who require it’ (ibid:37-40). Hence the District Commissioners, professional 
European labour recruiting agencies, and African chiefs implemented policies of forced 
labour that adversely affected Africans economically. 
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Kiwanuka points out that ‘whatever the local differences may have existed, they 
were obscured by the overwhelming common characteristics of suffering to which the 
Africans were subjected to’ (ibid:39-40). These included  
deaths in labour recruitment camps, on the journeys to and from places of 
work and during employment. Famine and starvation were also 
experienced due to the depletion of African villages of food producing 
populations. Then, there was the psychological impact itself of doing a job 
one did not want, of separating families for months and sometimes years. 
Apart from this the wages were low, deliberately fixed so that the African 
could not save and he could consequently be forced to return to the distant 
farms and mines of the white man (ibid).  
How these land and labour policies affected Africans in Northern Rhodesia 
between 1900 and 1963 and their impact on civil control of the military is the subject of 
the next section. 
4.8 Labour demands on Africans, land alienation, famine, and civil control of the 
military: 1900-1924 
The colonisation of Southern Rhodesia and the development of mines and farms 
affected the development of African agriculture in Northern Rhodesia as well. In 1890 
white settlers in Southern Rhodesia established mines and commercial farms using capital 
loaned from the BSAC. These developments required large numbers of African labourers. 
The Southern Rhodesian government solved the problem of labour shortages by 
alienating Africans from their land, and then imposing hut taxes. Thus Africans who had 
lost their land and could not raise money for hut tax from subsistence farming were 
forced to enter wage employment in whites’ mines and farms. These developments 
created centres of worker population that stimulated agricultural and industrial 
development in Southern Rhodesia. 
Growing demands for African labour in Southern Rhodesia prompted the BSAC 
to introduce hut tax in North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia, in 1901 and 1903 
respectively. Hut taxes were also used to help finance the colonial administration. These 
taxes were collected in forceful and even brutal ways. Brelsford (1954:19-22) reports that 
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members of the Barotse Native Police who were armed and trained as 
soldiers accompanied Company officials on the first tax collecting tours in 
areas such as the Zambezi valley, and little or nothing in the nature of civil 
police duties was undertaken. During these tours the Company police 
subjected hut tax defaulters to cruel punishments such as flogging, 
imprisonment and burning of native dwellings.  
Brelsford further notes that in ‘1906 Harding retired from the post of 
Commandant for no other reason other than his recusant to the burning of native 
dwellings as a punishment for alleged hut tax defaulters’ (ibid:22). Under these 
conditions, African men in Northern Rhodesia had little choice but to leave their families 
behind and travel to Southern Rhodesia to seek work (Vail 1977:137). Under these 
circumstances, many Africans came to hate the Company labour policies, and the 
Company police, and an antagonistic relationship developed between the Company 
police, District Commissioners, and African communities. 
Despite the introduction of hut tax in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia still 
did not have enough African labour. The need to achieve its labour targets for rapidly 
developing Southern Rhodesian industries and the construction of Cape to Cairo 
rail/road/telegraph networks prompted the BSAC to accelerate land alienation in Northern 
Rhodesia. At the same time, it began to encourage whites to settle in Northern Rhodesia. 
The first land to be taken from Africans was in ‘North-Eastern Rhodesia in 1895 
when the Company created the North Charterland Exploration Company and approved 
the grant, a concession of 10,000 square miles of land’ (NAZ 1895). After the Ngoni 
resistance was crushed in 1897 the ‘Company passed the 1900 Regulations which vested 
all land in North-Eastern Rhodesia in the Chartered Company’ (Hall 1968:90). 
Accordingly, in ‘1907, the Company delimited the Ngoni Native Reserve that was 43 
miles in extent’ (Colonial Office 1938:57). Siamwiza (1998:251) states that in ‘Chilanga, 
Lusaka Province, between 1915 and 1916, 93,000 acres of the best land were alienated 
for European agricultural production. By 1922, 9,160,000 acres had been alienated for 
European occupation in the same area. … This gave each European farmer 4,250 acres 
against 176 per African who occupied an area with very little land with surface water.’ 
In North-Western Rhodesia the 1900 Coryndon Treaty gave the BSAC 
administrative and judicial powers to make grants of land for farming purposes in any 
portion of the Batoka and Mashukulumbwe areas. By 1910, land in the Southern Province 
had been divided into three categories, namely the ‘railway strip that covered 830 square 
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miles; Crown land that covered 524 miles; [and] portion of Reserves No. 10, 11, and 12 
that covered 2 945 miles’ (Read 1931–2:10). These demarcations were undertaken by the 
Survey Department, supported by Company police. From 1914 onwards Crown land and 
the railway strip were reserved for occupation by white settlers, and land in the Native 
Reserves for occupation by Africans. In 1912 Native District Commissioners throughout 
Northern Rhodesia were directed to order Africans living on Crown land to move to the 
Native Reserves. Those who had not yet moved were instructed to leave their homes on 
Crown land after the 1914 harvest (Griffin: 1958:1-38). 
The Reserves were ‘over-crowded with livestock and human beings, contributing 
therefore to excessive soil erosion, poor crop yields, famine and death’ (Palmer 1983:93-
96). The anticipated settlement of whites on Crown land did not take place immediately. 
Throughout Northern Rhodesia, most areas designated as Crown land reverted to bush, 
and became a habitat for baboons, wild pigs and elephants. Their destruction of crops 
worsened food shortages in the reserves, and populations of wild animals near human 
settlements brought the problem of tsetse fly. This led to the rapid spread of 
trypanasomiasis, which decimated the cattle population in the Eastern and Southern 
provinces of Northern Rhodesia in particular. As a result, Brelsford (1954:66) notes, the 
paramilitary branch of the BSAC police established a ‘Barotse cattle cordon from 
Sesheke to Mwengwa on the Kafue in May 1922, through 186 miles of uninhabited bush. 
It was a straight cut, on compass bearings. Later the line was shortened to come closer to 
Namwala.’  
Despite these dire conditions, District Commissioners, accompanied by Company 
police, continued to demand hut tax. This forced able-bodied young men to migrate to 
travel to Southern Rhodesia for wage employment. Relations between Company officials 
and police on one hand and Africans on the other continued to worsen, and this trend was 
further accelerated by demands for military labour and food during World War I, which is 
the subject of the next section. 
4.9 The demand for military labour and food requisitions from Africans in 
Northern Rhodesia: 1914-1918 
Siamwiza (1998:148) notes that when the ‘First World War broke out in 1914 
Northern Rhodesia had a problem of undeveloped agricultural industry, shortages of 
transport and poor communication systems. Settler agriculture failed to take off because 
of lack of markets as the copper mines had not yet been opened. Since the settler farmers 
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could not provide food for the war the Company administration depended on African 
production which was at subsistence level.’ 
The movement of troops, food and war equipment was also very difficult. 
Hostilities in southern Africa took place on the border with German East Africa, which 
was more than eight hundred miles away from the nearest railway line. This meant that 
supplies had to be carried by African porters known as Tenga Tenga. These were 
recruited in tens of thousands. Groves (1964:66) states that whereas the Union of South 
Africa recruited 35 000 African men for non-combatant duties in German South West 
Africa, Northern Rhodesia recruited 41 000 first-line military porters for service in 
German and Portuguese East Africa. Lucas (1958:287) also reports that  
Northern Rhodesia supplied African runners and cyclists to maintain lines 
of communication until emergency telegraph lines could be set up. Out of 
all these the runners beat both cycle and motor cycle, carrying some 
messages by relay with day and night travel a distance of 450 miles in six 
days.  
The demand for African labour during World War I had far-reaching 
‘implications for labour and food and food availability among the Africans in Northern 
Rhodesia throughout the war’ (Siamwiza 1998:148). Labour recruitment and food 
requisitions began in Northern, Luapula and Eastern provinces immediately the war was 
declared. Siamwiza states that there were 
1,200 African troops with 200 messengers and scouts on the border with 
Tanganyika at the end of 1914. By 1915 the number of troops increased to 
2,000. Because of poor transport and communication systems all patrolling 
columns were accompanied by hundreds of carriers who carried war 
equipment and ammunitions as well as food, water and other essential 
commodities for the troops (ibid).  
Initially, the supply of labour for war purposes was undertaken by Native District 
Commissioners. However, when Africans began evading recruitment by living in the 
bush and hiding their food in caves, the colonial authorities turned to their traditional 
collaborators, the African chiefs, for food and labour. If chiefs refused or failed to 
perform these tasks, they lost their appointments and official recognition. The need to 
recruit more men for war purposes and the impact of the war on administrative expenses 
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forced the ‘Company government to increase tax in 1915 from 3 shillings to 5 shillings in 
North-Eastern Rhodesia and from 5 shillings to 10 shillings in North-Western Rhodesia’ 
(Siamwiza 1998:152). 
At the war front, several thousand carriers suffered terribly from diseases such as 
dysentery and influenza. Hall, citing Michael Gelfand, writes: 
 It was most unfortunate that this great contribution to the war effort by the 
porters should be accompanied by such huge losses, for the death rate 
amongst them was higher than could possibly have been anticipated. Lack 
of food was an aggravating factor. Because of bad weather and lack of the 
male folk to raise crops the majority of Africans who returned from service 
in the Lundazi sub-district of the Luangwa district arrived in a pitiable state 
of emaciation due to starvation and dysentery. In October 1918, an 
influenza epidemic swept the country, causing many more deaths. It was 
reported to be so serious that all forms of transport were paralysed (Hall 
1968:102). 
It is clear from the foregoing that the demands for labour and food to fuel the 
military campaign had a very negative economic and social impact on African 
communities. African communities came to view the colonial army as a vehicle of 
starvation, disease, and death. White settlers, on the other hand, viewed it as an integral 
part of the colonial regime whose function was to assist them in the political, economic, 
and social exploitation of indigenous people and the resources of Northern Rhodesia. 
How Africans reacted to land alienation, hut tax, and military labour demands, and its 
impact on civil control of the military, is dealt with in the next section. 
4.10 African reaction to land alienation, hut tax and labour 
Africans responded to these oppressive policies by refusing to pay hut tax, 
antagonising settler farmers, and killing chiefs who collaborated with the colonial regime. 
In 1912, colonial authorities in Kasempa convicted three natives for murdering fellow 
villagers and sentenced them to be hanged. Chiefs, headmen and villagers were invited to 
watch the hanging. Hall (1968:97) reports that the ‘execution had a sobering and 
restraining effect on the Bakaonde for a considerable time.’ 
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In the same period in Kasempa district, Africans refused to pay hut tax to the 
Native District Commissioner and also refused to obey any regulations issued by the 
colonial government. According to Brelsford (1954:66), the government reacted by 
sending a 
patrol of two officers and sixty native rank and file with two Lewis Gun 
Sections who left for Kasempa on 15th August 1923, on orders from the 
Administrator. The patrol was effective and the most chastening effect, 
especially with the demonstrations given of Lewis gunfire. The patrol 
returned on 16th November 1923, having covered 1,180 miles.  
This brutal use of force by the colonial government gave Africans a highly 
negative impression of the role of the military in the governance of Northern Rhodesia. 
They realised that the consequence of refusing to pay hut tax was a military assault that 
could result in the loss of lives.  
Dispossessed Africans who worked on settler farms on former Crown land in 
order to earn cash wages for hut tax were very negatively disposed towards their work 
and their masters. A white farmer at Nega Nega in the Mazabuka district vividly reflected 
this when he wrote to the administrative secretary of Northern Rhodesia that  
the attitude of the natives towards the white man is unpleasant and 
menacing, and their labour less efficient than formerly and very 
untrustworthy, and in the writer’s opinion steadily getting worse. A native 
possibly suffering from the effects of smoking Indian hemp may become 
threatening and abusive in his manner at any time, offering to fight white 
men causing a general disturbance (NA Z 1926).  
It can be safely argued that these factors resulted in starvation in the reserves, and 
that this forced Africans to steal food crops from and hunt game on settler farms. When 
called upon by settler farmers to stop the practice, 
Africans in the Mazabuka area organised themselves into groups armed 
with spears and clubs and frequently attacked the white farmers while 
shouting and making offensive gestures. In the event that the white farmers 
were not armed, these native armed gangs were quite offensive and 
dangerous. Other gangs of Africans waited for trains at railway sidings and 
engaged in stone throwing (ibid).  
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The colonial government responded with coercive administrative and military 
measures. Between 1920 and 1926 the government, through the District Commissioners, 
registered all firearms in the hands of Africans. This enabled the police to trace the 
owners of any firearms dropped or captured during an assault on white settlers. All 
unregistered firearms were confiscated, and the importation of more firearms was 
regulated via customs regulations (NAZ 1926). 
In the Central, Northern and Luapula provinces Africans reacted to land 
alienation, hut tax, and the demands for labour and food for war purposes by joining the 
Watch Tower Movement led by Mwanalesa. This movement preached against the 
colonial laws; European settlers and white missionaries; chiefs and headmen; and the 
uselessness of cultivating crops that would end up being donated to troops fighting white 
men’s wars. 
In its constitution the Watch Tower Movement called for 
 Passive resistance to government; refusal to work, and if compelled, to 
accept payment and refuse to pay hut tax; that converts are released from 
all obedience and respect of chiefs and headmen; many things in the Bible 
are untrue, and the European Missionaries conceal much that is true from 
the Africans (NAZ 1926). 
On the basis of these principles many ‘settlers, chiefs and headmen in the Central, 
Northern and Luapula provinces were murdered by the Watch Tower Movement for 
working with the colonial authorities against Africans and on the pretence that they were 
witches’ (Brelsford 1954:66). 
In 1926 the colonial government reacted to African resistance to its coercive land 
and labour policies as well as the activities of the Watch Tower Movement by mobilising 
the paramilitary wing of the Company police. Brelsford (ibid) states that: 
In 1926 strong patrols from Livingstone, Kasama and Fort Jameson 
converged on Serenje and made extensive tours through the areas that had 
been disturbed by the activities of Mwanalesa. He was a watchtower 
prophet whose activities became anti- European and who had murdered 
many natives in the Congo and Northern Rhodesia. He was hanged with 
two others, having been charged with the murders of thirty- two Northern 
Rhodesian natives, and convicted. The patrols, consisting of four Officers, 
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one British Non-Commissioned Officer and 150 Africans under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stephenson, were some of the strongest ever sent out. 
Throughout Northern Rhodesia the troops carried out demonstrations and 
tactical schemes in the presence of chiefs and people who had been called 
to watch. The patrols were done under active service conditions and 2,500 
miles were travelled between June and August. 
The 1926 patrols taught rebellious Africans that resistance to white settlers and 
the colonial government and its officers could have extreme consequences. This was 
especially important since all the local chiefs, headmen, women and children were given 
an opportunity to witness field firing and other demonstrations that gave them an 
opportunity to realise the effects of gunfire.  
While the BSAC continued to function in a corporate way in order to make 
maximum profits from its colonies, the British government finalised its policies of 
indirect rule in Africa. How the British government terminated the BSAC mandate over 
Northern Rhodesia and used the Legislative Council, Judiciary and Executive – including 
the military – to management labour, land, and nationalist policies, and its implications 
for civil control of the military, is examined in the next section. 
4.11 Civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia as a British Protectorate: 
1924-1963 
In 1924 the British government terminated the Company charter to administer 
Northern Rhodesia and declared the territory a British Protectorate. Sir Herbert Stanley 
became the first colonial governor of Northern Rhodesia. As in Uganda, the colonial 
regime adopted a policy of indirect rule. Kiwanuka (1970:78) states that the ‘founder of 
indirect rule was Lord Lugard. Indirect rule then as a system of administration was based 
on the use of an indigenous authority or power for the coloniser.’ As has already been 
mentioned above, it was far cheaper, for instance, to employ an African because even if 
he did the same job twice as efficiently, he was always paid much less than his European 
counterpart. Being a mere functionary, ‘the African always did his best to please his 
colonial master and he was far much harsher towards his fellow Africans than the 
coloniser himself. Furthermore the immediate repercussions of the Africans’ harshness 
could not be directly associated with the coloniser but against the African Agents’ (ibid). 
In order to function, the system of ‘Indirect Rule operated efficiently under recognisable 
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indigenous authority like Chiefs to which power was delegated. The bigger the polity, the 
easier it was to locate the locus of political authority. Thus Indirect Rule worked 
excellently when used in centralised states such as kingdoms or chieftainships’ (ibid). 
Kiwanuka criticises the same system by pointing out that 
Under the system of Indirect Rule, whether a chief was hereditary or 
appointed, whether he was under a British or French regime, he owed his 
position to the approval of the colonial power and he retained that position 
only as long as the colonial regime believed he was playing the role he was 
supposed to play. For this reason the British, like other colonial regimes, 
deposed many African Kings and Chiefs (Kiwanuka 1970:79).  
Under this system of governance Northern Rhodesia was controlled by colonial 
institutions of governance such as the Legislative Council, the Executive, and the 
Judiciary. These institutions also made and implemented coercive racist policies in 
respect of civil control of the military. In order to understand the context in which these 
institutions operated, a number of questions need to be answered. These include: what 
was the composition of the legislative council, executive, and the judiciary? How many 
and what kind of Africans sat in these governance institutions? What was their role? And 
what role did they play in the struggle for independence? 
4.12 The role of the Legislative Council 
The first legislative council held its first meeting on 23 May 1924 in Livingstone, 
the then capital of Northern Rhodesia. It comprised the governor, nine official members 
who represented the government and five nominated back bench members. All these were 
white settlers, and no African was nominated to represent African interests. It is therefore 
not surprising that, during the early years of the council, native affairs were rarely 
discussed. Davidson (1946:68) notes that the non-participation of Africans in legislative 
council affairs was encapsulated in a remark by a member of the council, a Mr Moore, in 
1927 that ‘the natives do not come into contact with this House; they are governed in the 
sense that they are legislated for by the people, but they are governed by the people who 
employ them’. Twelve years later, while discussing African opposition to the 
amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, the same member stated that ‘the 
Natives have got no grounds for liking it or disliking it; we are running the show’ 
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(ibid:68-9). These remarks clearly indicate that the role of the first legislative council in 
Northern Rhodesia was to serve the interests of white settlers. 
In 1932, following pressure from white settlers, the numbers of official and back 
bench members were equalised at eight each. One white back bench member was 
nominated to represent African interests. In 1945 the number of members of the 
legislative council was increased to 21. Eight were officials; eight were elected back 
bench members, and five more members were nominated to sit in the back bench, three of 
whom represented African interests. Again, all the members were white. 
In 1948, the composition of the legislative council was changed yet again, in 
response to the increase in the white settler population, and pressure from the Northern 
Rhodesia Federation of African Welfare Societies as well as the African Representative 
Council established in November 1946 (Davidson 1946:32). Two African members 
elected by the African Representative Council were added to the ninth Legislative 
Council. On 10 November 1948 the governor of Northern Rhodesia ceased to be the 
President of the Council and was replaced by an elected Speaker. In 1948, therefore, the 
House was made up of nine official members who represented the Cabinet in the House, 
ten elected back bench members, and two official members nominated to represent 
African interests. The two African members did not have any impact on decision-making 
in the council, as any attempt by them to uphold African interests was bound to be voted 
out by the white members, who were in the majority. In 1954 the number of African 
members elected to the council by the African Representative Council was increased to 
four. In 1959 further constitutional changes were introduced that encouraged politics to 
develop along party rather than racial lines (Mulford 1967:56-57). The 1959 elections 
produced a Legislative Council comprising 14 Europeans and six African representatives. 
This time African members remained a minority because of property and monetary 
franchise requirements that limited the number of Africans who qualified as voters. 
As Mulford (1967:183-184) notes, in 1961 further constitutional changes were 
introduced in Northern Rhodesia as a result of the ‘winds of change’ speech by the British 
Prime Minister Harold McMillan. The constitution provided that 
of those members to be elected, 15 would be returned from single member 
constituencies by upper roll voters, 15 from member constituencies by 
lower roll voters and 15 from national constituencies by both rolls voting 
together. 
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The 1962 elections were contested by nationalist political parties led by both 
whites and Africans. The white-led United Federal Party won 16 seats in the Legislative 
Council, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) led by Kenneth Kaunda won 14 
seats, and the African National Congress led by Harry M Nkumbula won seven. The two 
African parties agreed to form a coalition government and to emancipate the majority of 
Africans from white domination. The coalition government lasted until January 1964 
(ibid:298), when fresh elections were held under the Northern Rhodesia Constitution 
Order in Council of 1963. UNIP won 55 seats, the whites-only National Progressive Party 
won ten, and the African National Congress the remaining ten. 
Between 1924 and 1962, the composition of the council resulted in legislation 
that did not promote harmonious relations among African civilians, the government, and 
the military. They served the economic, political and social interests of white settlers, and 
therefore did promote harmonious civil-military relations among white settlers, the 
government, and the military. These coercive laws included the Crown Lands and Native 
Reserves Order-in-Council 1928, the Northern Rhodesia Regiment Ordinance No 25 of 
1937, the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force Ordinance No 1 of 1939, the Northern 
Rhodesia Compulsory Military Service Ordinance No 13 of 1940, and the Northern 
Rhodesia Territorial Force Ordinance No 67 of 1953. 
 This situation only changed between 1962 and 1964 when the dominance of 
Africans in the Legislative Council enabled them to start moving towards consensual, a 
non-racial approach to issues related to civil control of the military. Among other things, 
they repealed or amended all discriminatory laws relating to the relationship between the 
military and security establishments and the people of Zambia. 
4.13 Composition and functions of the Executive Council 
The Executive Council was made up of white settlers who occupied all 
ministerial positions, including that of governor. They were assisted by Native District 
Commissioners, all of whom were also white. In line with the British colonial policy of 
indirect rule, the executive governed Africans via government-appointed and recognised 
chiefs and headmen for every tribe. 
The functions of the executive were to govern the country according to the laws 
passed by the Legislative Council. Since the colonial regime promoted the economic, 
political and social interests of white settlers over those of Africans, its laws and their 
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implementation created antagonistic methods of civil control of the military in respect of 
Africans. However, since these racist laws favoured the interests of white settlers, they 
promoted harmonious methods of civil control of the military in respect of white settlers. 
The exploitative, antagonistic, and racist nature of civil control of the military 
under the colonial regime was only curtailed by the passage of the Northern Rhodesia 
Constitution Order-in-Council, 1963 and the African attainment of a majority of seats in 
the Legislative Council. This whole period only ended after Zambia’s independence on 
24 October 1964.  
4.14 Composition and functions of the judiciary  
The judicial system under the colonial regime in Northern Rhodesia was divided 
into two components. One comprised British laws as they applied to Northern Rhodesia 
and the white settlers, and were interpreted by trained lawyers and magistrates. The other 
comprised customary laws, interpreted by African chiefs. As mere interpreters of the 
requirements of the law, the discriminatory nature of the colonial regime and its laws 
made these judicial officers punish offenders according to the demands of the law. The 
punishments meted out to Africans for opposing the colonial regime met with the 
approval of white settlers, and therefore contributed to harmonious relations among them, 
the government, and the military. However, the judicial system’s authorisation of the use 
of military force to punish Africans who defaulted on hut tax, resisted forceful removal 
from their ancestral lands, and fought for the independence of their people and country 
made many Africans hate the judicial system, the people who managed it, and the 
oppressive forces such as the police, prison authorities, and the military. In this sense the 
system did not promote harmonious civil-military relations with Africans. In order to 
understand the context in which the military operated, we need to examine the legislative 
framework in terms of which they were established and operated, to which we now turn. 
4.15 Establishment of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, 1924-39 
The Northern Rhodesia Regiment was established with the Northern Rhodesia 
Ordinance No 25 of 1937, adopted by the Legislative Council. Before its passage the 
Council simply advised the governor on issues related to the regiment. In terms of these 
arrangements the colonial government and its governor exercised effective control over 
the Legislative Council, and commanded the Northern Rhodesia police and military 
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forces. The executive introduced a policy to reorganise the regiment along the lines of 
other colonial units. The first step involved the secondment of an officer from the British 
Regular Army to command the regiment, assisted by two seconded junior officers. These 
officers then advised the government on the implementation of ‘the recruitment policy; 
what ranks were to be filled; and the appropriate time when the officers could take up 
their responsibilities in Northern Rhodesia’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937d: 211-
237). 
In November 1933, Brig-Gen C Norman, Inspector General of the Kings African 
Rifles and Royal West Africa Frontier Force, and commander of the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment, submitted recommendations to the governor of Northern Rhodesia on the 
reorganisation of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment. He recommended an increase in 
military personnel from seven British non-commissioned officers and 376 African rank 
and file to 12 officers, seven British non-commissioned officers, 567 African rank and 
file; and 240 African gun porters. He further recommended that the regiment be based at 
Lusaka, which would therefore require the rapid transport of personnel and supplies to the 
scene of disturbances (Norman 1933). 
He argued that this would require the establishment of an air wing, equipped with 
a troop carrier, and that the ability to fly 30 men to any trouble spot would be highly 
effective under any conditions that could be visualised in Northern Rhodesia. In case of 
labour disturbances at a mine, for example, it would not be possible to drop any bombs, 
but it would be possible to fly in 30 soldiers who could rapidly and effectively deal with 
the situation. He therefore recommended that plans be drawn up for moving the regiment 
by rail, motor transport, and air transport. The need for the rapid mobility of military 
personnel in Northern Rhodesia was one of the reasons for the later establishment of the 
Northern Rhodesia Air Force. 
The Northern Rhodesian government responded to Norman’s report by slowly 
implementing all the recommendations, depending on the availability of funds. 
In May 1935 African mineworkers went on strike for the first time, at the Roan 
Antelope Mine in Luanshya, and the strike quickly spread to Nkana and Mufulira mines. 
They were striking in protest against requirements that natives employed at the mines 
should pay tax. The miners damaged mine property and equipment, and threatened to 
attack white mineworkers, their residential areas, and their families. The Northern 
Rhodesia Police failed to stop the riots. This forced the governor to direct military units, 
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consisting mostly of Africans, to move into the Copperbelt and stop the riots. Despite the 
fact that the troops were 
grossly insulted by their own kith and kin in words calculated to make any 
African see red by breaking and leaving their duties in support of their 
African brothers, the troops stood firm and crushed the strike by following 
the commands which were directed by their commandant (Northern 
Rhodesia Government Legislative Council Debates 1937:84). 
As a result of this performance, and the loyalty of African members of the 
Regiment to the colonial regime, in May 1936 the British government approved a 
decision that the Northern Rhodesia Regiment should remain in existence and be brought 
up to full strength. Its mobility would also be improved. 
In December, 1936 one extra British non-commissioned officer took up his 
appointment to the Regiment, bringing the total up to seven, as recommended by 
Norman. On 25 January 1937 Major W A Dimoline was appointed as commander of the 
Northern Rhodesia Regiment with the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel (NAZ 1939-
1945).  
The regiment formed part of His Majesty’s forces. It was charged with defending 
the territory maintaining law and order, and performing any other duties as defined by the 
governor. The governor was its commander-in-chief. 
This formalisation and institutionalisation process shows clearly how, after 1937, 
coercive measures in civil control of the military were increasingly exercised by the 
executive, legislature, and judiciary. The executive, via the governor, had dual powers 
over the military, as he presided over laws passed by the Legislative Council related to 
the constitution and duties of the military and dealing with issues such as discipline, 
governance, enlistment, discharge and service, general provisions, and the application of 
military law. At the same time, he participated directly in the allocation of government 
resources to the military by the Legislative Council during the budget address and the 
consideration of the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, including Capital and 
Constitutional and Statutory Expenditure. The legislature exercised civil control over the 
military by passing laws and approving regulations in respect of the operation of the 
regiment, as well as approving its annual budget. The judiciary exercised judicial powers 
over any military officer who committed offences that could not be tried by court-martial. 
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In this institutional context, we need to examine the coercive nature of the 
recruitment policies for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Defence Force between 
1924 and 1953, and also the impact of these forces on civil control of the military, which 
is done in the next section. 
4.16 Recruitment policies for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment: 1924-1953 
In this institutional framework, after 1937 officers and soldiers of the Northern 
Rhodesia Regiment were recruited in terms of Part IV Article 72 of the Northern 
Rhodesia Ordinance No 25 of 1937 (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937b:33). 
The Northern Rhodesian colonial government adopted the same recruitment 
strategies as the BSAC. However, recruitment was no longer limited to five tribes only, 
but was extended to three other tribes who had participated in World War I. In all, 
members were recruited from the ‘Lozi, Tonga, Bemba, Ngoni, Luvale, Lunda, Chewa, 
Nsenga, Tumbuka, Bisa, Kaluchazi, and Kaonde, and British citizens’ (NAZ 1939-1946). 
When World War II broke out in 1939 the primary purpose of the Northern 
Rhodesia Regiment changed from that of providing internal security to that of repelling 
external invasions as well as participating in the defence of the British Empire against the 
Germans, Italians and Japanese. 
4.17 The recruitment of Africans for military service: 1940 
Following the outbreak of World War II, the Northern Rhodesian government 
was directed to increase the Regiment by an additional 3 000 men, making up two 
battalions named the third and fourth battalions. This figure was also meant to 
compensate for attrition in the existing two battalions. Africans were recruited voluntarily 
for service in the King’s African Rifles. This was the responsibility of District and 
Administrative Officers, in their capacity as Assistant Directors of Manpower, subject to 
the general control of their Provincial Commissioners and the Director of Manpower. 
Also, military officers were not directly recruited except when one of the District or 
Administrative officers was sent to the recruiting areas to assist District Officers. The 
procedure adopted for military recruitment was follows: On receipt of a governor’s 
requisition under Section 7 of Ordinance No 23 of 1940, the director of manpower, after 
consultation with the Provincial Commissioners concerned, allotted a quota to selected 
districts and required the District Officer of each district, in his capacity as Assistant 
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Director of Manpower, to select and provide the number of men specified in the quota for 
military duty. The District Officer then consulted the Native Authority of his district and 
decided upon the sub-division of the quota between the various Native Authorities. The 
District Officer also guided and directed the Native Authorities on the particular locality 
or localities from which recruits were to be selected, and explained the type, age, and 
physical standards that were required. The Native Authorities then distributed their quota, 
within the limits outlined by the District Officer, throughout their areas, and ensured that 
those men who expressed a willingness to enlist were chosen first, followed by others 
who had to be persuaded.  
Great care was taken to see that no unduly large numbers of men were taken from 
any one village or community. Officers were also instructed to select young unmarried 
men before married men with dependents. People in areas and villages that had already 
contributed to the war effort in terms of increased agricultural production were to be 
spared in comparison with those areas inhabited by less industrious males. ‘To this effect 
30 percent of the recruits in Northern Rhodesia were drawn from the Bemba group, 30 
per cent from the Ngoni group and 20 per cent from Mumbwa and Namwala and 20 per 
cent from other suitable Districts’ (NAZ 1940b). ‘Directives were also given that areas 
liable to famine conditions were not to be unduly denuded of their manpower’ (NAZ 
1940a). 
After training, Northern Rhodesian troops were despatched to the war front. By 
1943 Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had contributed ‘37,000 troops to participate in 
the Second World War in defence of the British Empire’ (ibid). These troops joined the 
East African Army Service Corps and in 1940 fought major battles in British Somaliland 
against Italian forces. Others were deployed in Madagascar, the Middle East, and the Far 
East, where they fought successfully against the Germans and Japanese on behalf of the 
British Empire. 
4.18 Establishment of the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force 
In 1939, besides the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, an exclusively white Northern 
Rhodesia Defence Force was established. This was done because members of the 
Legislative Council felt that the tasks and composition of the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment compromised the safety of white settlers. 
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In the course of discussing the impact of the first strikes by African mineworkers 
on the Copperbelt, council members expressed concern over the insecurity of white 
settlers as a result of the lack of an organised white military force in the country. 
Members asked the Executive whether the native force would remain loyal during strike 
or other dispute between the native and white populations. The minister of defence 
replied that the regiment would remain loyal to its officers. 
Responding to this reply, L F Moore, member for Livingstone and the Western 
Electoral Area, argued that 
The House was not looking for a force as a private citizen that is going to 
remain loyal to its officers. The House wants a force that is going to remain 
loyal to the King, that is, the government in this case. This force is not here 
for any other purpose than to protect the people of this country and this 
government and not one that is loyal to any particular officer or person, but 
to the King as represented by this government. I think that we are running 
grave risks in not getting a white force that we can depend upon also 
(Northern Rhodesia Government 1937a:276-277).  
A Mr Knight, member for the Southern Electoral Area, argued that the coercive 
nature and characteristics of a colonial regime made it imperative for the colonial 
government to establish a white force in Northern Rhodesia. Addressing the House, 
Knight argued that it was not sound policy that the entire defence of Northern Rhodesia 
should be placed in the hands of subject people who did not have the voting rights, 
freedom of movement, and other rights enjoyed by the European part of the community. 
He further questioned whether the government could utilise a native regiment to suppress 
any violent European protests or disturbances in Northern Rhodesia. Should the 
government use a Native Regiment against whites, the repercussions would be 
tremendous, from Ndola right down to Cape Town ( Ibid:80-81). 
Col Gore-Browne, a member nominated to represent Native interests, introduced 
a private member’s motion calling on the government to consider the ‘preparation of a 
scheme to enable all sections of the community to cooperate efficiently in the defence of 
the country by establishing a European Defence Force to be called the Northern Rhodesia 
Defence Force as well as compulsory registration for all Europeans resident in Northern 
Rhodesia’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1939a:197). 
C I V I L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I T A R Y  I N  Z A M B I A  
 
 98
In support of his motion, he argued that the departure of the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment for British imperial duties outside Northern Rhodesia had created an internal 
security gap which could put European settlers and their property in danger in the event 
of African miners on the Copperbelt staging a riot as they did in 1935, or a sudden 
invasion of the Northern Rhodesia copper mines by enemy forces. He argued that it was 
imperative for the Northern Rhodesia government to raise a defence force with a 
threefold purpose.  
Firstly as an internal security unit which could at all times be used in the 
aid of the civil power for the protection of life and property in the event of 
internal disorders. Secondly, the Defence Force was needed to guard and 
defend vulnerable points such as mine properties. Thirdly, to repel external 
aggression, but in the ultimate necessity only, since in order to use the 
Defence force as an active fighting unit, it would have been necessary to 
interfere seriously with essential mineral production if not actually causing 
it to cease entirely (Northern Rhodesia Government 1940:198).  
Gore-Browne further argued that it was important for the force to be trained as an 
infantry unit, so that it could be ready at any time to perform these functions. The training 
of its members in peacetime could also prepare them for military service in the event of 
war. The House unanimously supported this proposal: 
On 22nd March 1939 the House passed the Northern Rhodesia Defence 
Force Ordinance No. 1 of 1939, which provided for the establishment of 
the Northern Rhodesia Volunteer Defence Force. The force was under the 
supreme command of the Governor of Northern Rhodesia and could be 
called out for active service within the Units of the territory (Northern 
Rhodesia Government 1939b:2). 
Part V of the Ordinance provided for the mobilisation of the Defence Force. 
Article 16(1) stated that  
whenever the Governor felt it necessary to repel external aggression or to 
aid the civil authority in the protection of life and property and to prevent 
and suppress internal disorder in the Territory, the Governor could by 
Proclamation call out and mobilise the Defence Force or such part or parts 
thereof as he deemed necessary for active service. However, in the case of 
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sudden and imminent danger in any province or district, when it was not 
possible to obtain the authority of the Governor without undue delay, the 
Administrative Officer in charge of the province or district could call for 
the mobilisation of such troops for the protection of life and property 
provided that such officer forthwith reported to the Governor such calling 
out and any subsequent steps taken by him (Ibid: 4). 
In June 1939 the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force was constituted under 
Ordinance No 1 of 1939 of 22 March 1929. Importantly, the European Reserve force that 
made up the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force consisted of mobilised men working on 
the mines, on farms, in shops and banks, and in government occupations. 
Following the worsening of the war situation in Europe in June 1940, and Italy 
joining the hostilities against Britain, the Defence Force was reviewed. It was thought 
necessary to have full-time guards at vulnerable points on the mines, which required a 
considerable increase in personnel. As a result, in June 1940  
the Compulsory Military Service Ordinance was passed, and the Governor 
ordered compulsory mobilisation in the Defence Force of every one in the 
18-25 age group resident within five miles of the Bomas on the line of rail 
at which detachments existed. This increased the strength of the Defence 
Force from 1,470 to 1,671 and later the government changed the 
establishment figure from 1,671 to 1,715 British other ranks (Northern 
Rhodesia Government 1937b:1-7). 
The Defence Force undertook the guarding of certain vital points in the mining 
areas, and such men as could be spared temporarily from their employment were detailed 
for full-time duties for periods varying from 12 hours to one month. The detachment 
commander arranged the guards’ hours of duties. 
In March 1940, during the second African mineworkers’ strike on the Copperbelt, 
a large component of the still much smaller Defence Force were mobilised in co-
operation with the military and police. The Defence Force carried out its duties of 
suppressing the riots as provided for under the ‘King’s Regulations, paragraphs 1245 to 
1249, and paragraph 1255, 1250 to 1256 involving instructions to civil officers, military 
officers, police officers and Defence force authorities on the use of Armed force in case 
of civil disturbances’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937c:1-7). In this case the 
governor of Northern Rhodesia in his capacity as commander-in-chief and civil officer 
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concluded that the available force of police was unable to cope with the situation, and that 
troop involvement was required. He then issued a Government Notice  
in which he requested the Commander of the troops to mobilise his troops 
and took decisive action on the rioters in enforcing the law on the subject 
of every citizen’s right of self-defence and defence of person and property 
which brought an end to the strike (ibid). 
It is clear from the foregoing that the establishment of the Northern Rhodesia 
Defence Force exposed and reinforced the coercive racist and antagonistic nature of the 
colonial regime in Northern Rhodesia. Essentially, the colonial government created this 
force in the absence of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment as a result of World War Two in 
order to protect white settlers, their property, and the government against African 
uprisings. The introduction of the force also ensured continuing civil control of the 
military under colonial conditions. 
4.19 Roles of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Northern Rhodesia Defence 
Force after World War II 
After World War II the role of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment remained that of 
defending the territory against external aggression as well as providing internal security 
by protecting life and property within the territory. The force was equipped along modern 
lines, was efficient and mobile, and could be sent anywhere in Africa, as required under 
the general defence scheme of the British Empire. However, in the event of serious 
internal civil disturbances, troops could be requisitioned by 
 either the Resident Magistrates, Provincial Commissioners; District 
Commissioners; District Officers; the Commissioner of Police, or 
Superintendent of Police to assist the police force in maintaining law and 
order in the country as provided for under instructions to civil officers, 
military officers, police officers and defence authorities (Northern 
Rhodesia Government 1937c:1-21). 
We now need to examine civil control of the military under colonial rule in 
Northern Rhodesia.  
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4.20 Expenditure on and procurement for the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and 
Northern Rhodesia Defence Force: 1924-1963 
The annual budget of the Ministry of Defence, which encompassed expenditure 
on the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Northern Rhodesia Defence Force, was tabled in 
and approved by the Legislative Council. The executive, represented by the ‘Governor 
and the Army Commander who was a nominated Member of the Legislative Council 
defended the military budget in the House annually’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 
1940). Despite the fact that there was no parliamentary committee that scrutinised 
military expenditure, the governor and his officials in the Ministry of Defence scrutinised 
defence expenditure, using the powers conferred by the Legislative Council in Northern 
Rhodesia Ordinance No 25 of 1937 (Northern Rhodesia Government 1937b:8). The 
ordinance, for example, called for the 
imprisonment of any person employed by the Northern Rhodesia Regiment 
who was found to have made any false documents and statements in any 
report, return, master-roll pay list, certificate, book, route, or other 
documents made or signed by him/her or the contents of which it was his 
duty to ascertain the accuracy or truth (ibid:10). 
These measures were enforced by the regiment’s commanding officer, subject to 
the orders and directions of the governor. The commanding officer also supervised 
regiment stores, its paymaster, and its quartermaster. 
It is clear from the foregoing that despite the disciplinary measures provided for 
in Ordinance No 25 of 1937 with regard to accountability for the use of public funds and 
goods by the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, a lack of transparent and independent audits 
by the Office of the Auditor-General made it difficult for army personnel to detect 
fraudulent dealings by dishonest officers. Concomitantly, the lack of a parliamentary 
committee for scrutinising defence expenditure left the Northern Rhodesia Regiment free 
to use public resources as it wished. 
When World War II broke out in September 1939, the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment was placed under the General Officer Command, East Africa, Nairobi. Its 
salaries, allowances, clothing, equipment, and all other requisites were paid for directly 
by the War Office in London. However, the Northern Rhodesia Defence Force, which 
was responsible for internal security in Northern Rhodesia, was directly controlled by the 
C I V I L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I T A R Y  I N  Z A M B I A  
 
 102
civil government. In 1939, its first year of existence, the colonial administration spent 
GB£655,000 on personal emoluments, and GB£2,388 on other costs. In 1940 personal 
emoluments increased very considerably, because of the extensive guard duties 
performed at the Copperbelt and Broken Hill mines, as well as various railway and road 
bridges. Given the increase in size of the Defence Force, expenditure on arms and other 
equipment also increased, and total expenditure grew from 3 043 pounds sterling in 1939 
to 47 865 pounds sterling in 1940. 
In January 1941 the General Officer Commanding East Africa Force 
Headquarters issued a memorandum stating that the policy in terms of which the Northern 
Rhodesia Defence Force fell under local government instead of military control had to be 
changed. The reasons were that  
(a) The forces were military forces and it was important that their control 
were under military headquarters; (b) civil governments were being 
consulted on defence force questions on which they had no expert 
knowledge and no military department to deal with such questions unless 
they were referred to Force Headquarters; (c) financial control was in the 
hands of the civil government and without expert military advice, it was 
felt that neither the government nor the military were getting the full value 
for the money; and (d) while local governments met the pay, allowances 
and cost of equipment the actual military equipment supplied was provided 
from military sources on a system of repayment by the civil governments 
to the military vote. It was felt that if all these matters were dealt with 
directly by the military authorities a better distribution of available 
resources could have been made (NAZ 1941b). 
The military authorities would be in a better position to judge which of local 
forces should be equipped first, taking into account the respective roles of the forces in 
question. 
In view of the foregoing, the directive recommended that military authorities 
should immediately assume full control of all local defence forces and that these forces 
had to fall under the direct command of the General Officer Commanding East Africa, as 
did all other military forces in the British territories. The General Officer Commanding 
would delegate control over these forces to the senior military commander in the territory 
concerned, or some other suitable officer. 
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Financial responsibility for these forces rested with civil governments, which 
were to pay a fixed contribution to the military authorities for their upkeep. The size of 
these contributions were to be worked out between governments and the military 
authorities, with the cost of the force over the previous 12 months taken as a basis for 
calculations. At the same time, the duties these forces would be required to perform 
should also have a bearing on the costs of maintenance. 
The directive further recommended that ‘effective control of the forces by the 
General Officer Commanding could be done by a staff officer at Force Headquarters 
appointed by the General Officer Commanding styled “Staff Officer Local Forces” whose 
whole time was to be spent in dealing with local defence forces matters’ (NAZ 1939). 
Staff officers were also charged with the ‘responsibility to assist and advise and w[ere] to 
be the channel of all communications on defence force subjects requiring decision by the 
General Officer Commanding’ (ibid). 
Responding to this directive, the Northern Rhodesian government observed that 
the draft orders did not materially conflict with existing laws, regulations or procedures. 
However, it decided to retain full financial control over the defence force, because of the 
need to take account of coercive local factors to determine expenditure on the force, such 
as the high cost of living in the territory and the need to offer pay and allowances equal to 
those in Southern Rhodesia. The Northern Rhodesian government argued that this was a 
‘liability for which it had accepted full responsibility and considered that it was necessary 
to control the expenditure involved itself’ (NAZ 1941a). This stance demonstrated the 
close linkages between the government, the military, and white settlers in the context of 
colonial rule. 
4.21 Financial control over the military in Northern Rhodesia after World War II 
When the war ended in 1945, civil authorities in Northern Rhodesia retained 
control over Defence Force finances via the Legislative Council. However, pension 
benefits for soldiers and the next of kin of members of the civil defence, police and fire 
services killed by enemy action while on duty were paid for by the British government. 
Following the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Northern Rhodesian 
government retained control over Defence Force finances via annual approval of the 
defence budget by the Legislative Council. The federal government funded troops 
controlled by federal forces. It is again clear from the foregoing that, both 
administratively and financially, civil authorities determined the operations and activities 
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of defence forces by strictly following the coercive laws and regulations pertaining to 
those forces. This was again done via a consultative process involving the governor, 
minister of defence, army commander, Defence Council, members of the Legislative 
Council, provincial commissioners, district commissioners, and African chiefs. Through 
this consultative process the colonial government ensured that military personnel 
remained efficient, loyal, and obedient. This was especially demonstrated in the way in 
which the military handled disputes and strikes related to land and labour policies 
between 1924 and 1963. How these disputes impacted on civil control of the military is 
the subject of the next section. 
4.22 The impact of land and labour policies on civil control of the military in 
Northern Rhodesia: 1924-1963 
Mining in Northern Rhodesia began with the mining of lead and zinc at Broken 
Hill Mine in 1906. Between 1924 and 1931 Kansashi, Chambeshi, Mufurila, Nchanga 
and Bwana Mkubwa mines began mining copper under the Rhodesian Select Trust and 
the Anglo American Corporation. Mining companies advertised for thousands of skilled 
and unskilled personnel. This stimulated European immigration into Northern Rhodesia, 
especially from South Africa and Britain, which increased from 4 000 in 1924 to 13 800 
in 1931 (Bancroft 1961:27). 
The rapidly growing mines also provided markets for agricultural and pastoral 
products. This encouraged white World War I veterans and other white settlers to take up 
land for agricultural and pastoral production. In this period the demand for land and 
native labour by both European settlers and mining companies in Northern Rhodesia 
increased. In order to make these means of production available to white settlers, the 
colonial regime, which was directly controlled by the British government after April 
1924, advocated the creation of more native reserves in the Eastern Province and along 
the railway belt. In 1924 Sir Herbert Stanley, the first colonial governor, appointed the 
first Native Reserve Commission to examine the modalities of demarcating reserves in 
the Eastern Province, and moving Africans into them. The second and third commissions 
were appointed in 1926 and 1927 and recommended the creation of reserves along the 
railway belt as well as in the Northern Province.  
Siamwiza (1998:253) writes that at the end of this process the Commissions gave 
each African an average of 14.2 acres of land in the Eastern Province and 74.8 and 92.8 
acres in the Northern Province and along the line of railway respectively’. Brelsford 
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(1954:67) records that the demarcation of Native Reserves boundaries in the Southern 
Province was done by the ‘Survey Platoon of the military wing of the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment. The platoon also made land surveys for African gardens on the Maramba 
stream and [performed] many other useful tasks.’ They also supervised the eventual 
movement of Africans to the new reserves. 
Between 1953 and 1959 the colonial regime alienated more land by creating the 
Kariba Dam in the Gwembe Valley along the Zambezi river, on the border between 
Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia. Lagus (1959:42, 47) points out that dam was 
built to ‘provide electricity to the mines on the Copperbelt and various industries in 
Southern Rhodesia; to promote tourism, create a viable commercial fishing industry with 
an output of about 20 000 tons of fish and to provide water for irrigation’. 
The damming of the area between 1955 and 1959 flooded both Crown and 
reserve land, resulting in the resettlement of more than 60 000 Gwembe Valley Tonga 
people in other, less fertile Native Reserves. Lagus further reports that the process of 
resettling the Gwembe Tonga met some resistance from the local people who did not  
want to lose their land and leave the graves of their ancestors. Troops were 
called in. However, on 4th June 1958, villagers in Chisamu village, under 
Chief Chipepo, armed with spears, resisted by attacking the Native District 
Commissioner’s party and troops. In self-defence the troops shot eight 
villagers and injured more than 32 people (ibid:148).  
It was after this military defeat that the Tongas living in Headman Sianzembe’s 
village were forced to vacate their ancestral lands. 
As noted earlier, the coercive measures employed in the movement of Africans 
into the Native Reserves were characterised by 
over-crowding, cultivation on small acreage soon made the soils infertile 
and life in semi-desert conditions became the major causes of famine in 
Mkushi, Kalomo, Mazabuka, Livingstone (1930), Petauke, Chipata, 
Central, Copperbelt and Northern provinces (Siamwiza 1998:254-256).  
Under these conditions, Africans living in the reserves had no alternative but to 
perform wage labour on the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia. Hall (1968:260) writes 
that the number of Africans seeking wage employment on the Copperbelt increased from 
1 300 in 1924 to 16 000 in 1928 and 30 000 in 1930.  
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While Africans were experiencing all these hardships, the colonial regime 
ensured that the systematic economic exploitation of Northern Rhodesia occurred under 
the firm protection of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Police. Brelsford (1954:67) 
explains that ‘all road works along the Kapiri-Kasama-Mbala road; Lusaka-Fort Jameson 
road; and the construction of bridges over the Lukulu river between 1925 and 1935 were 
supervised by the Northern Rhodesia Regiment’. The ‘Gore-Brown First Anglo-Belgian 
Boundary Commission of 1911-1914, Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission of 1927-
1933 and the Caprivi Boundary Demarcation Commission of 1931 all received an escort 
of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment’ (Musambachime 2005:1-20). When foot and mouth 
disease broke out in Southern Rhodesia, members of the regiment  
searched all the trains arriving from Southern Rhodesia to ensure that the 
disease did not spread to the farms of white settlers in Northern Rhodesia. 
In March and April 1933 the regiment fought locusts in the white settled 
areas west of Lusaka. In the meantime the same regiment intensified its 
patrols in the Copperbelt and in Native Reserves in Lusaka, Mongu, 
Kasama and Fort Jameson with demonstrations of field firing and other 
military exercises where Africans were invited as witnesses (Brelsford 
1954:67). 
4.23 The impact of the 1935 and 1940 mineworkers’ strikes on civil control of the 
military 
The strike by African mineworkers in 1935 had its roots in the industrial colour 
bar brought to Northern Rhodesia by South African mineworkers. The system 
distinguished between ‘white work’ and ‘kaffir work’. In 1930 African surface workers 
received about 20 shillings a month, while underground workers received 30 shillings. 
White semi-skilled miners received a minimum of 30 pounds sterling. By 1935 African 
mineworkers began to move into semi-skilled jobs, but did not receive corresponding pay 
increases. Africans were ‘resentful of the fact that Europeans were paid ten or twenty 
times as much as they were for the same type of work’ (Hall 1968:130). The introduction 
of higher tax rates by the colonial government further reduced the take-home pay of 
African mineworkers. The deplorable housing and sanitary conditions of African 
mineworkers compared with those of their white counterparts further contributed to 
dissatisfaction. 
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African mineworkers struck in support of demands for better conditions of 
service in May 1935. The strike was characterised by violence directed at the mining 
companies, white miners and their families at Nkana, Mufurila and Luanshya on the 
Copperbelt. In order to contain the situation, the Northern Rhodesian government airlifted 
203 members of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment to the affected area. During the 
showdown between the rioters and the military, 
African miners tried to persuade African soldiers to join the rioters by 
shooting their white commanders and the white miners, but the soldiers 
stood firm on the orders of their military commanders. The strike was only 
defused after six African Miners had been killed, twenty-two wounded and 
scores arrested. The military also dispersed the rioters who looted grain 
stores and thereafter took complete control of all the mining towns 
(Brelsford 1954:71-72). 
After the strike had been quelled the government appointed a commission to 
investigate the causes of the strike and make recommendations to government. In its 
report the commission observed that the Northern Rhodesia Regiment had successfully 
defused the strike because it had been in  
a state of complete readiness and good discipline, and that the contingent 
which was actually confronted with danger and insult gave a fine 
exhibition of self-control and that the steady conduct of the forty-seven 
Officers and men at Luanshya prevented a renewed outbreak of the 
disturbance. The conduct of the Regiment was the most effective reply to 
the white critics in the Legislative Council who argued that the Askari 
could not be trusted to take action against their own people (cited in ibid 
:72). 
In 1940 African mineworkers on the Copperbelt struck for the second time. The 
strike was caused by the mining companies' recognition in 1937 of the white Mine 
Workers Union, which promoted the industrial colour bar. The wages paid to Africans in 
the mining, agricultural, government, commercial and industrial sectors had also 
remained largely the same between 1920 and 1940, and this became a source of tension. 
In early 1940 European miners at Mufurila and Nkana went on strike in support of 
demands for wage increases and better conditions of service. Hall (1968:131) records that 
on ‘March 27th the strike was settled after government intervention, the workers being 
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granted their demands’. A day later 15 000 African mineworkers on the same mines also 
downed tools in support of pay demands. Notices in the streets urged Africans to beat up 
police officers whether they were African or European, as they used guns to keep African 
miners in economic bondage. The miners also called for the formation of an African 
mineworkers’ union (ibid:132-133).  
The strike began on 3 April 1940 at Nkana and Mindolo mine shafts when nearly 
6 000 Africans swarmed around the compound offices. Brelsford (1968:83-84) explains 
that ‘instead of the government intervening by settling the problems peacefully as they 
did when the white miners staged their strike on March 27th 1940, it called in troops and 
police reinforcements to crush the strike’. The troops protected the surface plant of the 
Nkana mine and the Mindolo shaft, and guarded the compound offices by cordoning off 
the area and lining up across the road. The strikers then hurled stones at the troops and 
police and injured 20 African soldiers despite warning shots being fired. The soldiers 
were ordered to open fire, and ‘seventeen African rioters were killed and sixty injured’. 
Brelsford stresses that the effectiveness of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment in dealing 
with the African miners was demonstrated by the fact that 
there were no further disturbances and the miners did a good job of work in 
achieving a substantial increase in production in spite of many difficulties 
and obstacles which became progressively worse throughout the war years. 
During the six years Northern Rhodesia’s mines produced nearly one and 
half million tons of copper, a most valuable contribution to the Empire’s 
war effort (Brelsford 1968:84). 
The government and mining companies, on the other hand, responded to the 
strike by increasing the average wages of Africans to 35 shillings 6 pence for surface and 
52 shillings 11 pence for underground workers. Hall (1968:132) argues that these 
increments were meaningless to Africans as ‘acute shortages during World War Two 
[had] put up the prices of all basic commodities by between 50 percent and 100 percent’. 
In February 1948 the government also registered the first branch of the African 
mineworkers’ union at Nkana. Its first chairman was Lawrence Katilungu. 
The use of military force as part of its coercive measures, by the colonial 
government and mining companies to break up the 1940 mineworkers’ strike showed 
clearly that civil control of the military served the interests of the colonial regime and 
white settlers. The police, the regiment, white miners, mining companies, and the colonial 
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regime all had a common economic and political agenda, namely to use their power to 
exploit African labour power and resources for the advancement of the settler community 
and the continuation of British rule. 
The use of brutal coercive measures by the colonial authorities to suppress 
African land and labour grievances became one of the major causes of the nationalist 
struggle in Northern Rhodesia, to which we now turn.  
4.24 Civil control of the military during the nationalist struggle for independence 
in Northern Rhodesia, 1950-1964 
The impact of colonial economic, social, political, cultural, technological, 
scientific and educational policies on African societies in Northern Rhodesia led to the 
development of new social classes, and, ultimately, the rise of nationalism. These forces 
in turn changed the nature and character of civil control of the military by sharpening the 
antagonisms between Africans and white settlers, the colonial regime, and the military. 
This finally led to the triumph of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia in 1964. In 
this section, we examine the concepts of nationalism, and how the African struggle for 
independence changed the degree of civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia in 
favour of oppressed Africans in 1964. 
4.24.1 Concepts of nationalism 
Historians and political scientists define the term ‘nationalism’ as understood in 
European and African contexts in various ways, but have not come up with one 
universally accepted definition. Kellas (1994:4) defined nationalism as both ‘an ideology 
and a form of behaviour. The ideology of nationalism builds on people’s awareness of a 
nation (national self-consciousness) to give a set of attitudes and a programme of action. 
These may be cultural, economic or political.’ He also differentiates between colonial 
nationalism and anti-colonial nationalism, and defines colonial nationalism as that which 
developed in the European colonial empires (especially the British, 
Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and French) among the European settlers that 
led to the independence of the colonies from the mother country. Examples 
of these were the United States of America in 1776; South Africa in 1910 
and the British Rhodesian settlers, with their Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in 1965. These settlers like those in Southern Rhodesia tried 
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to seek secession in order to maintain their own internal (racist) hegemony 
at a time when the mother country wanted to liberalise the situation (Kellas 
1998:94). 
He further defines anti-colonial nationalism as ‘the emergence of indigenous 
national liberation and anti-colonial movements in the British Empire that corresponded 
with the spread of nationalist ideology from Europe. An example of this in Africa was 
Pan- Africanism’ (ibid).  
The above definitions are similar to Kiwanuka’s definition of nationalism 
(1970:104). Kiwanuka sees ‘nationalism as an expression of hostility to alien rule or 
influences in all their manifestations. In the colonial context nationalism is anti-
colonialism’ (ibid). 
In this section we will argue that coercive British colonialism in Northern 
Rhodesia undermined its cause by speeding up the economic, social, political and 
especially educational standards the Africans. This is because education produced an 
intellectual elite that 
learnt and accepted the ideas of material improvement of the masses 
through popular participation in government and in the economic sector. 
Intellectuals discovered that such ideas of democracy, equality and social 
justice were anathema to the colonial regimes which were only too eager to 
crush advocates of such infamy and regarded any acts in that direction by 
Africans as subversive (Kiwanuka 1970:106). 
Kiwanuka further argues that 
 for the educated and qualified Africans, the discriminatory distribution of 
the results of modernisation on the basis of one’s pigmentation deprived 
educated Africans gainful and satisfying employment, an emergence of a 
better society and an end of poverty for the masses. This could never be 
achieved while the centres of political and economic power were 
dominated by an alien rule. The inevitable alternative, therefore, was the 
overthrow of colonial rule (ibid). 
In Northern Rhodesia, the nationalist struggle against coercive measures of 
British colonialism assumed three phases. The first phase saw the formation of welfare 
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societies by educated Africans who registered their dismay at the racist nature of the 
colonial regime. They condemned the non-representation of Africans in the colonial 
government, the creation of native reserves, and other social inequalities up to 1948. 
However, these leaders did not effectively challenge the colonial regime and were not 
regarded as a threat to government (for detailed information on this subject, see Mulford 
1964). The second phase came after World War II in which the welfare societies came 
together and transformed themselves into a single political party voicing political 
demands for Africans through the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress. The 
third and last phase 
saw the establishment of nationalist movements with the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) as 
nationalist parties and political organisations. The most extreme 
nationalists were now satisfied with nothing less than total political 
independence for their nation, and their support was broadened to include 
the mass of the people (Kellas 1998:97).  
The fragmentation of the colonial political elite comprising white politicians, 
white settlers, civil servants, and the military – especially after the 1961 UNIP Cha Cha 
Cha campaigns – changed the nature of civil control of the military in favour of the 
nationalists, who succeeded in removing the colonial regime by constitutional and 
democratic means. This key development is examined in the next section.  
4.25 The impact of World War II on nationalist movements and civil control of the 
military in Northern Rhodesia 
Mass political organisation among Africans in Northern Rhodesia against the 
coercive measures of the British colonial regime developed after World War II. Among 
the factors that raised African nationalist hopes for self-rule was the achievement of 
independence by India in 1947. Africans started studying the methods the Indians used to 
fight for their independence. The United Nations also raised similar hopes when the 
organisation was set up in 1945. The UN Charter called for the self-determination of all 
people, and African nationalist leaders used the organisation’s committee of twenty-four 
to exert diplomatic pressure on their colonial rulers. Another source of encouragement 
was the change in the attitudes of British political parties, notably the Labour Party. The 
declaration by the Labour leader, Clement Atlee, in 1939 that ‘Britain should recognise 
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the right of an African to a place in the world’ made African leaders look upon the party 
as a champion of their interests, and the victory of the Labour Party in the 1945 elections 
gave them additional stimulus (NAZ 1972a:1). In the midst of this changing international 
political environment, Sir Roy Welensky, senior unofficial member of the Northern 
Rhodesia Legislative Council, ‘pressed the case for responsible government for Northern 
Rhodesia and the amalgamation of the three Central African territories when, in 1948, he 
met the Secretary of State for Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones’ (NAZ 1972a:2). Creech 
Jones rejected Welensky’s demand. However, he did hint that the British government was 
willing to consider a proposal for a federation. In 1949, therefore, Welensky and Sir 
Godfrey Huggins, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, convened a conference of 
settlers’ representatives at Victoria Falls that unanimously resolved to press for 
federation. ‘This decision sparked off a bitter political debate and led the two principal 
racial groups in Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia to marshal their 
strength for a confrontation’ (ibid). This in turn made the 
 Europeans demand that the government take tough action. Congress 
suffered through arrests and detentions during this period but it also learnt 
that rights had to be fought for (ibid). 
This worsened the relationship between the military and Africans. The settlers’ 
main motive for demanding federation was to ‘prevent African paramountcy and to 
entrench their domination; but they argued that the federation would be built on the 
principle of racial ‘partnership’ and that it would bring economic benefits to Africans’ 
(ibid). Africans, on the other hand, rejected federation as they had rejected amalgamation 
because ‘federation now would mean self-government for Northern Rhodesia by a 
European minority’ (ibid). The British government was convinced by the settlers’ 
economic argument, but while the Labour Party vacillated when it was in power, the 
Conservatives who succeeded Labour in late 1951 were determined to push the scheme 
through. 
The fear of a new form of white domination prompted Africans in Northern 
Rhodesia to organise themselves in order to resist European initiatives. In 1946 all the 
native associations in Northern Rhodesia met in Lusaka and formed a single organisation 
called the Federation of African Societies, led by Dauti Yamba. Its aim was to ‘speak for 
and on behalf of Africans in rural and urban areas as the African Representative Council 
which the government had sponsored that year was too compromised by its association 
with officialdom to represent the true opinion of Africans’ (NAZ 1972:3). African 
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suspicion of settler intentions gathered strength and, in July 1948, members of the 
Federation of Welfare Societies came together and transformed the organisation into the 
first political party, called the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC). 
Its founding president was Godwin Mbikusita-Lewanika. 
The programme of the NRANC was based on resistance to European ambitions. 
Under Mbikusita-Lewanika, Congress did nothing more than submit petitions and pass 
resolutions against the introduction of the federation, and did not threaten the political 
position of white settlers. Young men in Congress who wanted action, and enjoyed mass 
support, condemned this approach. 
Kenneth Kaunda formed a branch of Congress in Chinsali, and mobilised mass 
opposition to the federation. In 1951 Justin Chimba, Simon Zukas and Reuben Kamanga 
formed an anti-Federation Action Committee in Ndola, regularly published a ‘Freedom 
Newsletter’, and organised public campaigns calling on people to act (ibid).  
In 1951 these militant elements elected Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula as president 
of Congress, with R M Nabulyato continuing as secretary-general. The Congress also 
changed its name from the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress to the African 
National Congress (ANC). How the changes in the leadership of the nationalist party 
affected civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia between 1951 and 1963 is 
examined in the next section. 
4.26 African nationalism and civil control of the military in Northern Rhodesia, 
1951-1963 
Between 1951 and 1960 the ANC transformed itself into a mass movement, but 
its methods of campaigning for the total independence of Africans in Northern Rhodesia 
could not break the colonial political elite. Instead, white colonial hegemony was 
enhanced with the creation of the federal government. 
At the party level the ANC was reorganised into a dynamic body. Its executive 
was renamed as the National Executive Council. Its headquarters was in Chilenje 
compound in Lusaka. Nkumbula appointed provincial, district and branch secretaries, and 
all the members of the African Mine Workers Union and the African Representative 
Council became members of Congress. In this way Nkumbula ‘managed to make the 
average African regain his/her confidence which he/she was fast losing and to keep a 
united front of the right and the left, the traditionalists and the intellectuals’ (NAZ 
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1972a:3). In 1952 the ANC organised a conference at which copies of the British White 
Paper on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland were burnt. Resolutions calling for 
African mass action against the imposition of the federation were passed. A delegation 
led by Nkumbula travelled to London to campaign against the federation. They boycotted 
the Lancaster House Conference that examined mechanisms for the establishment of a 
Central African Federation. 
In 1953 a constitution for the federation was approved at a conference at Carlton 
House Terrace in London. No Africans were present. Nkumbula called for two national 
days of prayer during which all Africans, including civil servants and mineworkers, were 
expected to demonstrate against the imposition of the federation in Northern Rhodesia. 
The government reacted to the ANC plan by ‘deploying troops and all security personnel 
throughout the country and warned all workers of dismissal if they followed Nkumbula’s 
orders. African mine leaders like Katilungu and others failed to respond to Nkumbula’s 
orders and the two days of national prayer ended in a failure’ (Hall 1968:158). Some 120 
chiefs in Northern Rhodesia signed a petition protesting against the federation, and sent it 
to the British Houses of Parliament and the United Nations, but this also failed to stop the 
imposition of the federation.  
In July 1953 royal assent was given to the legislation authorising the 
promulgation of the federal constitution and government on 23 October 1953 by Order-
in-Council. This marked the failure of the ANC to achieve its political aims. In August 
1953 the ANC called a national conference in Lusaka at which Nkumbula was re-elected 
as ANC president, but Kenneth Kaunda replaced Robinson Nabulyato as secretary-
general. 
The election of Kaunda and the presence of other young radicals such as Simon 
Mwansa Kapwepwe, Rueben Kamanga, Arthur Wina and Sikota Wina resulted in the 
emergence of a radical leadership within the ANC. These leaders adopted a constructive 
programme of the social, political and economic advancement of Africans, and decided 
that the best way to dismantle the federation and white domination was to achieve 
political control at the centre. They therefore adopted a two-pronged approach. Besides 
picketing, they continued to participate in constitutional discussions at both the federal 
and protectorate levels, where the demand for one man, one vote was to be made. 
Federation brought no economic benefits to Africans in the protectorates. Despite 
a supposed policy of partnership, social, economic and political discrimination against 
Africans continued unabated. Dauti Yamba, Northern Rhodesia representative in the 
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Federal Assembly, tabled a private member’s motion in which he advocated equal 
treatment of people of all races in public places, and that this should be enforced by 
binding federal legislation. ‘V.N. Joyce, a white back bencher representing Mufulira, and 
Lord Malvern dismissed the Motion as futile and insincere and declared that white 
women could not be expected to stand in queues with African mothers bearing dirty 
babies’ (Hall 1968:168). 
The ANC in Northern Rhodesia responded by challenging the policy of 
partnership and racial discrimination. Under the slogans of ‘beat the colour bar’ and 
‘partnership’, the party organised its members, including women, into groups of two to 
15. These groups were instructed to visit hotels, bars, cafes and other places where racial 
discrimination was practised, and ask to be admitted and served (NAZ 1959). They were 
usually refused admission, as it was an offence to serve liquor to Africans or to allow 
them entry to most hotels and practically all cafes and restaurants. 
In the Northern and Luapula provinces the policy of non-co-operation with the 
colonial regime over its coercive laws and policies took the form of violent 
demonstrations ‘against the fishing, game and forest conservation regulations which were 
imposed on the Africans in 1953’ (Sikalumbi 1977:40). Demonstrations against fish 
conservation measures in the Luapula Province took place in ‘Kasenga, Mulundu, 
Kashiba and Chief Kambwali on the south-eastern shore of lake Mweru near Mifombo’ 
(Musambachime 1981:284-293). The government reacted to this disobedience by sending  
100 heavily armed paramilitary officers who carried out patrols in the 
whole of the Luapula valley. In the process seven people were arrested, 
Chiefs Kambwali and Mulundu were suspended for periods of six months 
for their involvement in the disturbances (Musambachime 1981:291-292). 
In Fort Roseberry District 
Senior Chief Milambo of the Ishi was deposed and deported to Chief 
Chungu's area in Luwingu district and was later returned to his areas but 
not as a chief. The Kabende Chief Kasoma Bangweulu, now of Nsamfya 
District, was imprisoned and then deported to Chief Matipa’s area in 
Luwingu district. Another Kabende Chief, Mulakwa, also served a prison 
term and then was deported to Chief Chitambo’s area in Samfya district. 
More than 80 so called ring leaders of the demonstrations were tried at Fort 
Roseberry and then sent to Kasama Central Prison (Sikalumbi 1977:40).  
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In the Northern Province, demonstrations against fish and game conservation 
measures resulted in the ‘arrest and banishment of senior Chief Mwamba and Nsokolo 
from their areas in the Abercorn District’ (ibid). The role of the military in enforcing 
these draconian laws against Africans and their chiefs worsened the relationship between 
the government, the military, and Africans. 
In 1958 the colonial political elite in Northern Rhodesia further tightened controls 
over Africans and their nationalist party, the ANC. Sir Roy Welensky became the federal 
prime minister in 1956 and secured more powers for the federal government. Britain also 
promised to hold the ‘Federal Review Conference, provision for which was written in the 
Federal Constitution at an early date in 1960, to consider plans for advancing the 
Federation to independence’ (NAZ 1972d:4). In 1957 the membership of the Federal 
Assembly was increased from 35 to 59, and African membership from six to 12. The 
African Affairs Board declared the complicated arrangements for electing Africans as 
discriminatory, but its appeals were rejected. ‘Africans lost the faith they had in the 
power of the Board’ (ibid).  
Similarly, settlers demanded control of the Legislative and Executive Councils as 
well as self-government. By 1958 the ANC’s struggle for independence was further 
unsettled when the colonial regime tightened up territorial security arrangements. 
Mulford (1967:66) records that 
Pressure on chiefs to take up action against local nationalist leaders limited 
ANC areas of legal operation. The Emergency Powers Act, 1957 provided 
wide powers for government action to prevent the declaration of the state 
of emergency. The Northern Rhodesia Police (Amendment) Act, 1957 
gave powers to the police to control public meetings that took place outside 
Native Authorities’ areas and off public roads and streets. The Societies 
Act, 1957 controlled nationalist political parties by requiring them to 
register their branches and to supply the government with specific 
information about their activities and organisation. The territory’s Penal 
Code also gave power to the government to use weapons against politically 
inspired boycotts and strikes. 
The militants in the ANC reacted to these draconian coercive measures by 
demanding that the ANC pursue a more aggressive campaign which ‘encouraged violent 
retaliation by the African public if provoked by security forces’ (ibid:69). On 24 October 
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1958, following contradictory pressures from the party as well as the colonial regime, 
Nkumbula agreed to participate in elections under the Benson constitution, which 
required both African and European voters to have a minimum of 120 pounds sterling and 
a Form Two level of education. This meant that the majority of the Africans were 
disenfranchised. Kaunda and other militant members walked out and formed the Zambia 
African National Congress (ZANC), with Kaunda as it first president. 
ZANC adopted the slogan ‘self-government now’ and declared its aim as nothing 
short of independence (NAZ 1972e:5). Its forceful approach was backed by the All Africa 
People’s Conference held in Accra, Ghana that adopted a strategy for independence and a 
decision to form a united front of all Central African parties to fight against the 
federation. Both the federal and Northern Rhodesian governments wanted to preserve the 
federation, and on 12 March 1959 ZANC was banned and its leaders arrested. 
In January 1960 Kaunda was released from prison. He immediately took over as 
president of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Taking advantage of the 
confusion in the ANC, Kaunda rallied the masses under UNIP with the slogan ‘Freedom 
Now’. From July to October 1961 UNIP’s struggle for full independence led to direct 
confrontations with the security forces. The party’s rallying cry was ‘Cha Cha Cha, which 
derived from the name of a dance but in this context was interpreted to mean “face the 
music” of the nationalist violent incidents against colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia’ 
(NAZ 1972d:4). Violent incidents took place throughout the country, but especially in the 
Copperbelt and in Luapula and Northern provinces. By the time calm was restored, 21 
people had been killed, 3 065 arrested and 2 691 imprisoned (ibid). In a report to 
Provincial Commissioner Kasama, District Commissioner Abercorn summarised the main 
incidents that took place in Northern Province as a result of the Cha Cha Cha campaigns: 
An attack by approximately 80 armed Africans from Manyika, Lwimbo 
and Chikonkwani villages on the Federal government Land Rover on the 
main Abercorn/Kasama road near the Chambeshi bridge; 400 armed 
Africans attacked a party of District Messengers on the main 
Abercorn/Kasama road near Manyika village; a police patrol was attacked 
by 1000 armed Africans on the main Abercorn/ Kasama road at the Senga 
Hill turn off; 400 armed Africans attacked the District Commissioner’s 
entourage at Kasakalabwe; Native personnel authority at Chief Mwamba’s 
palace were also attacked; acts of arson involving 3 dip tanks in Chief 
Mwamba’s area, the welfare hall in Abercorn township, the houses of two 
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royal Africans in the Senga Hill area, house of an informer in Chief 
Mwamba’s area, a house containing thronal stools in Zombe area, Moses 
school and court houses at Nondo (NAZ 1961). 
The government responded by sending armed troops to both Northern and 
Luapula provinces. On 4 August 1961 a 
District Officer together with a platoon and section of the second Kings 
African Rifles (KAR) that consisted mostly of Malawian troops swept 
through Senga Hill and Chief Nondo’s villages around Moses school 
looking for ring leaders. Africans who were arrested were screened by the 
Special Branch, together with the Criminal Investigations Department with 
the object of finding other leaders of the riots and some information (ibid).  
This enabled officers carry out further sweeps in the same area. The Special 
Branch also used these raids to select suitable persons for use as informers. Similar 
operations were also carried out by troops in Chief Mwamba’s area, the Muswilo and 
Mambwe areas of Nsokolo, as well as Mpande (ibid). 
The Kings African Rifles platoon stationed at Mpulungu continued patrols 
through all the lake shore villages. A further sweep was made in Mpondela village and 
Chisanza that enabled the troops to pick up any of the remaining leaders of UNIP for 
screening (ibid). On 9 August 1961 a KAR company arrived in Abercorn by air. These 
troops patrolled Nakonde, Mpulungu, and Chief Mwamba’s area at night and fired flares 
that landed on houses thatched with grass, thus setting many of them on fire (ibid). These 
acts of vandalism further angered many Africans who attacked the troops with stones and 
other objects. When the troops fired shots at the rioters they refused to disperse, ‘saying 
they were not afraid of shots because it was only gas. Instead, African ring-leaders gave 
orders to kill the Chief’s retainers and the troops’ (NAZ 1961). 
In the Kasakalabwe area a platoon of the Kings African Rifles fought pitched 
battles with local people. After the commander had ordered his troops to fire into the 
crowd, more than 200 Africans confronted all four military platoons with stones, and 
advanced on the troops intending to disarm them. These acts of bravery made the troops 
withdraw from the area (ibid). On 12 August 1961 more troops and police officers were 
sent to Kasakalabwe. Twenty-two people were arrested, and numerous weapons 
confiscated (ibid). 
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A government White Paper on the riots blamed UNIP party officials at the lower 
level, particularly those in Northern and Luapula provinces, for the violence. The large 
number of UNIP officials and members arrested as ringleaders were cited as evidence of 
this. However, UNIP denied this charge. A special issue of the UNIP magazine, Voice of 
UNIP, summarised the relationship between its members, the government and the 
military as follows:  
During the whole tragic affair we have never heard of any African lifting a 
finger against a white man, an informer or member of the Security forces. 
It is the security people who have butchered over fifty unarmed Africans 
and still doing brutal beatings and torturing the people in various ways. 
Thousands of the people are still living in the bush together with their 
families for fear of the security forces. Security forces, whose security do 
they answer? As a result of the barbaric actions of the security forces, 
thousands of people are in danger of dying from starvation. Hundreds of 
people will remain crippled for the rest of their lives as a result of these 
brutal acts. Thousands of virgins have been defiled, thousands of women 
have been assaulted in the name of law and order (NAZ 1972d: 4). 
During the Cha Cha Cha campaign the relationship between the military, white 
settlers, and the executive on one hand and Africans on the other had reached a new low. 
The behaviour of Africans towards the colonial regime and its security forces became 
aggressive. This marked the beginning of the fragmentation of the colonial coercive 
measures and political elite. The British government decided to intervene by calling for 
constitutional talks in London in 1962 on the basis of constitutional proposals by Ian 
Macleod. Kaunda and Nkumbula represented their respective parties during the talks, 
which were chaired by Reginald Maulding, the colonial secretary. An amendment to the 
1961 constitutional proposals enabled all the political parties in Northern Rhodesia to 
reach a compromise and participate in the 1962 parliamentary elections. The United 
Federal Party (UFP) won 16 seats; UNIP won 14; and the ANC won seven. 
UNIP under Kaunda and the ANC under Nkumbula agreed to form a coalition 
government. Its first act was to pass a resolution asking for the secession of Northern 
Rhodesia from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This led to the 1963 Victoria 
Falls Conference at which the mechanisms for the dissolution of the federation were 
worked out. 
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At this point, civil control of the military changed hands from the oppressive 
colonial regime to an African-led government. It also changed its nature and character 
from being determined by coercive measures to the new consensual democratic measures. 
Africans also dominated the legislative council. All legislation related to the colour bar 
was repealed. This included the Native Registration Ordinance, the Employment of 
Natives Ordinance, the Collective Punishments Ordinance, the Mine Township 
Ordinance, and other laws incidental thereto (NAZ 1962). Race Relations Advisory and 
Reconciliation Committees were set up in Lusaka and all the other cities and towns in the 
country. These committees tried to resolve any issues that arose in their respective 
communities involving racial conflict between Africans and Europeans without referring 
to the courts. 
UNIP and the ANC did not collaborate successfully, and the day-to-day 
functioning of the government became very difficult. In September 1963 the governor 
ordered fresh elections, based on universal adult suffrage. Voting took place in January 
1964. After an intensive campaign, UNIP won 55 seats, the ANC 10 seats; and the 
National Progressive Party (NPP) all 10 reserved seats for whites. In May 1964 further 
talks were held in London that decided on the nature of the independence constitution. 
Participants agreed that, on 24 October 1964, Northern Rhodesia should become the 
independent Republic of Zambia. 
At home the date was blazoned in triumph, and when the UNIP delegates 
returned they were welcomed by huge crowds. Plans for independence went rapidly 
ahead under the UNIP government, and at midnight 23 October 1964 all was ready for 
the transfer of power. The Princess Royal of the United Kingdom ceremonially lowered 
her country’s flag. Kaunda raised the flag of the Republic of Zambia, and in doing so 
became its first president (NAZ 1972d: 4). 
This section has demonstrated that the struggle for self-government by both white 
settlers and African nationalists sharpened the antagonisms between settlers, the 
executive and the military on the one hand, and Africans on the other. The temporary 
failure by Africans to defeat the coercive measures of the colonial regime further 
weakened their position. The settlers almost achieved their goals by creating the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. However, the gradual evolution of African 
consciousness through the adoption of advanced methods of nationalist struggle and the 
support from other pan-Africanist movements sharpened the contradictions between 
Africans and the white settler regime. The timely constitutional intervention of Britain 
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and the assertion of its authority over colonial nationalists fragmented colonial coercive 
measures of civil control of the military and led to the triumph of anti-colonial 
nationalism. This marked the end of a period in which coercive ideas of enlightenment 
expounded under the theory of modernity provoked a racially discriminatory response 
that eventually resulted in the failure of the colonial project in Northern Rhodesia. As 
Kiwanuka (1970:104) has observed, 
colonialism should, therefore, be observed as one of the major progenitors 
of African nationalism because any people subjected to alien rule will 
struggle to overthrow that rule. The process may take a generation or 
century, but it is an inevitable stage. 
While Northern Rhodesia attained African majority rule in 1963, the Northern 
Rhodesia Regiment and the Defence Force were still linked to the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland. This continued to have a negative effect on civil control of the military. 
The next section explains the context in which federal forces were established and 
operated, how and why the federation was abolished, and what impact this had on civil 
control of the military. 
4.27 The Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Defence Force under the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 1953-1963 
In 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed with the 
legislative approval of four countries, namely Great Britain and the three constituent 
countries: Southern Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe); Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia); 
and Nyasaland (today’s Malawi). Also called the Central African Federation (CAR), it 
was guided by the philosophy of modernity that determined the colonial government’s 
administrative policies, but modified into a concept of ‘partnership and government by 
responsible men irrespective of race’ (Mulford 1967:242). In terms of this concept 
Africans and Europeans were to collaborate in governing the CAR. However, from the 
outset Africans rejected the policy of partnership as Europeans continued to discriminate 
against them. 
The headquarters of the CAR were in Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia. The 
federal government created its own military force called the Federal Defence Force. The 
Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Defence Force was renamed the Northern Rhodesia 
Territorial Force. This was legalised by the passage in the Legislative Council of the 
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‘Northern Rhodesia Ordinance Number 67 of 1953 that provided for the establishment 
and government of a Territorial Force’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1953:1). The 
Southern Rhodesia Regiment and Defence Force became the Southern Rhodesia 
Territorial Force, while the Nyasaland Regiment and Defence Force became the 
Nyasaland Territorial Force. 
The command structure of these forces also changed drastically. Before 
federation the prime minister of Southern Rhodesia was the commander-in-chief of the 
Southern Rhodesia Regiment and the Royal Rhodesia Air Force (RRAF). Under the 
Federal arrangements the Southern Rhodesian premier commanded the Southern 
Rhodesia Territorial Force. Territorial commanders also became answerable to the federal 
commanders who approved military hardware and any infrastructure development in each 
country. Before the CAR, the governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were the 
commanders-in-chief of their respective regiments and defence forces. However, since 
these territories were protectorates of the British government, each governor had to gain 
the approval of the British government before their regiments could implement certain 
commands. Under the federal arrangement, the British government surrendered this 
competency to the federal prime minister. While the federal prime minister had direct 
powers to command and use the federal forces, he could not use the territorial forces 
except with the special permission of the territorial governors. 
The headquarters of the federal forces were established in Salisbury. The 
headquarters of the three territorial forces remained Lusaka for Northern Rhodesia, 
Salisbury for Southern Rhodesia, and Blantyre for Nyasaland. As at 30 June 1962, some 
15 555 soldiers were employed on a permanent and pensionable basis by the federal 
defence forces, including the Royal Rhodesia Air Force (Howard 1963:34).  
Military and intelligence officers of the federal government were spread among 
the three territories that made up the CAF. The First Battalion of the Northern Rhodesian 
Regiment and the Second Battalion of the King’s African Rifles that were based in 
Northern Rhodesia were federal forces under the direct command of the Federal prime 
minister. The first battalion of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment consisted of soldiers from 
Northern Rhodesia, but commanded by white federal officers. The Second Battalion of 
the King’s African Rifles consisted of a majority of personnel of Nyasaland origin (NAZ 
1963:26). Under these administrative and command arrangements, the federal forces 
followed the discipline, promotion and demotion, and force operation structures defined 
by federal defence laws and the federal government. Territorial forces also observed 
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similar discipline, promotion and operational structures as defined by territorial 
governments and commands. However, in the case of the territorial forces certain 
decisions had to be approved by the federal commanders and the federal prime minister. 
Despite these elaborate administrative and command arrangements, the nature 
and mode of operation of these military forces reflected those of their colonial 
antecedents. This was because recruitment at territorial level continued to be the 
exclusive domain of a few selected tribes. The same types of personnel were transferred 
to the federal forces at the inception of the CAF, and their operations, and patterns of civil 
control, were guided by the economic, political, social and technological interests of 
white settlers and the British imperial government. This was evidenced by the large 
number of British subjects directly recruited to serve in the Federal Defence Force, as 
against those recruited in the CAF’s constituent territories. African political, economic 
and social rights continued to be trampled on by the federal government. As noted earlier, 
the clashes between nationalists and both territorial and federal forces worsened the 
relationship between Africans, the military, and the territorial and federal governments. 
The failure by the federal government to influence constitutional changes in the 
constituent territories as well as its inability to contain nationalist struggles for 
independence sowed the seeds for the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland.  
The structural changes that affected the government, the military, and civil 
control of the military took place between 28 June and 3 July 1963 when the Central 
African Conference on the dissolution of the Federation convened at the Victoria Falls 
Hotel in Southern Rhodesia. The purpose of the conference was to ‘work out detailed 
administrative mechanisms and arrangements for the reversion of Federal government 
functions to the territorial responsibility, in such manner and order, as could best 
contribute to their speedy and orderly reversion’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 
1963a:1). The conference was also tasked with setting a ‘target date for the dissolution 
after mechanisms for the apportionment of the public debt, other liabilities and assets, and 
the future of the Federal Public Service were worked out’ (Ibid:2). 
Chapter Seven of the Northern Rhodesia Conference report specifically dealt 
with the future of both the federal forces and territorial forces after the dissolution of the 
federal government. The conference decided that  
when the federal government ceased to exercise responsibility for defence, 
the operational control was to revert to that which obtained before 1953 
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when Southern Rhodesia was responsible for her own forces and the 
United Kingdom government had operational control of the forces in 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Ibid:10).  
Thus, although the federal forces were partitioned among three territories, the  
actual task of partition was made easier by the fact that it became a 
question of transfer to two commands - that of Southern Rhodesia and that 
of the United Kingdom government in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
In most cases the conference envisaged units passing under the control of 
either Southern Rhodesia or the United Kingdom according to their 
dispositions at that time (ibid). 
Members of the federal forces were allowed to decide in which territory they 
wished to serve after the dissolution of the federation. 
The conference also decided that the ‘physical assets of the forces were to remain 
with their units as they existed in 1963. However, the value of these assets was dealt with 
in the context of the general arrangements for the apportionment of Federal assets and 
liabilities’ (Ibid). The payment of retirement benefits and gratuities to members and 
former members of the Federal Defence Forces was dealt with on broadly similar lines to 
those of members of the Federal Public Service. A target date of 31 December 1963 was 
agreed for the dissolution of the federation. ‘This was on condition that substantial 
settlement by that time of the public debt and other liabilities and assets and the future of 
the Federal Public Service including that of the Defence Forces was completed’ (ibid). 
Two committees set up by government representatives at the Victoria Falls 
Conference carried out the physical dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. Committee (A) consisted of officials representing the governments of the 
United Kingdom, the CAR, and Southern and Northern Rhodesia. It was chaired by a 
British representative appointed after consultation with the other three governments. The 
terms of reference of the committee were to: 
1) work out detailed arrangements for the reversion of federal government functions 
back to its constituent territories; 
2) work out solutions for general problems arising from the dissolution of the 
federation, particularly the federal public service, and including parliamentary 
officers, members of statutory bodies, the armed forces, and the judiciary; and 
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3) make recommendations for dealing with federal assets and liabilities, including 
public debt, and if an apportionment commission was thought necessary, to make 
recommendations for its terms of reference, powers and composition (ibid:2). 
Committee (A) became an intergovernmental negotiating body, and its members 
were tasked with reaching agreement while referring to their respective governments 
as necessary as the work progressed. The Committee was also empowered 
to set up separate sub-committees for the examination of particular 
functions such as Defence and Security matters. The Committee was also 
required to set up special sub-committees for the consideration of the 
Federal Public Service and assets and liabilities (ibid).  
The presence of a British representative on each subcommittee was essential for 
their speedy and effective operation. Each government appointed ‘one principal (co-
ordinating) representative to the Committee and was free to nominate at will additional or 
alternate representatives or advisers to the Committee and its sub committees in 
accordance with the subject under discussion’ (Northern Rhodesia Government 1963a:2). 
Different ministries were obliged to send representatives when their ministries were being 
discussed. 
4.27.1 Federal dissolution: Defence arrangements in Northern Rhodesia  
The Sub-Committee on Defence and Security made arrangements for transferring 
control of federal troops to Northern Rhodesia. The committee decided that the ‘1st 
Battalion of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and 2nd Battalion of the Kings African 
Rifles are taken over by the Northern Rhodesia control. However, the Northern Rhodesia 
government agreed to retain en-bloc the 1st Battalion whose personnel was made up of 
mostly people from Northern Rhodesia. The 2nd Battalion of the Kings African Rifles was 
disbanded because the majority of its personnel were of Nyasaland origin’ (NAZ 1963b). 
These were the troops that had mostly been used by the colonial government to suppress 
nationalist movements. 
Both the Victoria Falls Conference and the Sub-Committee on Defence and 
Security agreed that it was beyond the capacity of the Northern Rhodesian government to 
take over the RRAF, or any of its bomber formations, and that it could not be divided into 
more than one effective striking force. This was mainly because the  
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Air Force pilots were mainly whites, most of whom preferred to work in 
colonial Southern Rhodesia other than black ruled Northern Rhodesia. In 
the light of lack of experience and education by the Northern Rhodesia 
Africans, the Committee decided to give Northern Rhodesia smaller 
transport aircrafts from the RRAF (NAZ 1963a:2). 
However, since Northern Rhodesia had made a major contribution to the creation 
of an air strike force during the federation, the committee ‘assessed the value of the 
RRAF assets and advised the Northern Rhodesia government to claim her share of the 
Defence Force assets including those of the RRAF in kind and/or in cash’ (NAZ 1963b). 
The committee also agreed that  
compulsory military service for whites had to be suspended until such time 
as the Northern Rhodesia government decided on the pattern, structure and 
size of the future of Northern Rhodesia Defence Force as well as on the 
policies for the future of the Northern Rhodesia Territorial Units, which 
had to be re-organised on a non-racial basis (NAZ 1963a:26). 
As noted earlier, the federal government maintained a Federal Intelligence 
Security Bureau. The committee on the dissolution of the federation decided to wind up 
the military wing of the Bureau on 31 December 1963, the date set for the dissolution of 
the federation. However, some staff members were offered employment with the 
Southern Rhodesian government. Remaining staff who were not selected or accepted by 
the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland governments were retired. ‘The three 
governments simultaneously shared the equipment for the intelligence equally’ (Ibid). 
After the various bodies dealing with the dissolution of the federation had 
completed their work, the British government issued Statutory Instrument Number 2085 
of October 1963 entitled ‘Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federal Dissolution Order-In-
Council’, which was assented to by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth of England on 20 
December 1963. In terms of this order, the federal government ceased to make laws that 
affected Northern Rhodesia. The instrument also dissolved the CAF and with it the 
federal government and federal legislature at midnight of 31 December 1963 (Northern 
Rhodesia Government 1963b:1). 
Mulford (1967:5) summarises the reasons for the dissolution of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland when he states that  
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In a sense the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a microcosm of 
all these various conflicting forces. … Race came to dominate not only 
politics but also almost all relations between Africans and Europeans. 
What one group gained, the other felt it had lost. 
4.28 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the coercive policies and structures 
established during the colonial period was undemocratic. This was because Northern 
Rhodesia was ruled by colonial civil servants whose tasks were to collect revenue and 
maintain law and order on behalf of the Imperial government and the settler community. 
In carrying out these responsibilities the nature and character of the regime’s methods of 
civil control of the military were characterised by the use of coercive measures that 
promoted policies of discrimination against Africans and in favour of the white settler 
community. This explains why this study has described the nature and character of 
military institutions during this period as two-faced, liked by some white settlers, and 
hated by most Africans. Under these repressive conditions, overall military command 
structures, recruitment, and training programmes remained under the control of civil 
institutions of governance, notably the governor, the legislative council, and the 
executive, especially the Ministry of Defence. The colonial government’s repressive 
actions, notably enforced by the military, was only ended by the defeat of the regime 
through democratic elections, as provided for under the 1964 independence constitution. 
How the new independent government reshaped the coercive racial discriminatory 
policies of the British colonial government, including measures for civil control of the 
military, is described and analysed in the next chapter. 
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5 CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN ZAMBIA: THE FIRST 
REPUBLIC, 1964-1972 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how the Zambian government used consensual measures 
to reshape racially discriminatory British colonial policies; how Zambia’s geographical 
position and its role in the liberation struggle for Southern African countries still under 
colonial regimes influenced the formulation of her foreign policy; and how these factors 
influenced the formulation of policies for civil control of the military. These included 
consensual democratic measures enshrined in the Independence Constitution, the repeal 
of discriminatory laws, and the development of some new military institutions such as the 
Defence Council and the Office of the Command Secretary. Other important influences 
over civil control of the military were the establishment of new physical military 
institutions, and changes in the defence budget process. Furthermore, the chapter assesses 
how the restructured military was used to good effect to crush the Lenshina uprisings, and 
the impact of these events on civil control of the military. It concludes by arguing that 
even when the country faced the problems of inter-party and intra-party rivalries and its 
role in the liberation struggle that led to the declaration of a one-party state, the 
president’s effective use of post-independence military structures and his executive 
powers under the Preservation of Public Security Act obviated military intervention in 
domestic politics in Zambia. It is also important to note that in 1964 Zambia’s political 
economy heavily depended on the exports of copper. ‘Copper amounted to 92% of the 
country’s exports, contributing 53% of the total government revenue and supplying 47% 
of the net domestic product (Hall 1969: 90)’. As a result of foreign exchange reserves 
provided by the copper mining, the first Zambian government had considerable financial 
resources at its disposal. This enabled the government to embark on a major programme 
of developing the missing social, physical and economic infrastructures such as 
educational, health and military institutions (Government of the Republic of Zambia and 
United Nations Systems in Zambia 1996: 20). We now turn to how the government 
instituted the missing social and physical infrastructures in the military and how this 
affected civil control of the military in Zambia. 
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5.2 Policy guiding military institutional development in post-independence 
Zambia 
As noted in chapter 2, at the time of independence the Republic of Zambia had 
some of the characteristics of a praetorian state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003:21-22). The new 
state encompassed 73 different ethnic groups, with different cultures and origins. The 
composition of the military reflected the divisive racial and ethnic policies of the colonial 
regime in terms of which military forces were designed to be instruments of both imperial 
and colonial rule. In external terms, Zambia was in a dangerous position in that it was 
surrounded by hostile colonial states which resented its policy of providing bases to 
liberation movements fighting colonial or settler regimes in other countries in the region. 
Given this vulnerable political position, we need to examine how democratic consensual 
measures in form of structural reforms of the military in the First Republic, and their – 
largely positive – effects on civil control of the military in this period. 
5.3  Consensual Measures Affecting Control of the Military in the First Republic 
Zambia’s new parliament was largely democratically elected by means of 
universal adult suffrage. This included the five members nominated by the president. This 
was in line with Article 60 of the 1964 constitution which stated that: 
The president may appoint as nominated members of the National 
Assembly five persons as he considers desirable to obtain the service as a 
member of the Assembly, by reason of his/her special 
qualification…..would be of special value as such a member (GRZ 
1964b:48).  
 One of its functions was to regularise the position and role of the military in 
post-independence Zambia, and its relationship with the government and citizenry. It did 
so by repealing all racist legislation related to the Zambian defence forces, and 
introducing a number of constitutional and other legislative reforms that had an important 
bearing on the nature and quality of civil control over the military. 
The Republic of Zambia (Modification and Adaptation) (General) Order, 1964, 
Section 3(b), stipulated that, from 24 October 1964 onwards, any reference in the existing 
laws to the governor of Northern Rhodesia was to be read and constructed as a reference 
to the president. This meant that all powers other than those specifically entrusted to 
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military commanders was now vested in the president. Article 49 (1) of the 1964 
constitution stated that 
The supreme command of the armed forces of the Republic shall vest in 
the President, and he shall hold the office of Commander-in-Chief (GRZ 
1965:63). 
Article 49 (2)(a) and (b) stated that: 
… the powers conferred on the President by subsection (1) of this section 
shall include (a) the power to determine the operational use of the armed 
forces, and (b) the power to appoint members of the armed forces, to make 
appointments on promotion to any office in the armed forces and to dismiss 
any member of the armed forces (ibid). 
Article 49 (3) also stated that: 
the President may, by direction in writing and subject to such conditions as 
he may think fit, delegate to any member of the armed forces any of the 
powers mentioned in subsection (2) of this section (ibid). 
In line with this, responsibility for the appointments, promotions and dismissals 
of Warrant Officers Class I and lower ranks was delegated to commanders and exercised 
in accordance with appropriate enlistment and service regulations.  
Air force commanders were also given powers to approve the selection and 
appointments of officer cadets on the basis of the recommendations of Officer Selection 
Boards. Army commanders were also given powers to select officer cadets for training 
courses overseas. After cadets had completed their training courses, their commissions 
had to be approved by the president. Besides this, the appointment of any officer other 
than a cadet could not be gazetted until the president had signed the certificate bearing his 
commission. These measures effectively placed the appointments of senior military 
officers under civil control. 
The president also continued the practice of appointing elected or nominated 
members of parliament as heads of the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters 1964e:5). This also helped to ensure civil control of the military, in line 
with established practice in democratic states. Parliamentary oversight over the 
presidential command of the armed forces and other functionaries was enabled by Article 
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49 (4) of the 1964 constitution, which stated that ‘Parliament may regulate the exercise of 
the powers conferred by or under this section’ (GRZ 1965:63). 
Within this framework, the government created important administrative and 
advisory institutions that facilitated civil control of the military in the First Republic – 
notably the Defence Council, and the Office of the Command Secretary. Another 
important step was the restructuring of military institutions in post-colonial Zambia. 
5.4 The Defence Council  
Phiri (2001:2) states that the ‘Defence Council was established in 1955, and its 
civilian oversight roles were adapted for the post-colonial situation after 1964’. However, 
our archival research indicates that the Defence Council was established by the post-
colonial government. Chapter 131 of the Laws of Zambia, Number 45 of 1964, 
promulgated in Government Notice No 497 of 1964, authorised the government to 
implement the provisions of the Defence Act. One of these provided for the establishment 
of the Defence Council, which was intended to play a key role in civil control of the 
military. Chapter 131, Section 8 (1) (2) and (3) state that: 
There shall be a Defence Council which shall advise the President on such 
matters of policy and matters affecting the command, discipline and 
administration of the Defence Force and shall perform such other functions 
and duties as may be referred to it from time to time by the President. 
The Members of the Defence Council shall be appointed by the President. 
The President shall have power to co-opt any other person as a member of 
the Defence Council from time to time as he may decide (GRZ 1964a:18). 
In line with these provisions, the formation of the Defence Council was approved 
on Tuesday 11 February 1964. Its first task was to examine the size and shape of the army 
and air wing (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964a:4). The Defence Council met for 
the first time at Government House on Saturday 7 March 1964. Since Northern Rhodesia 
was preparing for independence on 24 October 1964, K D Kaunda, then prime minister of 
Northern Rhodesia, attended and participated fully in the first meeting of the Defence 
Council (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964c:1). While the Ministry of Defence 
remained the main policy-making and executive body in respect of defence matters, the 
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Defence Council was charged with advising the president on matters related to defence 
policy and command, discipline and administration of the defence force as stated in 
Chapter 131 Section 8 (1) (2) and (3) above. 
The composition of the Defence Council was aimed at ensuring the maintenance 
of civil control of the military. Minutes of a meeting of the Defence Committee in the 
Ministry of Defence dated 31 October 1964 state that ‘the President’s Deputy, as 
Chairman of the Defence Council, will be the Vice-President, and no other alternate will 
be appointed at this time’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964e:1). Other members of 
the Defence Council were the ministers of Defence, Works and Supply, Transport, and 
Finance and Development; service commanders; and co-opted officers, depending on the 
issue under consideration. Besides the full council, three subsidiary committees were 
formed. The first was an Appointment and Disciplinary Committee, which was 
responsible for military discipline, appointments, promotions, honours and awards, 
training, and any other matters relating to personnel as determined by the chairman of the 
full council. It was chaired by a member of parliament and consisted of representatives of 
the army, air force, and civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters 1964e:7).  
The second was a Development, Administration and Finance Committee that was 
responsible for the size and shape of the defence force, its budget and budgetary controls, 
development projects, conditions of service, and the procurement of military equipment. 
It consisted of senior military officers responsible for the command and administration of 
the defence force and civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence, and was chaired by a 
former army commander who was a nominated member of parliament.  
The third was a Strategy and Policy Committee responsible for defence policy 
and strategies related to security, the presence of foreign nationalist parties in Zambia, 
international relations, and research and development programmes. It consisted of senior 
military officers responsible for the command and administration of the defence force, 
civilian officials of the Ministry of Defence, and the political advisor to the president. It 
was chaired by a nominated member of parliament.  
In all three committees, civil control of the military was ensured through their 
legislative and executive representatives (Ibid:7).  
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5.5 Office of the Command Secretary 
The government also established an Office of the Command Secretary of the 
Zambia Defence Force. The post of command secretary was filled by a senior military 
officer. The secretary and his office provided an important link between the defence 
force, government ministries, government leaders, and parliament, and therefore served 
as an effective avenue for exercising and maintaining civil control of the military. Among 
other things, the Office of the Command Secretary liaised with the Ministry of Finance 
and the Office of the Auditor-General over the preparation of the military budget and the 
monitoring of military expenditure. 
The command secretary and his staff were located in the Ministry of Defence. He 
was responsible to the senior finance officer of that ministry for financial matters 
affecting the defence forces. The senior finance officer reported to and was directed by 
the permanent secretary of defence, a civilian appointed by the president, who informed 
him of the financial policies applicable to the defence forces, which varied in accordance 
with agreements reached with the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 
1963b: 8). 
The command secretary collated annual estimates of expenditure prepared by the 
army and air wing commanders, and submitted them to the senior finance officer, 
together with required explanatory material. He provided advice to the commanders of 
the army and air wing on the interpretation and application of the approved estimates. 
He prepared monthly statements of expenditure for submission to the senior 
finance officer, and indicated committed and uncommitted balances on votes. He also 
submitted proposals to the senior finance officer for dealing with any likely over 
expenditure before these costs were incurred. He compiled material required by the senior 
finance officer for the preparation of annual financial returns. He oversaw the audit of 
army and air wing financial and stores records, and the submission of copies of audit 
reports to the auditor-general and the unit concerned. He also ensured the compilation of 
army and air force accounting regulations. In this regard, due consideration was given to 
ensuring that accounting procedures were effective, economical, and efficient. The 
Command secretary consulted the senior finance officer at any time when the need arose 
to vary approved estimates, and liaised with various ministries on financial details. He 
was a permanent member of the Defence Conditions of Service Committee, the Defence 
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Equipment Policy Committee, and the Defence Establishment Committee, and worked in 
terms of instructions issued by the senior finance officer (Ibid). 
Early in each financial year, the Ministry of Finance issued instructions for the 
preparation and submission of draft estimates of expenditure for the following financial 
year. The government then determined levels of expenditure by each ministry, and final 
estimates were then submitted to parliament. 
Initial responsibility for the preparation of estimates in the Ministry of Defence, 
in accordance with instructions by the senior finance officer, rested with the commanders 
of the army and air wing respectively. In the case of the army, the Pay and Record Office 
and estimate of other expenditure normally prepared the personal emolument estimates by 
the accounting authorities. Draft estimates were then passed to the command secretary for 
further processing, before submission to the senior finance officer. Draft estimates had to 
reach the Ministry of Finance in early December each year, and, after allocations were 
finally agreed, were [re]submitted in April to the Ministry of Finance for incorporation 
into the national budget. Departments in the Ministry of Defence were  
authorised to commit inescapable expenditure in advance of the voting of 
funds by the National Assembly at the Budget Session in July of each year. 
Authority to do so was usually conveyed through the Senior Finance 
Officer before the close of the Financial Year (Ibid). 
Within the authority of the approved estimates,  
the Commanders of the Army and Air Wing respectively could commit and 
expend monies without further reference to the Ministry responsible for 
Defence, subject always to the Defence Accounting Regulations and to any 
instructions issued by the Command Secretary. In cases where authority to 
expend was in doubt, or unforeseen expenditure arises not covered by the 
Estimates, the matter was referred to the Command Secretary for action 
(Ibid ). 
These functions and responsibilities of the Office of the Command Secretary 
ensured that military expenditure was closely monitored by civil authorities, which also 
became an effective method of civil control of the military. 
C I V I L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I T A R Y  I N  Z A M B I A  
 
 135
5.6 The restructuring of military institutions in post-colonial Zambia 
The restructuring of the army in post-colonial Zambia was an important 
consensual measure that played a key role in cementing civil control of the military. The 
government reviewed the composition of the army as inherited from the colonial period, 
confirmed the retention of some units, and closed others. Officers in units that were not 
retained, such as Military Intelligence were retired, and those serving in units that were 
retained had to demonstrate that they were loyal to the new government. This decision 
was taken because the Zambia Defence Force inherited British conditions of service for 
the officer corps, which was dominated by whites. Those officers were more loyal 
towards the Southern Rhodesian government than the Zambian government. In 1971 
Zambia decided to fully support the liberation struggle in Southern Rhodesia. In order to 
avoid spying by remaining British officers, the government decided to Zambianise the 
officers' corps, which resulted in the retirement of British officers (Kazembe, interview, 
2006). 
After extensive consultations with military experts, the government gazetted the 
units of the Northern Rhodesia army which it intended to retain in the post-colonial era on 
31 October 1964. These were:  
the Headquarters, Northern Rhodesia Defence Force; Northern Rhodesia 
Corps of Engineers, consisting of Number 1 Signal Squadron; and 
Northern Rhodesia Infantry consisting of the Northern Rhodesia Armoured 
Car Regiment 1st Battalion; the Northern Rhodesia 2nd Battalion; the 
Northern Rhodesia Regiment School of Military Training; the Royal 
Rhodesia Regiment; 3rd Northern Rhodesia Battalion and the Royal 
Rhodesia Regiment 7th Northern Rhodesia Battalion. Other military Corps 
and Units gazetted were the Northern Rhodesia Army Service Corps 
consisting of No. 1 Ordinance and Supply Company; station workshops 
Lusaka; station workshops Ndola; No 3 Supply and Transport Company 
consisting No. 12 supply and Transport platoon; and No. 14 Supply and 
Transport Platoon; and Northern Rhodesia Chaplains Department; Army 
Medical Corps; Pay Corps; and Educational Corps (Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters 1963a). 
C I V I L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I T A R Y  I N  Z A M B I A  
 
 136
In consultation with military officers and government architects, the government 
also authorised the construction of new headquarters for the Zambia Defence Forces in 
Lusaka: 
Under these arrangements three offices in the Secretariat Annex M Block 
28 were to be made available for the Air Force at the beginning of 
December 1963. The government further decided that the Air Force 
Headquarters was to be located alongside Defence Force Headquarters 
(Ibid ). 
The government also decided to establish an Air Force base at Livingstone 
commanded by officers who had agreed to be transferred from the Royal Rhodesia Air 
Force based in Salisbury. Since it became difficult for the Air Force Command in Lusaka 
to direct operations from the Livingstone base, the government decided to build a new air 
wing base in Lusaka. The construction of this new base began in December 1964. A total 
of GB £750,000 Sterling was released for the purpose based on GB£2.00 Sterling per 
square foot Headquarters’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1963a). The location of the 
command units in Lusaka – the seat of civil government – facilitated civil control of the 
military authorities. 
Most of the military personnel retained by the government had been recruited 
under the tribal and racial policies of the colonial government. Therefore, we need to 
examine the new policies introduced by the post-independence government with regard to 
military recruitment, training, and the Zambianisation of the defence force between 1964 
and 1972 – and their effect on civil control of the military. 
5.7 Military recruitment and training, and the Zambianisation of the defence 
force 
The post-independence government abolished all racial or ethnic discrimination 
in recruitment for the Zambia Defence Force – an important step that facilitated effective 
civil control of the military in the First Republic. The government was aware that 
ethnicity had played a major role in military intervention in domestic politics in the 
Congo, and a military mutiny in Tanzania. As a result, it abandoned the use of race and 
tribe as a basis for military recruitment, and introduced the motto of ‘One Zambia, One 
Nation’. In terms of this approach, recruitment for the defence force was guided by 
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Article 49 of the Constitution of Zambia, as quoted earlier, and the 1964 Defence Act 
Chapter 106 of the Laws of Zambia. CAP 106 provided for: 
The creation and maintenance in Zambia of a Defence Force consisting of 
an army, comprising the Regular Force of the Army, the Territorial, Army 
Reserve, and Air Force comprising the Regular Force of the Air Force, the 
Auxiliary Air Force, the all Air Force Reserve; to provide for the 
conditions of discharge of the soldiers from the Regular Force and for their 
transfer to the Reserve Force when necessary in the public interest (GRZ 
1964b:5). 
Accordingly, young men and women from all 73 ethnic groups in Zambia 
qualified for recruitment as officer cadets as well as lower ranks as long as they met the 
minimum entry and application qualifications. Recruitment took place in both urban and 
rural provinces. Rural resident secretaries were asked to report on the recruitment 
potential in their provinces. After conscription by the Military Selection Board, conscripts 
were subjected to the same medical check-ups used during the colonial days. Thereafter, 
they were trained under the supervision of expatriate British military personnel brought 
into the country under the British government’s ‘loaned personnel agreement’ (Ministry 
of Defence Headquarters 1964a). This agreement required British military specialists to 
train Zambians for key posts in the Zambia Army Technical Corps and other specialist 
units. The conscripts were trained in military drill, warfare, discipline, and all other 
aspects taught to conscripts in the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, as noted in the previous 
chapter. After training, these soldiers were employed on a pensionable basis, and posted 
to various barracks under various commands. 
While men could enter the defence force as combat troops, women recruits joined 
in support roles such as nurses, secretaries, accountants, and logistics and administration 
personnel (Kazembe, interview, 2006). These measures ensured effective civil control of 
the military as no single ethnic group dominated the defence force, and the possibility of 
one ethnic group organising a successful military coup d’etat – as had happened in 
Nigeria – was very remote. At the same time, military authorities were required to 
maintain standards in order to avoid a loss of efficiency in the defence force. Given the 
problem of the emulation of western military institutions, which was the main cause of 
President Nkwame Nkrumah’s overthrow in Ghana in 1966, President Kaunda frequently 
addressed the military. 
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The most important of his speeches was delivered at a seminar for army and air 
force officers at Kalewa barracks in Ndola on 21 March 1967. In it he 
warned against military seizure of political power. In his warning he 
asserted that the military is ‘ill equipped to rule’ and that consequently, the 
coup d’etat is followed by ‘an inevitable train of disaster and general 
chaos’ and by ‘an inevitable return to the dark ages.’ He, then, exhorted the 
officers to channel their energies into acquiring professional competence 
instead of planning or plotting to wrestle political power from the civilian 
authorities (cited in Mtshali 1972:155-156). 
The Zambian government further defused the emulation problem by deciding 
that, while it was important to maintain good relations with Sandhurst Military College in 
Britain, officers should also be trained at other institutions within and outside the 
Commonwealth. In the interests of uniformity, Zambian military officers who had been 
trained elsewhere had to undergo further training and reorientation. Therefore, the 
government established a nine-month cadet course and other orientation courses at the 
School of Military Training at Kohima Barracks in Kabwe. 
It was hoped that these policies would improve the relationship between the new 
government, the new officer corps, and the citizenry, and would gradually change the 
people’s view of the military from that of an oppressive colonial instrument to that of a 
protector of the people. The government was also aware that ‘post-independent Zambia 
was a member of both the Commonwealth and the United Nations. It was, therefore, 
important for the new government to have a viable army in order that it could make a 
useful contribution if the United Nations or a Commonwealth country sought assistance’ 
(Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964a:2). To this end the government re-examined 
policies for the recruitment and promotion of Zambian officers, which is examined in the 
next section. 
5.8 The selection and training of army officers 
The policy for selecting and training army officers was guided by three main 
principles. The first was that officers should be selected on a non-racial basis. However, 
until such time as the racial imbalance inherited from the colonial era had been rectified, 
the numbers of Europeans selected as officers had to be restricted. The Defence Council, 
for instance, decided that only one out of every six cadets sent for training could be a 
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European. The second principle was that suitable African warrant officers and senior non-
commissioned officers had to be commissioned from the ranks after a restricted officer 
training course. They were then promoted to captain after two years, and to major after a 
further five years. The Defence Council also decided that best officers had to be promoted 
far more rapidly than previously, including to battalion command, but this would be 
reviewed in the light of the developing political situation. 
The third principle was that all outstanding young African officers, especially 
those trained at Sandhurst, had to be rapidly advanced. It was decided that young officers 
had to progress up the promotion ladder more rapidly than those in the British army as 
they would have to take over from older officers due to retire in five to ten years after 
independence. The Defence Council further decided that the following time scale had to 
be taken as a guide: 
Lieutenant: three years after starting a Cadet course; Captain: six years 
after starting a Cadet course subject to recommendation and passing a 
promotion examination; Major: nine years after starting a Cadet course 
subject to recommendation and passing a promotion examination; and 
Lieutenant Colonel: by selection from those among the best officers 
(Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964a). 
These policies had to be backed by training capacity at officer training schools 
both in Zambia and abroad. To this effect the new government, through the Defence 
Council, also decided that a high and uniform standard of training for officer cadets had 
to be maintained, and that they should be trained at officer training schools in England 
and other Commonwealth countries. At the time of independence the officer training 
allocation to Northern Rhodesia was six a year at Sandhurst, and 12 a year at Mons. The 
new government negotiated with the British government for an intake of 12 a year at 
Sandhurst, and 24 a year at Mons. The Defence Council was requested to investigate the 
possibility of obtaining placements at other Commonwealth officer training schools. The 
government decided to send two cadets annually to Canada. The Defence Council was 
further asked to investigate the suitability of the officer training school in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, despite the fact that the language difficulties this would involve could reduce 
the effectiveness of the training. Following a decision to proceed with training in Addis 
Ababa, the government decided that the returning officers should also be trained under 
Commonwealth methods when they returned to Zambia. 
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The government further decided that when the number of African officers had 
increased sufficiently to occupy most command appointments, a corps of European 
instructors could be formed to continue addressing their lack of experience. It also 
recognised that, given the rapid envisaged increase in the number of African officers, a 
stage would be reached where further promotion would be blocked for large numbers of 
officers. It therefore decided to implement an early retirement scheme for officers who 
had served in the colonial and federal regiment, as well as European officers in general 
(Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964: 4). This enabled the government to provide 
promotion opportunities for post-independence military officers. These opportunities 
continued to make the military work in harmony with the government, and their 
relationship improved further with the Zambianisation of the defence force, to which we 
now turn. 
5.9 The Zambianisation of the defence force 
In 1968 the government decided to Zambianise most senior posts in the civil 
service and parastatal corporations. In respect of the defence force, this process entailed 
giving Zambian officers supernumerary appointments before expatriate officers were 
retired. In terms of this arrangement, the Zambian officers worked side by side with the 
expatriate officers until the latter finally left. This enabled the military administration and 
government to prepare for a smooth handover from white expatriates to Zambians. It also 
enabled military and civilian administrators to observe how the Zambian officers 
performed their duties during the transitional period, including their loyalty to their 
country and government. If an officer failed to carry out his military responsibilities, and 
his loyalty to the government of the day was questionable, he could be removed without 
causing bad feelings, as the officer would have known that he was under observation. 
This method of administering military personnel enabled civil administrators to instil the 
principle of the subordination of the military to civil political authority. The direct 
appointment of officers to various command posts was discouraged, as this gave both 
military management and civil authorities no room to manoeuvre if the officer did not 
make the grade and needed to be removed from his post. The system of supernumerary 
appointments was also advantageous in the sense that ‘it did not give enough room to 
expatriate officers to destroy vital documents or engage in sabotage activities before their 
departure from office’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1970a). 
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On the basis of these procedures, expatriates holding key military posts were 
given notice of the ‘termination of their contracts, and Zambian officers replaced them. 
The appointments were on condition that the officers remained loyal to the civil 
authorities, failure to which would lead to their dismissal’ (ibid). The permanent secretary 
of defence further reminded officers that  
the President and the Commander-in-Chief expected them to discharge 
their duties with utmost loyalty, devotion and diligence. The appointees 
were further reminded that these were temporary appointments whose 
confirmation depended on the officers’ abilities to carry out their duties 
efficiently and loyally to the government of the day and the nation at large 
(ibid). 
Similarly, in terminating expatriates’ contracts of service with the Zambia Army 
and Zambia Air Force, the minister of defence thanked them for their loyal and dedicated 
service. The officers were informed that their retirement was necessary because of the 
policy of Zambianisation. The retired officers were reminded that the stage for  
Zambianisation had been reached because of their great assistance in 
preparing Zambians to take responsible positions. Such a task required 
great men who have the ability to train someone whom they know would 
eventually take their positions and that those who had succeeded to do this 
deserved unreserved words of praise and appreciation for such an 
achievement that could only be done by very few people who believed in 
rendering service to their fellow men regardless of race (Ministry of 
Defence Headquarters 1970b). 
While the process of Zambianisation was under way, the posts of director of 
Intelligence and of Security and Political Education in the Ministry of Defence were left 
vacant until suitable people had been trained to fill them. By 1971 a 
Chief of Military Intelligence had been appointed. This measure assisted 
the government to train an indigenous cadre that replaced the white officers 
who continued leaking information to Salisbury, in their capacity as 
military intelligence officers, in the light of Zambia’s open policy of 
supporting liberation movements (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 
1970c). 
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The post of director of Home Guards was also left vacant until the national 
service scheme had been in operation for two years. In the meantime the ‘affairs of the 
Home Guards were to be dealt with by the Assistant Director for Home Guards in the 
National Service Headquarters’ (ibid). 
The process of Zambianisation continued until 1971. However, in March 1972 
some retired expatriate military officers warned President Kaunda that they viewed the 
removal of British officers from Zambian military commands with some misgiving. They 
advised him that when Kwame Nkrumah had assumed office as the first president of 
Ghana he had been strongly advised by political leaders in India and elsewhere to retain 
British officers throughout his military commands, for reasons which became obvious 
from the moment he dispensed with them. The officers further stated that although 
Nkrumah’s regime became progressively unpopular, the traditional loyalty of British 
officers would have averted the military coup in which he was summarily deposed. It was 
extremely unlikely that a regular British officer would dishonour his sworn allegiance to 
any ruling authority, regardless of whatever politics such authority pursued, and that an 
officer troubled by conscience on any injustice in his environment could satisfy his 
honour by resigning his commission and retiring from further service. The former officers 
further reminded the president that  
Zambia was a wonderful country, and the people were easy to get on with 
at all levels of society, and that it was indeed going to be tragic if any 
subversive influences were permitted to mar the picture of a Zambia many 
former expatriate military officers knew so well and remembered with 
nostalgia. The officers concluded by wishing the President sincerest wishes 
for his continued efforts under conditions so few people really appreciated 
(Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1972). 
The government took note of this warning, and decided that the contracts of 
remaining expatriate military personnel would be allowed to run up to the end of the 
Zambianisation programme. At that point the government would decline any requests for 
renewals. In this way the government allayed fears among remaining expatriates of being 
instantly discharged. Although this delayed the Zambianisation programme, it 
nevertheless gave the Ministry of Defence time to train replacements using Zambia’s own 
resources. The warning also prompted the government to start developing a Department 
of Military Intelligence, and it began to train officers in this field. 
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While the Zambian defence forces continued to send officers for training to 
military institutions in Britain and other Commonwealth countries, they also started to 
send officers 
for military training in Communist countries such as Yugoslavia, China, 
Russia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany. The 
military training that the officers learnt in these Communist countries also 
included an element of political education (ibid).  
Chinese and other communist military experts were also invited to conduct 
military training exercises within Zambia, involving Zambian military personnel. This 
began the process of gradually changing the outlook of the Zambia Defence Force from a 
purely professional formation to a partly politicised one. 
While new recruitment, training, and Zambianisation policies had been 
implemented, the government had to find an appropriate way of deploying these 
graduates among the ethnic groups of Zambia. In the next section, we examine the 
Zambian government’s decision to establish new barracks in both rural and urban areas, 
and the implications of this decision for civil control of the military in the immediate 
post-independence period. 
5.10  Physical military institutional establishment 
The post-colonial government faced a number of political challenges that also 
influenced its decisions about the defence forces. As noted in chapter one, Zambia’s 
geographic location was perilous in that it was surrounded by hostile colonial states that 
opposed the government’s policy of providing bases to liberation movements fighting for 
the independence of their countries in the region.  
In July 1964 a religious sect led by Alice Lenshina rose up against the new 
government and advised its members not to recognise the national flag or national 
anthem, or respect government authorities. Faced with both external and internal threats, 
the newly elected government decided to develop its own military institutions and 
arsenals. However, it decided to avoid any involvement in external defence issues until up 
30 June 1965. In terms of this policy the military authorities were advised that they would 
not be required to undertake any operations outside the national borders. However, they 
would be expected to deal with any internal security problems, within the limits of trained 
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units available. They would also be expected to deal with minor cross-border incursions 
not amounting to co-ordinated armed assaults. The air force, on the other hand, was 
expected to continue fulfilling its role of airlifting up to one company of troops or police 
to any trouble spot. The implications of the above ‘policy was that “fly-in” 
reinforcements could be required in the event of any major emergency outside the scope 
of these modified roles’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1964d). 
In December 1965 the government, through the Ministry of Defence, allocated 
‘GB£2,100,000.00 that resulted in the construction of the Military Training Establishment 
of Zambia (Miltez) at Kohima Barracks, Kabwe’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 
1965a:2).The school comprised an  
officer training wing; officer’s cadet training wing; weapon training wing; 
driving and maintenance wing; signal training wing; and specialist training 
wing. The training school was expected to produce efficient military 
officers and other leaders to man the non-commissioned posts in the 
expanded Army. By the end of 1968, the school had produced a total of 
1,067 warrant officers and non-commissioned officers broken down as 12 
warrant officers class 1; 40 warrant officers class 2; 117 colour sergeants; 
229 sergeants; and 669 corporals (ibid).  
At the same time, the Ministry of Defence also moved the School of Military 
Training from Kalewa Barracks in Ndola to Kabwe. In December 1965 the government 
released ‘GB£1.4 million for the raising and training of fourth and fifth Battalions 
excluding a further GB£320,000 for equipment and recurrent expenditure of 
GB£556,000’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1965a:3). 
These training facilities inside the country facilitated civil control of the military 
in that officer cadets could also be politically educated. Cadets were informed of the evils 
of colonialism against Africans and other indigenous populations in the Third World, and 
how different peoples had fought for their emancipation. They also learnt how the 
Zambian people had ‘struggled to get their independence and the problems that the 
indigenous people still under colonial rule in the neighbouring countries were still going 
through’ (UNIP Archives 1978: 99-100). According to Grey Zulu, former vice-president 
of Zambia and the longest serving chairman of the Defence Council, the officer cadets 
were also taught how western countries persuaded power-hungry and disgruntled officers 
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whom they had trained to overthrow their nationalist leaders, as had happened in the 
Congo and Ghana. 
They were also taught that, given ‘Zambia’s geographical position, it was 
important to have an army that was nationalistic and loyal to the government of the day 
and its people. These lessons instilled the officer cadets with the ideals of nationalism and 
patriotism’ (Zulu, interview, 2005).  
In line with this, Zambia’s armed forces were based along railway lines as well as 
in rural provinces. This mean that they were well placed to respond to any incursions by 
troops of minority regimes in the region in pursuit of nationalist guerrilla fighters based in 
Zambia. Dispersing troops throughout the rural areas also minimising the risks of 
presenting concentrated targets to any aggressor, especially air attacks by minority 
regimes. Stationing troops in rural areas had the additional benefit of stimulating 
economic development in those areas.  
The disadvantage of dispersing military forces was that, given the relative lack of 
infrastructure and other resources, notably good roads and suitable airfields, it would be 
more difficult to deploy them rapidly and effectively. The problem was compounded by 
the fact that, at the time of independence, the country did not have sufficient Zambian 
officers to command more than two battalions. The government was also aware that the 
initial and recurrent costs of maintaining troops in rural areas were greater than doing so 
along railway lines. 
Given Zambia’s geographical position, and an accurate analysis of the advantages 
and disadvantages of dispersing its military barracks, the government decided on a policy 
of dispersal, because of the economic benefits this would provide to the rural areas where 
the barracks were located. This approach was politically significant to local people, as 
these forces provided them with a sense of security. The presence of barracks in rural 
provinces also worked as a ‘deterrent to foreign troops and governments to organise local 
insurgents as they did in Southern Angola and Northern Mozambique, which turned these 
provinces into centres for the internal destabilisation of their own governments and 
people’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1965b: 1). In this way, the dispersal of 
military barracks led to a positive interaction among citizens, the military, and the 
political authorities. This policy was further strengthened by the creation of the third wing 
of the Zambia Defence Force, the Zambia National Service (ZNS), to which we now turn. 
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5.11 The Zambia National Service 
The establishment of the ZNS created a third wing of the Zambia Defence Force, 
which led to stiff competition over the sharing of resources and promotion prospects in 
the Ministry of Defence. However, instead of causing friction among the forces, as was 
the case in Uganda, the ZNS relieved the Zambia Air Force and Zambia Army of some of 
their internal responsibilities, thus allowing them to concentrate on defending Zambia 
against external attack. Moreover, the government’s policy of dispersing ZNS camps 
throughout the country resulted in close ties between the military, the citizenry, and the 
government. 
After 1964 the UNIP Youth Wing, which consisted of young men who had 
played an active role in the struggle for independence, had to be looked after carefully by 
the new government. If this was not done, it was felt that those unemployed youths could 
engage in criminal activities which could endanger the security of the country as a whole. 
The government also had to deal with food shortages, caused by the fact that a number of 
white commercial farmers had migrated to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa after 
1964 as they did not want to be ruled by black Africans (Baylies 1978:512-515). The 
party and government therefore decided to introduce a programme of ‘agrarian 
revolution’, in which the youths were the major participants. This programme was further 
necessitated by a worldwide economic recession, which seriously affected the Zambian 
masses despite the availability of abundant natural resources.  
 The government felt that it was important to take advantage of the economic 
hardships and establish production units in the form of youth centres all over the country, 
in order to attain the objective of creating a self-reliant nation. These District Youth 
Production Camps were established in all 70 districts in Zambia and were controlled by 
the director of the Zambia Youth Service, who was a civilian. Recruitment was voluntary. 
The centres concentrated on producing maize, sunflower, tobacco, and groundnuts, and 
rearing cattle, sheep and goats. Recruits were also trained in skills such as carpentry and 
bricklaying. Following heightened tensions between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia 
caused by the latter’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, the Zambia 
Youth Service changed its name to the Zambia National Service, and was now mandated 
to provide youths with basic military training, thus enabling them to guard vital military 
installations. 
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5.11.1 Change from the Youth Wing to ZNS 
In 1971 the government decided to transform these youth centres into both 
defence and development centres. To implement this, parliament passed ‘The Zambia 
National Service Act No 35 of 1971. The Act provided for the establishment, 
maintenance, government and discipline of the Zambia National Service and for matters 
incidental thereto’ (GRZ 1971:1). It enabled the military training of all Zambian citizens 
attached to former District Youth Centres as well as the Zambia National Service, and 
directed the ZNS to produce agricultural foodstuffs for the army and the nation as a 
whole. It was also required to build houses, roads and bridges and provide other 
productive services required by the military as well as by civilians. Therefore, from the 
outset the service provided a direct link between the military, civil authorities, and the 
citizenry, especially with regard to services rendered to the community. 
In motivating the act in parliament, the minister of defence argued that in African 
traditional society every man and woman was basically a farmer during peacetime and a 
soldier during wartime. This system of training allowed everyone to defend himself or 
herself, and complemented the efforts of those regarded as the ‘present regular army’. In 
traditional society the role of the army was to keep the enemy at bay while the whole 
community was engaged in making spears, bows and arrows, knobkerries and shields 
(National Assembly of Zambia 1971:2000). 
The minister further observed that after independence the Zambia Youth Service 
had been established as a pilot project aimed at channelling the energies and skills of 
youths who had helped to win Zambia’s independence into other constructive roles, such 
as agriculture, carpentry and bricklaying. 
The developmental objective of the ZNS was to prepare participants for food 
production in peacetime, and defence in times of war. It was argued in the House that the 
ZNS would quickly equip thousands of Zambian citizens with military skills and provide 
them with an opportunity to render useful service to the nation, whether during an 
emergency or on developmental projects. 
The formation of the ZNS was aimed at helping the regular military forces to stop 
or prevent the violation of Zambia’s territorial integrity, and the regular destruction of 
villages and property along Zambia’s borders by white colonial regimes. The House 
further agreed that the ZNS would involve all Zambians aged between 18 and 35 
regardless of their educational qualifications. Clause 5, sub-clauses (1) and (2) of the 
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same act provided for the compulsory enlistment of all persons who had completed Form 
V education with effect from 1975. 
Two types of camps were created, namely military training camps and production 
unit camps. One military training camp was established in each of Zambia’s eight 
provinces, and one production camp in each of its 70 districts. Since each camp was to be 
self-reliant in terms of food production and other services, they were all located on a 
minimum of 1 000 acres of arable land. Vegetables, maize, chickens, cattle and other 
products were produced, which were used to feed the camp personnel and the regular 
army. Any surplus was sold to the general public. In this way, the legislative intention to 
make the ZNS contribute directly or indirectly to national economic and military growth 
was achieved. Training members in agriculture, bricklaying and carpentry also provided 
villages and others areas with useful skills and manpower. In order to avoid conflicts 
between the army and the ZNS, the House directed that army officers would work as 
tutors and instructors, thus providing leadership in the early stages of the development of 
the ZNS.  
Given this, the ZNS was looked upon as a service for the people and by the 
people. Upon graduating from the service, youths became members of the Home Guard 
Unit which was tasked with defending the security of the nation as and when the need 
arose. In 1971 the ZNS was integrated with the army and air force. This called for the 
restructuring of the defence forces as a whole, which had positive implications for civil 
control of the military in the First Republic. This process will be dealt with in the next 
section. 
5.12 Integration of the Zambia Army, Zambia Air Force, and Zambia National 
Service 
In 1972 the government decided to integrate the army, air force, and national 
service into one force, named the Zambia Defence Force. The expansion of the roles and 
functions of the Zambia Defence Force was necessitated by the transformation of the 
Zambia Youth Service into the Zambia National Service, which was tasked to perform 
defence and security duties. In order to facilitate the integration process, army officers 
were seconded to the ZNS as company commanders and instructors. In this sense the 
functions of the Zambia Army personnel were identical to the activities of the Zambia 
National Service. The reorganisation also required the strengthening of the Ministry of 
Defence by bringing in senior military personnel as administrators. These officers were 
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expected to work side by side with their civilian counterparts in tackling the many 
problems that were expected to emerge as a result of the reorganisation.  
The president continued to appoint the minister of defence and his permanent 
secretary. The post of head of the Department of Military Intelligence and Security, 
which was formally recognised as a government department in 1971, but did not have any 
physical structures, was upgraded to chief of military intelligence and security. The 
president also appointed this functionary, because the chief of military intelligence and 
security co-ordinated all matters related to operational, strategic, and tactical intelligence 
as well as other security matters in the army, air force, national service, and defence 
headquarters. This intelligence was reported to the minister of defence for onward 
transmission to the vice-president and finally the president (Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters 1970c). Despite the fact that Zambia had a liberal-democratic multiparty 
constitution, the Office of Chief of Military Intelligence and Security was an important 
one, given the country’s policy of providing bases to liberation movements fighting 
remaining minority regimes in the region. 
Furthermore, instead of having one command secretary, the government created 
three similar posts that were all based at the Ministry of Defence Headquarters. These 
were the army secretary, the air force secretary, and the national service secretary. The 
three secretaries – who bore the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Zambia Army and ZNS, 
and squadron leader in the Air Force – were directly supervised by the chief of military 
intelligence and security. The three secretaries continued to perform the functions of the 
Office of the Command Secretary in their respective wings. In this sense, they became the 
principal co-ordinators of all technical and budgetary matters relating to their respective 
wings. These post played an important role in civil control of the military, as their 
occupants continued to answer to the auditor-general, the Ministry of Finance, and other 
civil authorities in terms of their annual budgets.  
The government also created the post of army commander, and abolished the post 
of chief of staff. In terms of this arrangement, all the battalion commanders, senior 
officers in charge of departments, and directors fell under the army commander. A 
lieutenant-colonel from the army was appointed as commandant of the ZNS, replacing the 
director, who was redeployed elsewhere in the public sector. Eight other officers bearing 
the rank of major or captain were appointed to command the eight provincial national 
service camps. The expansion of the Zambia Defence Force created greater prospects for 
promotion, and increased the number of people whom the government could call upon in 
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case of any serious security threat, both internally and externally. These arrangements 
ensured that civil control of the military remained firmly in the hands of the civilian 
political authorities. 
These new recruitment and training policies and the establishment of new 
military structures had financial implications. How this affected parliament’s oversight 
role over defence expenditure, and its implications for the role of parliament in 
maintaining civil control of the military in the First Republic, will be examined in the 
next section. 
5.13 The defence budget 
In the period 1964–9 the Zambian government continued the colonial policy of 
tabling an annual defence budget for approval by parliament. Welch (1976:8) argues that 
budgetary supervision is the most powerful means of maintaining civil control over 
military establishments. Despite the fact that Zambia’s foreign policies placed it at risk of 
retaliation by neighbouring minority regimes, the Ministry of Finance trimmed the 
defence budget every year, as it did with those of all the other ministries. The defence 
force operated under highly centralised and very rigid control by civil government 
departments, which resulted in organisational difficulties at the top. The army was 
administered by a Defence Department in the Office of the Vice-President, and 
financially controlled by the Ministry of Finance. A satisfactory system of collaboration 
between the two departments was difficult to develop. The result was that ‘endeavours to 
apply a very centralised and rigid control of the defence force led to conflict between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Defence Department’ (Wina, interview, 2006).  
The approach of the assistant secretary: finance was that in course of the phased 
build-up of the army it was simpler to apply one code of regulations to all military 
departments in respect of the allocation and release of funds from the annual budget. 
Since the Ministry of Finance applied this practice to all other government ministries, the 
defence force was no exception.  
The command secretary, on the other hand, believed that a lack of funds could 
adversely affect the formation of an efficient army, the Zambianisation of the defence 
force, promotion prospects for serving members, and the security of the nation. It was 
therefore important for the government to realise that the administration of the army was 
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different from that of other government departments, and that special financial 
arrangements were required. 
After examining the financial problems at hand, the government found that a 
problem of overcentralisation did exist. This manifested itself in a reluctance on the part 
of the Ministry of Finance to delegate financial powers to the defence department. Two 
examples were cited. The first was that delegated powers of write-off were limited to 
losses not exceeding GB£10, and the second was that all Boards of Survey required 
Ministry of Finance approval. Even if these instances were not very important in 
themselves, they served to illustrate the general pattern. The government further learnt 
that the Ministry of Finance feared that if some financial powers were delegated, control 
over the use of public resources would be diminished to unacceptable levels.  
As a result, the government advised the Ministry of Finance that everyone to 
whom financial powers were delegated would be accountable for his/her use of those 
powers. In addition, the criteria for delegation would be the extent to which work could 
be saved, and the officials to whom these powers were delegated should be senior enough 
to make delegation acceptable. The cabinet further pointed out that the phased build-up of 
the army had to be tailored to meet military requirements rather than be tied to a method 
developed for civil departments. There were, of course, limits to this. This was because 
the administration of the army had to be governed by the general financial principles of 
the Zambian government, and the methods of estimating and controlling expenditure had 
to fit in with the Ministry of Finance systems. The general principles of public accounting 
and stores control were universal in British and former British administrations, and it was 
only necessary for the army to differ in matters of detail. 
Another problem that emerged between the Ministries of Defence and Finance 
was that the system of procurement of stores and equipment common to other 
government departments was cumbersome. In a small organisation such as the Zambian 
government, it was logical to centralise procurement to some extent. This could prevent 
the duplication of provisioning organisations, and could also result in more economic 
purchases. The government did not quarrel with the general proposition that the army 
could procure common user stores through existing civil departments, but there were 
instances in which separate purchases by the army could be as economical, and 
procedurally simpler. In any case, there was no fundamental reason why purchasing 
procedures should be cumbersome.  
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The government decided to iron out this difficulty by emulating a workable 
system practised in Britain in terms of which finance officers in the Defence Department 
were responsible to an accounting officer. They were also responsible for ensuring that 
the administration was economical, and that regulations issued by the Treasury or 
Ministry of Finance were observed. They were the channel through which financial 
propositions were made to the Treasury, but had no direct loyalty to it. Their 
responsibility for good husbandry derived not from supervision by the Treasury but from 
their loyalty to their own accounting officer, who was responsible to parliament for the 
performance of their department. 
Given the huge planned expenditure on the defence and security sector, the need 
arose to resolve the problems between the ministries of Defence and Finance. On 12 
August 1969 President Kaunda directed the permanent secretary of development and 
finance to ‘put K2.9 million in the estimates for the special fund so as to enable him to 
meet the challenges announced in the 1968 economic reforms and the military offensive 
launched by minority regimes against Zambia’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters, 12 
August 1969). In acknowledging the receipt of the letter from the president, the 
permanent secretary advised that  
after consultation with the Attorney-General, and the Auditor-General, the 
inclusion of the provision for security and the special fund under Head 99 
and without subjecting the same to debate in the House was not 
constitutional and could make the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Development and Finance be subject for queries by the Auditor-General 
and the Public Accounts Committee (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 
1969a). 
Auditors in the Permanent Secretary’s Office in the Ministry of Development and 
Finance further advised that special expenditure by the Special Division in 1969 had been 
abused, and that this had led to over-expenditure. The undersecretary (budget) further 
stated that: 
I am extremely perturbed about disquieting rumours that I have heard 
regarding the possible abuse of the special expenditure held by Special 
Division. I am quite well aware that of necessity in this sphere there must 
be more than an element of secrecy, but I really do feel that the present 
system can lend itself to abuse. The Senior Finance Officer in the Office of 
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the President is merely requested to write out cheques, sometimes of very 
large denominations, to individual officers. The officers concerned at all 
give no explanation. I wonder whether it might be possible for you to 
inquire into this and at least perhaps recommend that the sole authority for 
disbursement of funds rests with the Permanent Secretary (Ministry of 
Defence Headquarters 1969e). 
Despite this timely warning by the permanent secretary and undersecretary on the 
possible abuse of defence and security funds, the cabinet approved a memorandum from 
the president stating that the constitution should be amended to provide that: 
(a)  The annual financial report required to be laid before the National 
Assembly pursuant to Section 110 of the Constitution shall not disclose 
details of Constitutional and Statutory Expenditure; 
Expenditure on Defence matters and special expenditure relating to 
security shall, to the extent authorised by the President, be charged on the 
General revenue; and 
The present duties of the Auditor-General under Section 113 of the 
Constitution shall be clarified so as to distinguish between the Audit of 
Accounts relating to the expenditure of money’s appropriated by 
Parliament and the audit of accounts relating to the expenditure of moneys 
charged on the general revenues (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 
1969d:2). 
Accordingly, on 21 January 1970 the Constitutional (Amendment) (No 6) Act, 
1969 was tabled in the House of Assembly. The government supported the bill on the 
basis that it was important to ensure that Zambia’s expenditure on defence and matters of 
public security was not made public. In the past, this expenditure had been published in 
both the printed estimates and the annual Financial Report. As both these documents were 
not confidential, the information was therefore available to anybody interested in it, 
including Zambia’s enemies. 
The House was further reminded of the vulnerability of Zambia’s geographical 
position and of the acts of aggression committed against it by minority regimes in the 
region. It was therefore important for the Zambian government not to sit back and watch 
its people suffer without taking appropriate defensive action. The government therefore 
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felt that, in the interests of peace and security, defence expenditure should not be 
published, and the bill before the House achieved that. The government noted that Head 
99 Special Expenditure was not subject to debate in the House, and that what was now 
being sought was a logical extension of the same principle. 
Clause 2, Section 110(2) of the constitution required the financial report to show 
all government expenditure for a given year, including on defence and public security, 
which it felt had to be kept secret. Public security involved those officers who worked 
either in military or civil intelligence that were not yet backed by any act of parliament. 
The government therefore decided to amend section 110 to read: 
(2) Section one hundred and ten of the Constitution is amended in 
subsection (2) by the deletion of ‘the expenditure of the government in that 
financial year’ and the substitution therefore of ‘the expenditure of the 
government in that financial year other than expenditure charged by this 
constitution or any other law on the general revenues of the Republic (GRZ 
1970:79)  
The government also introduced a new clause 3 which made defence and public 
security expenditure a direct charge on the general revenues of the Republic. This meant 
that this expenditure no longer needed to be shown in the printed estimates or in the 
financial report. It would merely form part of a lump sum under ‘Constitutional and 
Statutory Expenditure’, and no details would be published. The relevant new section read: 
112A. ‘Expenditure of the government for purposes of defence and public 
security shall, unless the President, by statutory instrument, otherwise 
orders in respect of any head of such expenditure, be charged on the 
general revenues of the Republic’ (ibid). 
The government also introduced a new clause that clarified the duties of the 
auditor-general under section 113 of the constitution. Subsection (d) ensured that the 
auditor-general would still be able to audit defence and public security expenditure, while 
internal auditors of the Ministry of Development and Finance were excluded. Such 
reports by the auditor-general could only be seen by the president, who would decide 
either to keep it secret, publish it, or distribute it in any other way he thought fit. The 
government assured the House that normal financial controls would continue to apply to 
military expenditure – the more so now that this expenditure was no longer subject to 
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public security, which continued to apply to all other government expenditure. The 
president also assured the Ministry of Development and Finance, through its permanent 
secretary, that ‘he was going to make it clear to those who handled those funds that this 
was not going to mean carelessness on the part of any public officer insofar as public 
funds were concerned’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1969b). 
On 30 January 1970 the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill was read for a third 
time, and became law when the president assented to it. Parliament had voluntarily 
abdicated its responsibility for debating defence and public security expenditure. This 
violated the principle of the separation of powers and checks and balances between the 
executive, legislature, and judiciary. It also led to the negation of one of the fundamental 
principles of civil control of the military in that the people’s representatives were denied 
an opportunity to actively participate in decisions that involved the allocation of public 
resources to defence and security institutions. 
The other effect of this decision was that it substantially increased the influence 
of the armed forces in the decision-making process. For instance,  
the offices of army commander, air commander and commissioner of 
police were now given dual responsibilities of being commanders of these 
forces and ministers of state in their respective ministries. This allowed 
them direct access to party and government policy on security issues 
(Masheke, interview, 2005). 
These measures not only weakened civilian political control over the armed 
forces, but enabled the ‘armed forces to assume responsibility for decisions that were 
fundamentally political in nature which was the allocation and distribution of finances 
within the Zambia Defence Force; the formulation of personnel policy; and major 
decisions related to defence planning’ (Williams 1993:12). It also brought a ‘top-heavy 
military bureaucracy within the executive reaches of the Zambia Defence Force. This 
brought the emergence of a new category of civil servants in uniform’ (ibid). 
The decision also gave the Zambian government leeway to quietly take money 
from the national coffers to pay for the ‘movement, food, and other expenses of the 
members of the various liberation movements in conjunction with other countries like 
Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania and the countries in the Soviet Communist bloc’ (Masheke, 
interview, 2005). When asked, in an interview conducted for this study, about the 
negative consequences of the same decision with regard to parliamentary oversight, 
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former president Kaunda replied that ‘it was the best way of handling the situation at the 
time’ (Kaunda, interview, 2005). Furthermore, to allow the government to continue 
curbing both internal and external threats to national security, parliament agreed to pass 
emergency acts and regulations that were undemocratic. How these affected civil control 
of the military in Zambia will be examined in the next section. 
5.14  Emergency powers passed by the House of Assembly 
Besides the budgetary measures discussed in the previous section, the House 
showed that it took Zambia’s external and internal threats seriously by allowing the 
government to legislate for emergency powers, and establish the Zambia Security 
Intelligence Service. To this end the National Assembly passed the Emergency Powers 
Act Chapter 108 No 43 of 1964, which empowered the president to make regulations 
whenever ‘an emergency proclamation is in force: to specify the matter which may be 
provided for in emergency regulations; to provide for the duration of emergency 
regulations; and to provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing’ 
(GRZ 1964c:1). 
The act further empowered the president to make such regulations as he deemed 
necessary for securing the ‘public safety, the defence of the Republic, the maintenance of 
public order, and the suppression of military rebellion and riot, and for maintaining 
supplies and services essential to the life of the community’ (GRZ 1995b). The act 
empowered the president to provide for the ‘detention and exclusion from the Republic of 
persons who are not citizens of Zambia’. It also authorised the president ‘to take 
possession or control on behalf of the Republic of any property or undertaking other than 
land; authorise the entering and search of any premises … and provide for the 
apprehension, trial and punishment of persons offending against the regulations’ (ibid). 
These presidential emergency powers were later backed by the Zambia 
Intelligence Services Act, Chapter 109, No 43 of 1973, which formalised the existence of 
civil and military intelligence in Zambia.  
This act provided for the establishment of the ‘Zambia Security Intelligence 
Service, its functions and discipline; and matters incidental thereto or connected 
therewith’ (ibid). The functions of the service were to: 
1) collect, correlate and evaluate intelligence relevant to the security or interests of 
the Republic; 
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2)  disseminate such intelligence to government institutions in such manner as the 
President may direct; 
3) advise government, public bodies or institutions, and statutory bodies or 
corporations on the protection of vital installations and classified documents; 
4) vet all persons who may have access to classified information; 
5) co-ordinate and supervise the activities of any Ministry or Department of 
government, the Armed Forces and Police Force in so far as such activities relate 
to security intelligence, and to act as a channel for the dissemination of the 
intelligence obtained from such activities; 
6) in the exercise of his/her functions and performance of his duties, an intelligence 
Officer shall have all the powers conferred on a Police Officer by or under the 
Preservation of Public Security Act and the State Security Act and an Intelligence 
Officer shall be deemed to be a Police Officer for the purpose of those Acts; and 
7) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, an 
Intelligence Officer, while on duty, shall be entitled to carry such small arms as 
may be prescribed by regulations made under this Act, and may, in the course of 
his duties, use such arms in circumstances where use of arms is necessary and 
justifiable (GRZ 1998: 80). 
The passage of these draconian and anti-democratic pieces of legislation were 
important for the maintenance of civil control of the military, in the sense that both the 
military and civil intelligence played key roles in thwarting the Lenshina uprising 
between 1964 and 1968 as well as the 1980, 1990, and 1997 coup attempts, thus ensuring 
that governance by civil authorities continued to prevail. 
However, the act was draconian and anti-democratic in the sense that it 
empowered security officers to violate citizens’ rights to privacy and freedom of 
movement and association. It contributed to what Decalo (1992:12) termed the 
‘production of presidential authoritarianism of various degrees of repression, disdain for 
civic and human rights and enabled a small cabal of influentials to erode any existing 
semblance of democracy and justice’. 
As noted earlier, one of the immediate threats to internal security at the time of 
independence was the political challenge to the new leadership posed by the Lumpa 
Church uprising in August 1963. How the government dealt with this threat while 
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ensuring that governance by civil authorities continued to prevail is examined in the next 
section. 
5.15 UNIP and the alienation of members of the Lumpa Church, 1964-8 
The uprisings of members of the Lumpa Church led by Alice Mulenga Lenshina 
on the eve of Zambia’s independence presented its new political leaders with a serious 
challenge. The new president, Kenneth Kaunda, had to deal with the complex process of 
multiparty politics and nation-building. In the case of the relationship between Kaunda’s 
ruling UNIP and the Lumpa Church the conflict originated from the Cha Cha Cha 
campaigns in which ‘UNIP members’ use of violent methods of victimising Lumpa 
Members who did not possess UNIP cards annoyed the church leadership’ (Mulenga 
1998:36). Alice Lenshina, the founder of the Lumpa Church, reacted to this development 
by staging a rally at Kasomo in May 1962 at which she condemned the lawlessness and 
political violence of UNIP members. In the competition for political supremacy between 
UNIP and the ANC after the 1962 elections, UNIP decided to eliminate all forms of 
disloyalty to it in its strongholds in Northern, Luapula and Eastern provinces. Mulenga 
(1998:37) states that  
UNIP saw itself as Zambia. Those who withheld support from UNIP were 
simply regarded as not just political opponents but as enemies of the 
nation, and had to be crushed to submission so that they did not delay the 
objectives of the Party.  
UNIP followers implemented this principle by launching a village-to-village 
party card-checking exercise in Chinsali, and instant punishment was meted out to non-
UNIP cardholders such as Lumpa followers. 
Between 1962 and 1964 UNIP members beat up Lumpa followers wherever they 
found them, burnt their houses, destroyed their crops, and restricted their movements. 
Lumpa members moved around in groups so that if they were attacked by UNIP 
members, they could fight back. Thus, between 1962 and 1963, the Chinsali Rural 
Council observed that 
the fights organised by the Lumpa Church included axing villagers at 
Bright village in Chinsali in 1962. In 1963, they set 11 houses on fire and 
injured many people at Kapimpa, Chief Nkula, Chinsali; attacked villagers 
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at Kaseya village, Chief Mwinecifungwe in Isoka, killed six UNIP 
members in Lundazi, attacked UNIP members at Mucheleka, beat up a 
UNIP man at Kasama village in Kasama; killed 10 and injured 60 UNIP 
people in Chinsali; killed 2 UNIP people in Lundazi and killed 2 UNIP 
people in Mpika (NAZ 1964: 10). 
The violence against UNIP came to head in June 1964 when clashes between 
UNIP and the ANC leaders intensified. According to Mulenga (1998:51), UNIP alleged 
that 
Lenshina was being armed and financed by opposition political parties led 
by Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, Tshombe of Zaire, Michelo and Welensky. 
UNIP further stated that some arms destined for Lenshina’s headquarters 
from Welensky were intercepted by UNIP leaders. It was also alleged that 
Tshombe had sent bags of money to Lenshina through Nkumbula and 
Michelo to support her fight against UNIP. 
In an attempt to subdue the worsening political conflict, the government sent 
police patrols to the Chinsali area in June 1964 during which  
police inspector Dereck Smith was killed and his body dumped near the 
river with his penis cut and put in the mouth. The death of Smith turned 
what was a conflict between UNIP and the Lumpa Church into a rebellion 
against the government and Kaunda termed it as the Lenshina uprising 
(NAZ 1964:8 ). 
The government reacted to this  
rebellion by de-registering the Lumpa Church on 3rd August 1964 because 
its activities had become prejudicial to peace, welfare and good order in the 
country. Sir Evelyn Hone, the last colonial Governor and Kenneth David 
Kaunda, the first African Prime Minister and President of UNIP, decided to 
use government resources and troops from the 1st and 2nd Northern 
Rhodesia Regiment armed with artillery, automatic rifles and armoured 
cars to silence Lumpa members in Chinsali, Lundazi, Isoka and Chama 
once and for all (Ibid). 
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In the ensuring conflict between government troops and the Lumpas, official 
statistics indicate that  
in the last half of 1964 in Northern and Eastern provinces the Lumpa Sect 
members killed 185 villagers, wounded 128 people, killed 7 members of 
the forces of law and order. Due to retaliatory attacks by non Lumpas, 40 
Lumpas were killed, 472 perished while resisting police and army, and 
over 5000 Lumpas were put in re-education centres in Luwingu, Chinsali 
and Mufulira districts, 34 pupils lost both their parents during the uprising 
(ibid). 
Mulenga (1998:iv-v), a sympathiser of the Lumpa, states that in these areas 
soldiers killed nearly everybody, including women and children, they 
found in the villages whether challenged by Lumpa members or not. 
Slitting their throats or bayoneting them through the heart finished off the 
casualties. Small children who were injured were either stepped on or 
bashed against trees or buried beneath dead bodies where they died of 
suffocation. The bodies of Lumpa members were later buried in mass 
graves in Chinsali, Isoka, Lundazi and Chama. 
This behaviour by soldiers in the period immediately preceding independence 
presented the new political leadership with the challenge of changing the mentality of its 
security personnel from that of colonial soldiers to that of troops operating under a 
multiparty democracy. Otherwise the actions of the soldiers would have serious 
implications for civil-military relations, with Zambians able to claim that the new 
political leaders were using the military against citizens in the same way as the 
colonialists had done. 
On 11 August 1964 Alice Lenshina and 10 of her deacons handed themselves 
over to the government, and were placed in detention in Kalabo and Senanga. This 
enabled the government and security forces to round up more than 5 000 Lumpa members 
who were roaming the countryside, and place them in re-education centres in the 
Northern and Eastern provinces. The implications of this development for civil control of 
the military will be examined in the next section. 
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5.16 Implications of the Lenshina uprising for civil control of the military 
The activities of a deviant religious group on the eve of Zambia’s independence 
were not sympathetically received by non-Lumpas. The non-Lumpas in the Northern and 
Eastern provinces of Zambia co-operated with government officials and military forces 
against members of the Lumpa sect, because they were bitter over the loss of their houses, 
food, loved ones, and children at the hands of Lumpa members. Even when Lenshina and 
ten other detainees escaped from Kalabo and Senanga prison in October 1967, ‘a 
combined civilian, police, army and air force operation code-named “Operation Stallion” 
was successfully carried out to try and recapture the escapees’ (NAZ 1967b). The 
operation was only called off when Lenshina and ten others were handed over to Kalabo 
police by guerrilla fighters of the Movement for the Peoples Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA), who had captured them in Angola while they were on their way to Zaire. 
In 1968 the Lumpa members, both those in exile at Mokambo in the DRC and in 
re-education centres in Zambia, agreed with the Zambian government that it was in the 
interest of the common good and the maintenance of social order that they be resettled in 
their former villages. The repatriation and resettlement programme began on 20 June 
1968, and involved the use police officers, immigration officers, army personnel, and 
district secretaries. Transit camps were set up at 
Mkushi, Mpika, and Chinsali for the Lumpas going to Northern Province. 
Other transit points were made at Chongwe, Nyimba and Chipata for the 
Lumpas going to the Eastern Province. The District Secretaries arranged 
for the dispersal to their villages in consultation with the local chiefs and 
Headmen (NAZ 1965a:1). 
Importantly, despite the blood spilt as a result of the Lenshina uprising, the post-
colonial state managed to find an acceptable solution among UNIP, the government, 
members of the Lumpa sect, ordinary people, and the military. After crushing the 
rebellion, the army was actively involved in resettling the defeated people. The post-
colonial state’s methods of civil control of the military, strongly influenced by the new 
syllabus at the school of military training in Kabwe, gradually changed the attitude of the 
military from one of oppressing its own people to a humanitarian one. Hence the assertion 
by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:22) that ‘the major problem of the post-colonial state is that it 
was largely incapable of undertaking the expected role of mediating between competing 
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and contending forces within society’ began to be disproved by the mediation methods of 
the Zambian government in the process of finally resolving the Lumpa uprising. 
The next challenge to civil control of the military in the First Republic involved 
the provision of bases for foreign nationalist parties. How the Zambian government 
harmonised its relations with the military in spearheading the liberation struggle against 
minority regimes in the region – in sharp contrast with Nkwame Nkruma’s forces – will 
be examined in the next section. 
5.17 The impact of foreign nationalist parties based in Zambia on civil control of 
the military, 1964-1972 
After attaining independence, Zambia became a member of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) whose political objective was to complete the political liberation of 
all Africans still under colonial and apartheid rule. As noted earlier, Zambia’s location in 
Southern Africa and its foreign policy objectives resulted in the country providing bases 
for liberation movements from neighbouring state which were still under minority rule. 
Foreign nationalist parties were allowed to operate in Zambia provided they were 
recognised by the OAU. The government decided that liberation movements could 
establish offices in Zambia under the following conditions:  
offices could be opened in Lusaka and other provincial headquarters in the 
border provinces. Office bearers and members of these organisations were 
allowed to operate within the country with special permission from the 
Office of the President. Furthermore, office bearers in Lusaka were 
required to render to the office of the President details of itineraries and 
programmes of their officials operating from their offices (NAZ 1965b). 
By 1965 a number of nationalist organisations had been recognised by the OAU, 
and had established offices and military bases in Zambia. They included the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the 
African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress of South 
Africa (PAC), the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, the 
Mozambique African National Congress, the Union of Populations of Angola (UPA), and 
the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (ibid). 
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Colonial regimes launched armed raids on the military wings of these liberation 
movements, both in their countries of origin and at their bases in Zambia. The incursions 
of both SWAPO and ANC guerrilla fighters over the 180-kilometre border on the Caprivi 
Strip between Zambia and Namibia resulted in the South African government intensifying 
military patrols, and building an airstrip capable of handling large aircraft. In response, 
the Zambian government built security roads in the same area, such as the Sesheke-
Kalomo and Mwandi Kuti-Mambova roads. The activities of South African troops in this 
area prompted the Zambian government to deploy military forces in order to defend the 
country’s borders and its people against racist incursions. 
On the border with Southern Rhodesia, clashes between nationalist guerrilla 
fighters and Southern Rhodesian troops were reported near ‘Salisbury and Kariba in 
Southern Rhodesia and at Siavonga, Chirundu and Feira in Zambia between 1964 and 
1967 in which the racist regime lost a number of troops’ (NAZ 1967a). This forced the 
Smith regime to embark on its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, 
and engage the guerrillas in Southern Rhodesia and at their bases in Zambia. In addition, 
the failure by the British government to grant Southern Rhodesia independence in return 
for services rendered during World War II angered Rhodesian whites (Jardim 1978:11). 
This forced the Zambian government to deploy forces on the border with Southern 
Rhodesia, and develop strategic roads and airstrips. 
Nationalist guerrilla fighters from Angola and Mozambique fought against 
Portuguese troops in the eastern, western and north-western areas of Zambia. The 
Zambian government was forced to deploy its troops in these provinces to protect the life 
and property of Zambian citizens as well as the territorial integrity of the country. 
The deployment of military forces in five of Zambia’s provinces brought an 
important change in civil control of the military. Military forces were now predominantly 
used to defend the territorial integrity of the state against external enemies, in contrast 
with the colonial period, in which they were largely used for internal security purposes. 
At the same time, the gap left by the defence forces in guarding strategic installations was 
filled by national service personnel who assumed the responsibilities of home guards 
during the colonial period. Zambian citizens’ attitude towards the military gradually 
changed from viewing them as oppressors to regarding them as protectors of their lives 
and property against colonial and apartheid troops that hunted their black brothers in the 
border villages. Therefore, civil control of the military was no longer adversarial or racist, 
but was characterised by good relations between the government, citizens, and the 
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military. Whereas the government had a responsibility to protect the lives and property of 
its citizens, citizens were also sensitised to report the presence of troops from 
neighbouring colonial regimes to security personnel deployed in their areas. 
The last major threat to civil control of the military in the First Republic was the 
problem of inter-party and intra-party rivalries. How and why the Zambian government 
ensured that this was not used as an excuse for military intervention in domestic politics – 
as had happened in Zaire under Patrice Lumumba, and in Ghana under Nkwame 
Nkrumah – is examined in the next section. 
5.18 The impact of inter-party and intra-party conflicts on civil control of the 
military  
The period 1964-72 was one in which many African regimes were overthrown as 
a result of inter-party and intra-party rivalries. This was compounded by the fact that 
during the ‘formal transfer of power at independence, civilian control as nurtured in Great 
Britain was not effectively transferred in toto to Commonwealth States that gained 
independence after World War II’ (Welch 1978:160). To understand what was actually 
transferred, Price (1971:399-430) examined the ways in which perceptions of civil 
control of the military in the ‘case of Ghanaian senior military officers contravened 
nationalistic interests and democratic governance’. 
Price (ibid:399-403) argues that ‘behavioural controls of ex-colonial armies 
suffered from the problem of non-nationalistic and non-puritanical African military 
officers as a result of emulating the traditions of training, ideology and values based on 
the Western military format’. As a result, he developed the notion of ‘the emulation 
paradox under the Reference Group Theory that psychologically made the ex-colonial 
officers identify themselves with the traditions, symbols and values of the ex-colonial 
power’ (ibid:402–32). ‘Such identifications and commitments, in the case of Ghana, 
affected the behaviour of military officers … in their relations with civilian political 
authorities … in ways that were neither explicable nor predictable in terms of the formal 
organisational model’ (ibid:407). Conversely, post-independence methods of civil control 
of the military suffered from a lack of ‘experienced political leadership in dealing with 
the civil control of the military. This was because British Colonial Administration in 
Africa and Asia provided little training to enable politicians to meet the demands of the 
armed forces’ (Welch 1978:162). A ‘putative Minister of Defence lacked a long 
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apprenticeship during which he could learn how to carry through civilian control, and this 
diminished the chances for effective political oversight of the armed forces’ (ibid). 
In this context, the military authorities in Ghana found it difficult to respect the 
constitutional provisions that made the president the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces in the place of their former white commanders. Therefore, instead of strengthening 
African nationalist leadership and interests both locally and regionally, as they had 
previously supported ‘British rule in its genesis and continuation’, the Ghanaian military 
command worked against the ‘genesis and continuation’ of nationalist leadership. In at 
least three instances, Dr Nkwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president, undertook ‘major 
policies that ran counter to the extra-Ghanaian political loyalties of his officers, in the 
Rhodesia and Congo situations and in the matter of acceptance of military aid from 
Communist Countries’ (Price 1971:413). Furthermore, despite the appeasement of 
officers through a policy of Africanisation that led to the replacement of white British 
officers with indigenous Ghanaians, the psychological commitments of these officers to 
British and Commonwealth interests rather than those of Ghana and Africa prevented 
them from differentiating between black and white, and they overturned Nkrumah’s 
government in 1966. 
Zambia’s economy was relatively stable. However, its military was passing 
through the same phase of gradual changes to suit the post-independence era. Zambia’s 
political leaders were also going through the process of implementing its new military 
policies and transforming the behaviour of its military personnel from that of a colonial 
soldier to that of taking up the challenges of a post-colonial state. But why did the 
Zambian military not use inter-party and intra-party rivalries and the gradual reorientation 
of military training away from western to Soviet-style methods as excuses to overthrow 
the Zambian government? And how did the Zambian government manage to retain its 
control of the military in this period, and prevent it from following its West and East 
African counterparts in overthrowing their civilian governments? 
Firstly, unlike in Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda, where troops were mostly confined 
to barracks, all military personnel were kept busy in border areas preventing the 
incursions of minority regime troops into Zambia. Troops confined to barracks were kept 
busy with combat and weapons training. Thereafter these troops were moved to the 
borders to relieve those who had spent lengthy periods in the operational zones. These 
military schedules prevented the development of ‘political activists in the military 
organisation who are frequently members of political clubs and conspiratorial cabals 
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within the military that plan and conduct military coups and military interventions in 
politics’ (Perlmutter and Bennett 1988:16). 
The Zambianisation of the military took six to 15 years. Zambian officers had to 
understudy their expatriate colleagues for a specified period before their appointments 
were finally confirmed. During their probation period, officers in both civil and military 
intelligence closely monitored the behaviour of each officer, both at their places of work 
and elsewhere. If an officer was found to be disloyal to the regime, the commander-in-
chief revoked his appointment. This process enabled the government to replace expatriate 
officers with Zambians loyal to the government of the day. When the problem of 
insufficient budgetary allocations cropped up between 1969 and 1970, the government 
did not become intransigent, like the Busia regime in Ghana. Instead, as noted earlier, the 
commander-in-chief, with the approval of parliament, assumed direct responsibility for 
allocating defence expenditure. These measures, while not commensurate with accepted 
democratic practices of transparency and accountability, ensured that the Ministry of 
Defence received an adequate annual budget. 
5.19 Inter-party rivalry 
This study defines ‘inter-party rivalry as the struggle between the different 
political parties for political supremacy and support among the Zambian electorate’ 
(Chikulo 1979:201-203). In this period the dominant parties were the ruling UNIP under 
Kaunda, and the ANC under Nkumbula.  
During the campaigns for the 1968 presidential and parliamentary elections, 
members of the youth wings of these parties fought against one another. They threw 
stones, disrupted rivals’ meetings, blocked roads with rocks and logs, and burnt political 
opponents’ grass-thatched houses. UNIP also promised jobs to ANC members who 
defected to its ranks. 
These clashes became a recipe for chaos and tribalism that could have resulted in 
military intervention in domestic politics. Given the fact that UNIP had 57 seats in the 
House of Assembly as compared to the ANC’s 10 seats at the time of independence, 
UNIP leaders thought the ANC would go into voluntary liquidation, leaving UNIP as the 
sole political party (UNIP Annual General Conference proceedings; 14 to 20 August 
1967:10-11). However, instead of dying a natural death, the ANC steadily increased its 
support. By the 1968 general elections the ANC had increased its seats in parliament from 
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ten to 23. Hence it became clear that UNIP was not going to succeed in establishing a 
one-party state system of government through the ballot box. The main cause of this 
problem was conflicts within UNIP itself. 
5.20 Conflicts within UNIP 
The conflicts within UNIP revolved around differences over regional 
representation in the cabinet, and membership of the central committee. The struggle over 
posts in the government and regional representation reached serious proportions during 
the UNIP general conference at Mulungushi in August 1967. This was because the party 
changed the procedure for election of central committee members. The previous system 
required the party president to make a list of possible members of the central committee, 
which was then submitted to the serving central committee for consideration. Once 
accepted, the list was passed on to the national council for further consideration. After 
approval by the national council, the list was then submitted to the general conference, 
which finally elected the central committee.  
The new system opened up the election of members of the central 
committee through democratic means. The results of the application of this 
method produced a central committee that was dominated by members 
from Northern and Luapula provinces. North-Western and Western 
provinces had no representation. Worse still, on 7 September 1967, then 
President Kaunda reshuffled his cabinet on the basis of the 1967 UNIP 
general conference election results. This alignment of the central 
committee positions with those of ministerial positions angered UNIP 
members who had no representation in the central committee (Zulu, 
interview, 2006). 
As a result of this infighting, Nalumino Mundia, a former member of the central 
committee, formed a splinter party called the United Party (UP), which was dominated by 
people from the Western Province. Kaunda responded in 1968 by imprisoning Mundia 
and banning the party. In order to preserve party and national unity, the central committee 
then decided that no province should have less than two cabinet ministers, and the party 
president was mandated to implement this decision. This resulted in the removal of some 
elected members of the central committee from Northern and Luapula provinces from 
their ministerial positions to make room for those provinces that had no representaion in 
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the cabinet. This move angered Northern Province members of UNIP (Kaunda, interview, 
2005).  
In 1971, therefore, a further split occurred in UNIP through the formation of the 
United Progressive Party (UPP), led by Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, and dominated by 
people from Northern Province. The formation of the UPP as another opposition party by 
disgruntled members of UNIP threatened the survival of the latter party, and politics 
based on ethnic considerations threatened the unity of the country. Pressure within UNIP 
to declare a one-party state mounted. President Kaunda and his government banned UPP, 
and on 4 February 1972 Kapwepwe and 124 members of his party were detained under 
the Preservation of Public Security Act. 
In order to preserve national unity and prevent the military from taking advantage 
of the political divisions within the ruling party, on 25th February 1972 President Kaunda 
finally announced that his government had decided that Zambia should have a One-Party 
System of government in which a participatory type of democracy would be practised. 
Accordingly, a National Commission of Inquiry led by the then Vice-President, Mr 
Mainza Chona, was appointed under Statutory Instrument No. 46 of 1972 pursuant to the 
Inquiries Act, CAP 41. The terms of reference for the Chona Commission were to ‘work 
out recommendations on how the One-Party System of government was to be 
implemented in the interest of the people and not on whether the people wanted the One-
Party System of government’ (GRZ 1972:1). 
On 13 December 1972 Kaunda declared a one-party state. This outlawed not only 
the ANC but also any future initiative to establish opposition parties. As the then vice-
president, Mainza Chona, succinctly put it  
Zambia had found from bitter experience that the multi-party system of 
Government encouraged indiscipline as crooks jumped from one party to 
another (like monkeys jumping from one tree to the other) spreading 
dissension by false rumour. They also encouraged tribalism, and now 
scoundrels have no refuge in one-party participatory democracy. We have 
fixed them; they are now like monkeys having only one tree (Times of 
Zambia, 14 December 1972). 
Later, UNIP’s leaders convinced Nkumbula and other ANC leaders to join UNIP. 
In June 1973 Kaunda and other UNIP leaders met Nkumbula and members of his party in 
Choma, and signed the Choma declaration. Nkumbula agreed to dissolve the ANC, and 
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instructed the national headquarters and provincial, district and area branches of his 
former party to identify with UNIP. 
Importantly, whereas inter-party and intra-party conflicts were a major cause of 
military coups, interventions and mutinies in some West and East African states, the 
Zambian government managed to avert this through the effective use of the Preservation 
of Public Security Act and the Inquiries Act of 1967. These measures did not allow the 
military to intervene in civil politics. In this way, civil control of the military in Zambia 
effectively remained in the hands of the civil authorities, albeit at the cost of civil 
liberties.  
5.21  Conclusion 
In the period 1964-72 the independent government of Zambia used consensual 
measures to reshape British imperial civil–military relations, that had discriminated 
against Africans, to suit the new Zambian state. Parliament, the executive, and the 
judiciary now consisted of people who represented the interests of all Zambians. All 
discriminatory legislation that caused friction between Africans, the colonial government, 
and the military was repealed.  
Under the motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’, policies related to the 
recruitment, training and promotion of members of the Zambia Defence Force now 
opened doors to all nationals regardless of colour, sex, creed, or ethnic origins. This study 
has also shown how the executive dealt decisively with incidents such as the Leshina 
uprising and inter-party and intra-party rivalries by using emergency powers provided by 
new security legislation. Thus stability was maintained at the cost of introducing political 
repression, the erosion of civil liberties, the politicisation of the military, and the 
undermining of transparency and accountability in defence expenditure. We will turn to 
these factors in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
6 CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY DURING ONE-PARTY 
RULE, 1973–1990 
6.1 Introduction 
In the Second Republic, Zambia’s political economy was modelled along 
socialist lines. UNIP became supreme and the only legal political organization in the 
country. In the economy the state took a leading role through the establishment of 
parastatal companies and centralized planning became the main method of managing the 
country’s economy (Sardanis 2003: 222). In the middle 1970s the shrinkage in copper 
earnings, the increase in oil import bills, the failure to reduce the exchange rate and the 
debt service requirements caused a sharp decline in Zambia’s economic performance. The 
average annual growth rate in gross domestic product fell from 2.4 percent in this period 
to 0.7 percent ‘lagging well behind even the modest level of growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a whole’ (GRZ  1996: 22).The country further failed to make necessary 
adjustments in economic policy and public expenditure, accumulating massive macro-
economic imbalances (ibid: 22). Its support for liberation struggles in Southern Rhodesia 
and apartheid South Africa made it a target for military attacks and economic 
destabilization by the regimes of those countries. It also suffered economic hardships 
because of international sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. These 
regional conflicts served to ‘reduce Zambia’s scope for manoeuvre, both politically and 
economically’ (ibid: 22). Zambia’s role as both supporter and victim of the liberation 
struggle was also used by the ‘government as a means of diverting attention from its 
failure to make tough domestic policy decisions’ (ibid: 22). Faced with all these political 
and economic problems the government leadership decided that the most appropriate way 
to avert a military takeover of government and maintain stable civil control of the military 
was to introduce coercive measures characteristic of socialist one party state 
governments.  
 
In this chapter, therefore, it is argued that civil control of the military under the 
one-party dispensation in Zambia from 1973 to 1990 was exercised through largely 
coercive l controls of military personnel, with military and civil intelligence as well as 
party organs in the military establishment acting as the eyes and ears of the civil 
government. Zambia modelled its one-party system on those in communist countries, and 
a brief examination of the dynamics surrounding civil control of the military in the Soviet 
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Union will be instructive. Kolkowicz (1967:19-21) notes that relations between the 
Communist Party and the military establishment in the Soviet Union were characterised 
by coercive measures through a severe curtailment of professional freedom, authority, 
and self-esteem. The party achieved this by placing military intelligence officers in all 
military units, charged with preparing daily reports on the private and professional 
activities of each soldier. Party leaders used these reports to determine the promotion, 
demotion, suspension, or expulsion of officers. During the Stalin era, politically aligned 
officers were appointed to the highest party councils such as the Political Bureau, Central 
Committee, and Central Auditing Committee. 
As a result of these policies, substantive disagreements emerged between the 
military and the party. While the party maintained multiple control networks within the 
military establishment with the aim of securing information, indoctrinating and 
manipulating military personnel, and controlling the professional and private activities of 
anti-party officers, the military resented and directly opposed excessive pressure that 
interfered with its performance of its professional duties (ibid:21). 
Drawing on Kolkowicz’s analysis, this chapter examines the coercive controls of 
the military introduced by the Zambian government during the one-party era. We then 
explain the problems created by the disuse of parliamentary oversight mechanisms, which 
began to expose the weaknesses of the one-party system. The creation of military and 
civil intelligence departments, the establishment of party organs at places of work, and 
the appointment of military officers as district governors, members of the UNIP central 
committee, and managing directors of parastatal organisations will be given as examples 
of interference that affected civil control of the military. We conclude by pointing out that 
various coercive controls over the military under the one-party dispensation turned into 
anti-democratic practices that were resented by the people. Following the end of the Cold 
War, the one-party state eventually gave way to multiparty politics. 
6.2  Constitutional provisions for a one-party state 
The introduction of the one-party system fundamentally affected methods used 
by civil authorities to control the military. Civil control of the military during the colonial 
period was characterised by largely coercive measures through the policies of racial 
discrimination. During the First Republic, these policies were replaced by consensual 
measures and limited party controls. During the Second Republic, some consensual 
controls were consolidated and coercive controls introduced in all military 
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establishments. This was important for the government leadership because the electoral 
system the one-party state put in place made it difficult for anyone to remove the regime 
in power since the political process was controlled by the fusion of party and government. 
The 1973 constitution increased the membership of the National Assembly from 110 to 
135. Article 4(1) of the constitution stated that ‘there shall be one and only one political 
party or organisation in Zambia, namely the United National Independence Party, in this 
Constitution referred to as the Party’ (GRZ 1973a:4). Furthermore, UNIP’s supremacy 
over the other state organs, including parliament, was provided for in Article 5 of the 
1973 UNIP constitution, which was annexed to the Republican constitution. This article 
stated that the party was the ‘supreme organisation and the guiding political force in the 
land’, and that ‘its aims and objectives as expressed in this Constitution shall provide 
guidelines for all persons and institutions in the land’ (GRZ 1973b:7). 
The UNIP constitutional provision was reinforced by the Constitution of Zambia 
(Amendment) Act Number 22 of 1975 that made ‘the provisions of the Party Constitution 
binding and interpreted on the same basis as the Republican Constitution’ (Chibesakunda 
2001:45). The act stated that 
where reference to the Constitution of the Party is necessary for the 
purpose of interpreting or construing any provisions of this Constitution or 
any written law, the text of the Constitution of the Party annexed hereto, 
together with such amendments as may from time to time be made thereto 
by the Party and published in the Gazette, shall be taken to be the sole 
authentic text of the Constitution of the Party (GRZ 1975:10). 
Therefore, the one-party state involved the formal subordination of the 
legislature, executive, and judiciary to the ruling party. ‘UNIP, through its machinery, 
National Council and the Central Committee was able to control its members of the 
Legislature and the Executive including the Ministry of Defence’ (Phiri, Haantobolo and 
Banda 2004:16). In addition, the role of its central committee as the supreme policy-
making body was strengthened by Article 47(c) of the Constitution of Zambia 
(Amendment Number 22 (f) 1975) which stated that: 
The Central Committee shall formulate the policy of the government and 
shall be responsible for advising the President with respect to the policy of 
the Party and the government and with respect to such other matters as may 
be referred to it by the President. 
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Where a decision of the Central Committee is in conflict with a decision of 
the Cabinet, the decision of the Central Committee shall prevail (GRZ 
1975:2). 
Therefore, UNIP, as the sole source of political power, made decisions related to 
civil control of the military as well as all other aspects of governance, and parliament then 
translated these decisions into laws. The executive then applied those laws, and the 
judiciary interpreted them. 
Kaunda now served as head of state, party president, and commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces. His deputy, the executive vice-president, served as secretary-general of 
the party, and therefore head of the party secretariat. The party’s central committee, 
which was elected by its general conference, was Zambia’s supreme policy-making body. 
Next to the secretary-general of the party was the prime minister who served as head of 
cabinet, and was also an ex-officio member of the central committee. Next to the prime 
minister were cabinet ministers – including the minister of defence – who were appointed 
by the president, from among members of parliament. They were held responsible for 
implementing party and government policies. 
The ruling nexus of party and government strengthened the structural controls of 
the military during the First Republic by introducing far more extensive coercive controls 
during the Second Republic. This fundamentally changed Zambia’s methods of control of 
the military from a western to a Soviet-style communist model. The reasons for 
introducing these measures are examined in greater detail in the next section. 
6.3 Reasons for the introduction of coercive controls of the military 
Intensified coercive measures in form of behavioural controls were introduced for 
a variety of reasons. Party and government leaders were well aware that the monopoly of 
the military over the instruments of violence allowed it to easily intervene in domestic 
politics. 
The capacity of the security forces to influence the direction of a political 
process through military coups with linkages to foreign forces especially 
during the Cold War era and selective assassinations of leaders such as in 
Ghana and Nigeria were known to the Zambian leadership (Masheke, 
interview, 2005). 
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 They were also well aware that the introduction of the one-party system would 
be strongly opposed by opposition politicians and other supporters of multi-party 
democracy. They therefore decided that it was important to safeguard the security of the 
state and its leaders against possible military intervention. Moreover, until 1978 both the 
army and the air force had large contingents of expatriate personnel from the British Joint 
Training Team (BJTT) in their ranks. These consisted of  
officers and men from the British Army and Royal Air Force Reserve and a 
handful of active officers. Many of these had either operated, trained or 
served in the then Southern Rhodesia during the colonial days or were part 
of the Federal Army and Air Force. Suffice to say that some serving army 
and air force personnel of the rebel Rhodesian Army and Air Force were 
their close friends, associates and relations (Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters 1991a). 
Thirdly, the country’s policy of harbouring liberation movements had resulted in 
neighbouring minority regimes adopting policies towards it of offensive or pre-emptive 
defence. Pre-emptive defence was aimed at undermining Zambia as a country in general 
and the logistics, infrastructure, morale, and intelligence-gathering capabilities of the 
liberation movements in particular. The minority regimes deployed intelligence officers 
and other agents within the liberation movements and some international organisations. 
Raids on refugee camps around Lusaka and campaigns to assassinate key liberation 
figures such as Herbert Chitepo were intensified. Offensive defence also resulted in 
minority regimes creating a vast logistical infrastructure that supported proxy forces.  
According to Gen Malimba Masheke, the first director of military intelligence in 
Zambia, the first proxy forces involved the alleged  
combined Southern Rhodesian and South African government training in 
South West Africa (Namibia) of 100 selected mercenaries from Zambia’s 
Southern, Western and North-Western provinces led by the former mayor 
of the Livingstone Council, Mr Chipango. The purpose of training this 
group was to let them enter the country and take up strategic positions and 
work with the South African government to support an uprising that would 
eventually lead to the overthrow and arrest of government leaders. After 
getting into government, the quislings were expected to declare a new 
policy of stopping the support for all liberation movements by the Zambian 
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government and would then throw these liberation movements out of their 
bases in Zambia. However, the Zambia Military Intelligence followed the 
training programme of this group and arrested them the same day they re-
entered Zambia in 1973 (Masheke, interview, 2005).  
The second proxy force involved the Mushala gang that was limited to some 
ethnic groups in Zambia’s North-Western Province. This force successfully entered 
Zambia and extensively damaged some infrastructure. It also helped to ‘divert the 
country’s material and military resources from concentrating on fighting minority 
regimes to internal rebellions, but were eventually crushed by loyal troops’ (ibid). 
Fourthly, at the international level, Zambia’s desire to defend its people, 
infrastructure, and territorial integrity was rebuffed by western countries such as Britain 
and the United States that provided economic support to minority regimes and ‘did not 
want their kith and kin to be killed using their weapons supplied to Zambia’ (ibid). These 
countries, which had sold weapons, aircraft, and other military hardware to Zambia 
between 1964 and 1972, ‘decided to undermine the country’s security through the non-
provision of technical manpower and spare parts for the weapons supplied to Zambia 
previously’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1976). Zambia and the liberation 
movements therefore turned to China, the USSR, and Yugoslavia for military aid and 
training. 
This dependence on the communist bloc for military aid and training, the threat 
of subversion, the introduction of a one-party state, and the policy of pre-emptive defence 
by minority regimes gradually resulted in Zambia’s leaders changing their methods of 
civil control of the military from those of the British model to those of China and the 
USSR. The awareness of party and government leaders of the need to safeguard the 
military against being subverted by local and foreign enemies, such as minority regimes 
in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa, led to an increase in military 
intelligence personnel between 1973 and 1980. Besides engaging in purely military 
strategic, operational, tactical, and counterintelligence operations, one of the main duties 
of military intelligence was to ‘check on non-loyal members of the military personnel to 
the party leadership. This in turn became one of the main coercive control mechanisms 
that the one-party state system in Zambia evolved as part of its civil control of the 
military’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991b). 
In sum, a combination of domestic, regional, and international threats to 
Zambia’s political system were the main reasons behind the introduction of  coercive 
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control measures in all military establishments. This was done by the establishment of the 
Department of Militaryÿÿntelÿÿgeÿÿe, to which weÿÿow turn. 
6.4 Establishmeebÿÿfethe Department of Military Intelligeine 
According to Lieut-Gen Christone Tembo, former army commander, diplomat, and 
vice-president, 
The creation of Defence intelligence centralised the Zambia Army and 
Zambia Air Force intelligence that previously operated separately. Military 
intelligence now operated under one command. This measure also brought 
to the fore two important divisions in the Office of the President that 
eventually proved crucial in the civil control of the military in Zambia. 
These were the Department of Defence Intelligence that now drew its 
personnel from the Zambia Army, Zambia Airforce and the Zambia 
National Service. The other one was the Special Division, made up of civil 
officers operating along the lines of the United States Criminal 
Investigation Agency, which drew its personnel from the civilians. The 
Directors of both Departments were directly answerable to the President 
who assumed a direct role as minister responsible for these two wings 
under the Office of the President (Tembo, interview, 2005).  
Collaboration between officers in the Department of Military Intelligence and 
Special Branch officers ensured that very few threats to security went unnoticed. While 
both organisations dealt with matters related to national security, the Department of 
Military Intelligence had the added responsibility of dealing with operational and tactical 
intelligence during military operations. However, since both organisations reported 
directly to the government, they became important tools for maintaining civil control of 
the military. 
As noted earlier, the functions of military intelligence were twofold. Initially, 
defence intelligence personnel underwent intelligence training and full military training, 
and then served in the military for at least two years. In addition, intelligence personnel 
were attached to operational defence force units and were eligible for specialised military 
and air force training as well as staff and command courses (Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters 1991a).  
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At the purely military level, defence intelligence officers were trained in 
strategic, operational, tactical, and counterintelligence techniques. Strategic defence has 
been defined as 
intelligence that is required for the formulation of policy and military plans 
at national, regional and international levels. Strategic defence intelligence 
concerns interalia the capabilities, frailties and possible-probable behaviour 
of friendly, hostile or potentially hostile states, alliances, power blocks and 
organisations (Centre for Defence and Security Management 2003a:2).  
Defence intelligence officers reported organisations suspected of engaging in 
espionage or sabotage to their headquarters. From here the information was fed directly to 
the president, who then directed the minister of defence and security and the chairman of 
the Defence Council (the secretary-general of UNIP) to recommend appropriate action. 
This normally resulted in these organisations being closed down, and staff members being 
arrested or deported. The use of strategic defence intelligence prevented Zambian military 
officers from selling military secrets to the country’s enemies. 
Operational intelligence has been defined as 
intelligence and security measures for use by military combat echelons in a 
specific theatre of operations. It is used in the planning and execution of 
operations and comprises knowledge of the operational area and the 
capabilities and weaknesses of the enemy, in order that the commander 
may determine the best application of his fire power, the best manoeuvring 
of his forces or the best way to secure the safety of his command (Centre 
for Defence and Security Management 2003b:2). 
Tactical intelligence and security, on the other hand, refers to ‘the information 
needed by frontline soldiers, airmen or sailors and their immediate commanders in order 
to be able to wage war and survive on the battlefield’ (ibid). Acts of sabotage and 
espionage related to operational and tactical intelligence and security committed by 
Zambian military officers were also reported to Military Intelligence and the Defence 
Council for disciplinary action (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1982).  
At the international level, military intelligence officers co-ordinated and 
supervised the activities of defence force personnel seconded to the Zambia Foreign 
Service as defence attachés or liaison officers, as long as such activities related to 
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intelligence. The Department of Military Intelligence also acted as a conduit for contact 
between Zambian defence attachés, military liaison officers, and advisors accredited to 
Zambia. Furthermore, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other 
security agencies, the department controlled activities of defence officials accredited to 
Zambia by foreign governments, recognised liberation movements, and international 
organisations. It also performed all these foreign responsibilities in collaboration with the 
special branch, other intelligence and security agencies in Zambia, the defence 
intelligence organisations of other countries, or as directed by the commander-in-chief 
through the minister of defence and security. 
Zambian Counter-Intelligence, on the other hand,  
had as its brief the responsibility for ensuring information and security 
within the armed forces and the protection of own information from 
disclosure, compromise and/or penetration. This has involved a range of 
technical tasks such as security personnel clearances, appropriate 
classification of security materials, the installation of locks, safes and 
physical protection for security premises and the use of electric/ magnetic 
spectrum to ensure that communications are not intercepted by the enemy 
(Williams 1993:20). 
On a number of occasions, Zambian Counter-Intelligence launched limited 
offensive actions to prevent information from being used by enemy forces (Ministry of 
Defence Headquarters 1981b:3).  
The Department of Military Intelligence operated under cover from the Office of 
the Military Secretary at the Ministry of Defence. Its staff in the army, air force, and 
national service operated in various pseudo-appointments ranging from artisans to 
physical and political education instructors. These operatives were also tasked with 
reporting on complaints of any kind against the government among the military and civil 
population. These included complaints about instances of tribalism, nepotism, and 
corruption. Other occurrences that attracted the attention of intelligence operatives 
included complaints about maladministration, ‘defeatist and cowardly talk’ by any 
Zambian citizen that instilled fear in members of the security forces, freedom fighters and 
any immoral and criminal activities by military personnel. These officers accessed 
military barracks, officers’ places of work and homes, as well as sergeants’ and officers’ 
messes. Telephones were tapped, people were followed, and mail was intercepted. Given 
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the increased scope of the department’s operations, it was given its own administration 
and budget. Its budget was independent of those of the other three services in respect of 
both capital and recurrent expenditure, except that the controlling officer was the 
permanent secretary of defence. However, direct expenditure on intelligence operations 
was controlled separately by the chief of defence intelligence, and was not subject to an 
open audit. The chief of defence intelligence issued instructions for the general 
administration of the department in relation to 
duties distribution, inspection, training, arms, clothing, equipment and 
transport for the purpose of promoting efficiency and discipline or 
preventing negligence in the Department. However, this command, control, 
direction and supervision of the Department was subject to the orders and 
directions of the Commander-in-Chief or the Minister of Defence and 
Security (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991a:5). 
These resources enabled intelligence officers to collect both positive and negative 
information about the professional and private activities of military officers, especially in 
relation to their loyalty to the party and its government. This information helped the 
government leaders – through the Defence Council – to vet all disloyal defence personnel 
and dismiss or demote them if deemed necessary (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 
1988). These functions of the defence and other intelligence agencies strengthened civil 
control of the military in that very few anti-party and anti-government elements went 
unnoticed. 
By 1978 the Zambian government had learnt a number of lessons from the 
military coups that had taken place in Africa and Latin America. As already argued in the 
literature review, these were mainly caused by ‘a few politically or ideologically 
committed officers or civilians who infiltrate the military in search of army collaborators 
for civilianistic coup’ (Perlmutter and Bennet 1980:16). In order to prevent this method of 
organising domestic military intervention in Zambia, the government established an 
elaborate system of defence and security committees from the national down to the local 
level. This development will be examined in the next section. 
6.5 The establishment of defence and security committees 
In 1978, as part of coercive control measures over both the military and civilians, 
the government passed Standing Defence and Security Instruction Number 1 of 1978 
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(UNIP Archives 1978:1) which provided for the establishment of defence and security 
committees at the national, provincial, and district levels. The national committee was 
appointed by the president, but chaired by the secretary-general of the party.  
Provincial committees were chaired by the relevant provincial member of UNIP’s 
central committee. Other members included the provincial political secretary, permanent 
secretary, intelligence officers, regional commanders, officer commanding both police 
and prisons, and any other co-opted members as the situation demanded. 
District committees were chaired by district governors, who were also members 
of parliament. Other members included the district secretary, intelligence officer, officers-
in-charge of police, prisons and any other co-opted member as the need arose (UNIP 
Archives 1978:1-16). 
The national committee met once a month. Its functions were to advise the 
president on all matters concerning defence and security. It also constantly reviewed the 
security situation in the country, and examined all intelligence reports from the security 
forces and the party. In carrying out these functions, the National Defence and Security 
Committee depended on the advice given to it by the Defence and Security Advisory 
Committee, which was appointed by the president. The advisory committee carrying out 
instructions by the Defence and Security Committee, and reviewed and worked out 
specific operations and joint defence and security plans. 
The Defence and Security Advisory Committee relied for its advice on an 
operational committee called the Central Joint Operations Committee. This committee 
consisted of senior officers of the defence force, police force, and intelligence service. It 
met as often as possible. It implemented instructions from the Defence and Security 
Advisory Committee, and supervised Provincial Joint Operations Committees. It also 
updated information related to counter-insurgency and internal security operations, books, 
pamphlets, and publications. The Central Joint Operations Committee further assessed 
and evaluated all information affecting counter-insurgency and internal security 
operations. It ensured that all security forces maintained good relations with members of 
the public, as well as the efficient operation of all the security forces (ibid:3). 
The Provincial Defence and Security Committees met once a month in normal 
situations, and twice a month in emergency situations. They were responsible to the 
National Defence and Security Committee in Lusaka for all defence and security matters 
in their provinces, and were charged with informing the national committee of all 
activities relevant to defence and security in those provinces. 
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They implemented security instructions issued by the national committee, and 
constantly reviewed the security situation in their provinces. They also worked out 
provincial plans and contingency measures for the civilian population against any 
external aggression, emergency, or natural disaster. The committees conducted security 
education, and directed and supervised all district defence and security committees on 
defence and security matters, including civil defence. They also reviewed intelligence 
reports from the security forces and the party, and monitored progress made with 
operations agreed upon at previous meetings, including the disposition of forces in their 
areas of responsibility. These committee also considered the logistical requirements for 
the operations of the security forces (UNIP Archives 1978:1-16). 
In carrying out these functions, the Provincial Defence and Security Committees 
relied on the advice of Provincial Joint Operations Committees, chaired by the regional 
commander. Other members were the provincial police divisional commanders, 
provincial intelligence officers, divisional criminal investigations officers, regional 
military intelligence officers, and personnel from the provincial intelligence officer’s 
office. Some of the committee’s functions involved implementing decisions of the 
Provincial Defence and Security Committees relating to defence and security operations. 
The committees co-ordinated operations between the various services, and formed 
intelligence collection and assessment committees. They also planned counter-insurgency 
operations, as well as strategies for evacuating casualties and civilians in the event of an 
invasion. The Provincial Joint Operations Committees were responsible to both the 
Provincial Defence and Security Committees as well as the Central Joint Operations 
Committee (ibid:6-7). 
The District Defence and Security Committees met every week. They were 
tasked with keeping the Provincial Defence and Security Committees informed of all 
defence and security matters in their districts, and performing similar functions to those 
of the Provincial Defence and Security Committees at a district level. The committees 
further directed and supervised all party branches and sections in their districts on 
security matters (ibid:8). 
Below these committees were more local committees, and the chain of command 
and communication, both in peace and during emergencies, systematically moved up this 
system. From the bottom upwards, this system started with Section Security Committees, 
followed by Branch Security Committees, Ward Security Committees, Security 
Committee at Places of Work, District Defence and Security Committees, Provincial 
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Defence and Security Committees and the National. Defence and Security Committee 
(ibid 1978:8). These committees were meant to safeguard the Zambian government and 
people against both internal and external enemies, which we will deal with in the next 
section. 
6.6 Some of the activities of security organs  
Besides guarding against attacks by minority regimes, this chain of security 
organisations – from the local to the national level – were also tasked with politically 
educating citizens, particularly about the country’s national goals, as well as those threats 
from minority regimes. Civil control of the military was ensured by the fact that each 
section of the party maintained a register of all families and individuals in its area. Any 
new arrivals were reported to the registrar within 24 hours, and particulars of strangers 
were recorded. Citizens were also required to report suspicious characters, goods, and 
parcels and the disruption of any installations to the police and other security authorities. 
Furthermore, all unemployed people were registered, and people were generally advised 
to guard against hostile propaganda (UNIP Archives 1978:11). 
Public confidence was built by making advance plans for public security in case 
of an attack by agents of minority regimes. This involved providing alarm systems, 
civilians digging trenches under the supervision of security forces, and the construction of 
air raid shelters and communication trenches. All military plans and security organisation 
at section, branch, and ward levels were organised according to the party chain of 
command. 
During curfews and blackouts, essential services were kept going by ensuring 
that essential workers were issued with special identity cards which had to be produced 
when challenged by security forces. Under blackout conditions, all lights had to be 
switched off. In some places windows were fitted with blinds. Surface lights at the mines 
were also blacked out, but underground lighting systems continued to operate normally. 
In order to avoid any conflicts with the operation of the security forces, each essential 
service was required to produce orders pertaining to the services it provided, which were 
then studied by military experts. All vital installations including those dealing with 
energy, water supplies, telecommunications, and fire fighting were guarded against 
sabotage by trained and armed guards (ibid:13). 
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During emergencies, provincial members of the Central Committee or district 
governors could apply to the president for all resources to be placed at the disposal of the 
security committees. In such situations, any individual officer, transport, or other 
resources could be mobilised. The forces immediately available to the provincial member 
of the Central Committee and district governors for the maintenance of law and order 
were the Zambia police, its reserves and special constables, immigration and customs 
officers, and intelligence officers. When committed to internal security operations, 
defence force units were meant to provide support and assistance to civil authorities. 
Authority was exercised by civil organs, but command and control remained vested in 
military regional commanders (UNIP Archives 1978:15). 
During attacks, defenceless and untrained citizens were usually evacuated to 
prearranged defence areas. After the attack the district governor and his committee were 
required to assess the situation and reorganise the district. When land mines had been 
planted, or bombs had been dropped, these areas were closed off until they had been 
cleared by experts. Such was the case when the  
Rhodesian rebels bombed Chikumbi refugee centre for Zimbabwean 
children and disabled refugees, 20 kilometres north of Lusaka, on 19 
October 1978, killing 226 persons and injuring 629 of them. On the same 
day, the rebels bombed Mkushi training settlement for girls, killing 100 of 
them (GRZ 1980:6).  
Great care was taken in dealing with members of the public, as it was important 
to maintain and enhance their support and confidence. Members of the press were also 
carefully guided and controlled in operational areas, and the issuing of press statements 
on various operations were strictly controlled and centralised (ibid:16-17). 
These responsibilities, exercised predominantly by joint committees of civil and 
military intelligence during the one-party era, shaped the behavioural characteristics and 
controls of the Zambian people towards their leaders, security forces and the refugees 
they harboured on behalf of various liberation movements with bases in Zambia. 
According to Dr Kaunda, these guidelines were in line with ‘God’s commandments … 
when the Bible states that [you should] love God your creator with all your mind and 
body, and love your neighbour as you love yourself’ (Kaunda, interview, 2005). This 
system also helped to ensure that civil authorities remained firmly in control of the 
military. 
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The establishment of the Department of Military Intelligence and the Defence 
and Security Committees facilitated civil control of the military in Zambia. This was 
demonstrated by the foiling of the combined military and civilian coup attempt in 1980, 
to which we now turn. 
6.7 Attempted coup d’etat 
The attempted coup d’etat in 1980 had numerous causes. The centralisation of 
power in a one-party state, with policy dictated by the central committee of the ruling 
party, did not please many Zambians, who harboured different opinions to those of 
fanatical party members. Inertia and inefficiency in both the party and government 
became the order of the day. All privately owned companies were nationalised. 
Accountability for the use of public funds deteriorated. Cabinet ministers who 
misappropriated government funds were merely transferred to other government 
departments or retired ‘in the national interest’, without being charged or prosecuted. 
Very few members of the central committee had higher qualifications. Several of 
them headed numerous ministries – as many as seven in some instances. None of these 
members of the old guard, including Dr Kaunda himself, showed any signs of voluntary 
retirement. They were kept in power by the complicated system of civilian and military 
intelligence described above, as well as the uniformed security wings. This gradually led 
to a degeneration of Zambia’s political system from a popular one into a dictatorship. The 
suffering of ordinary workers and peasants as a result of the ‘Zambian government’s 
implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic adjustment measures 
alienated Zambians from the principles the party and its government stood for’ (Central 
Statistical Office 1997: 3). 
As a result, a group of Zambian businessmen, lawyers, military officers, a High 
Court commissioner, and some Zairean nationals decided to overthrow the Zambian 
government. They included Edward Jack Shamwana, Mundia Sikatana, Brig-Gen 
Godfrey Miyanda, Valentine Shula Musakanya, Godwin Yoram Mumba, Anderson 
Kambai Mporokoso, Thomas Mapunga Mulewa, Deogratias Syimba, Albert Chilambwe 
Chimbalile, Laurent Kanyimbu, Pierce Annifield, and some military personnel. However, 
the process of consultation among them was so extensive that the party and government 
was able to infiltrate the coup plotters using both military and civil intelligence personnel. 
The coup plotters, for instance, 
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persuaded Major-General Christopher Kabwe to make arrangements with 
Zambia Air Force personnel for an aeroplane that could carry Dr K D 
Kaunda, the President, and land at an unauthorised place where the 
President would fall into the hands of armed persons, who would force him 
at gunpoint to sign a declaration renouncing his office as President of the 
Republic of Zambia (Ndhlovu and Sakala 1985:51).  
The process of consulting with air force personnel over making an aircraft 
available resulted in defence intelligence gaining knowledge of the attempted coup. Some 
military and civil intelligence officers allowed themselves to be recruited for the coup, 
but continued to report to the government. Between April and October 1980 the coup 
plotters recruited from Mwinilunga district ‘65 persons, some of whom came from 
defence intelligence. These were conveyed to a farm in Chilanga, Lusaka district, where 
rehearsals on how they were going to overthrow the Zambian government by unlawful 
means were practised’ (Ndhlovu and Sakala 1985:51-58). These rehearsals were 
communicated to the government by military intelligence through the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces. The forced abdication by the president and the hand-over of 
power to one of the coup plotters was to be  
announced on television and Radio Zambia and other forms of the mass 
media. The successful execution of the plot was to be followed by the 
arrest of the Secretary General of the Party, the Prime Minister, and the 
Secretary of State for Defence and Security, the three service commanders, 
and all Ministers (Ndhlovu and Sakala 1985:51-58). 
The coup plotters enlisted the support of the National Liberation Front of Zaire. It 
was mutually agreed that these men would join forces with the ‘Zambian group for the 
purpose of overthrowing the government of Zambia, and that, thereafter, the Zambian 
group, would in turn, assist the Zairean group to overthrow the Zairean government’ 
(Ndhlovu and Sakala 1985:51-58). Again, all the execution plans were communicated to 
party and government leaders via defence intelligence and security by Maj-Gen 
Christopher Kabwe, who later became the principal witness for the prosecution during the 
trial of the coup plotters. This was confirmed by Alexander Grey Zulu, former secretary-
general of the party and chairman of the Defence Council, during an interview for this 
study when he stated that: 
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even though the 1980 attempted military coup d’etat was well planned, 
with the assistance of the American and British governments, the work of 
the military and civil intelligence officers operating within the rebel 
military wings and leadership caused extensive divisions and 
disagreements among the coup plotters. This made it easy for the military 
intelligence infiltrators to report all the details about the coup to the 
government leadership, which then decided to take a pre-emptive move 
two days before the execution of the coup (Zulu, interview, 2005). 
Party and government leaders reacted to the defence intelligence briefings by 
strengthening security around all media institutions, airports, and post offices. On Friday 
24 October 1980, a few days before the coup was meant to take place, President Kaunda 
declared a curfew from 7 pm to 6 am in terms of the Preservation of the Public Security 
Regulations. The curfew 
covered Lusaka, Kafue, Mumbwa, Kabwe rural and urban, Keembe, 
Chisamba, Kapirimposhi and all the Copperbelt towns, including Ndola 
rural. Under the order, private and unscheduled flights were all banned. All 
essential service workers were required to carry special passes and 
National Registration Cards (Phiri 1980b:1). 
On 25 October 1980 a combined air force and army contingent using ‘AB205s, 
Macchis and Buffalo aircraft engaged the illegal army in Chilanga with ground and air 
firepower and defeated them in what was termed as “Operation Early Bird”. Some 
members of the illegal army were killed, while others were arrested’ (Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters 1981:3). Thereafter defence, police and immigration personnel led by ‘civil 
and military intelligence personnel arrested all the masterminds of the coup except 
Annifield and others who escaped out of the country through Angola after dumping their 
weapons in wells’ (Zulu, interview, 2005). Those arrested were tried in the High Court 
for treason, and ‘Edward Shamwana, Godwin Mumba, Thomas Mulewa, Deogratias 
Symba, and Albert Chimbalile were convicted and condemned to death. The Supreme 
Court of Zambia upheld the High Court decision in 1985’ (Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters 1981:3). Thereafter, all military officers who were involved in the coup plot 
or had plans to rescue the 1980 coup plotters such as  
Macpherson Mbulo, Major Ronald Chansa, Warrant Officer class one 
Christopher Chawinga, Flight Sergeant M. Mukumbuta and Lance 
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Corporal C M Situnda were all dismissed by the Commander-in-Chief with 
the advice of the Defence Council and the Defence Intelligence (Ministry 
of Defence Headquarters 1981:3). 
These events clearly demonstrate that the party, government, and military 
leadership effectively used coercive measures in form of behavioural controls introduced 
through defence intelligence to foil the coup attempt. In return for these services, the 
government rewarded defence intelligence personnel by appointing some to the ‘posts of 
prime minister, members of the central committee, ministers, nominated member of 
parliament, district governor, and parastatal heads’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 
1990:2). 
The appointment of these military officers in government positions resulted in the 
‘bureaucratisation of the military, or militarisation of the bureaucracy’ (Omari 2003:102). 
As in Tanzania, the one-party dictatorship tried to solve the problem of attempted coups 
by co-opting army officers into civilian administration. Williams (1993:19) has argued 
that 
in these states the presence of defence personnel and defence intelligence 
and security officers at all levels of the state ensemble witnessed the 
strengthening of that category of officers best referred to as armed 
bureaucrats or civil servants in uniform. Their perception of their role as 
administrators also affected, predictably, their corporate identity. The 
formulation, co-ordination and implementation of policy became regarded 
as part of the line of function of the Defence Force at local and national 
levels and not a temporary aberration to be relinquished at a later date.  
Importantly, one of the lessons the Zambian government learnt from the 
attempted coup was that it needed to politicise the military. This, it was hoped, would 
further strengthen its coercive controls of the defence forces, and help to avert future coup 
attempts. The government did this by establishing UNIP structures in all military units, 
which is examined in greater detail in the next section. 
6.8 Establishment of UNIP structures in military units, 1989-1990 
The party and government decided to further strengthen its controls of the 
military by introducing more coercive measures such as UNIP structures in all military 
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units. In line with this policy, between 1983 and 1988, selected military personnel from 
the rank of private to that of army commander were send for political education in 
communist countries. These courses lasted between three months and seven years, and 
were held in the USSR, Bulgaria, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and 
China. Officers were taught how communist party structures were integrated in the 
military, and worked as the eyes and ears of the party and government. In line with this, 
in 1989 a Department of Political Education and Culture was created in the Ministry of 
Defence, with branches in all military establishments. The department was responsible for 
all political education in the defence force. It held political education seminars among all 
ranks where party policies were explained and loyalty to the party and government 
promoted. 
During the seminars, party officials, some of whom were military intelligence 
officers, assessed the loyalty or otherwise of military officers from their contributions to 
various political topics on the agenda. Those disagreeing with the party were reported to 
the Department of Defence Intelligence. The department then intensified its monitoring of 
those officers, and submitted its findings to the Defence Council, which could 
recommend those officers’ resignation, retirement, or dismissal from the service. In this 
way the Department of Political Education and Culture acted as the principal link 
between ‘the Office of the Secretary General of the Party, Office of the Secretary of State 
for Defence and Security on one hand and the services on the other on matters relating to 
the attitude of military officers to politics’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1989:1). 
The department also used these seminars to identify loyal officers whose names were 
forwarded to a scholarship committee in the Office of the Secretary-General of the Party 
for political education courses in communist countries. In collaboration with ‘Defence 
Intelligence and Security, the Political Education and Culture Department took up the 
responsibility of processing recommendations of service personnel for decorations 
(medals), Honours and awards by the President, in line with the provisions of Statutory 
Instrument Number 347, Proclamation Number 6 of 1965 (GRZ 1965:1) and The 
Honours and Decorations (Prevention of abuses) Act Number 5 of 1967’ (GRZ 1967:1).  
The cultural branch of the department was established to enforce party policies 
and their implementation through ‘sports, drama, public relations and culture. In this way 
it was envisaged that the Zambia Defence Force could be a people’s force that remained a 
true reflection of all the Zambian people’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1989:1). 
Wednesday afternoons were set aside as sports days for all defence force personnel, a 
practice that has continued to this day. 
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The mingling among senior and junior defence personnel through drama and 
sports enabled party activists and defence intelligence personnel to further assess their 
loyalty. 
However, the tightening of coercive controls by one-party regimes did not save 
them from the trends and events leading up to the end of the Cold War. As noted in the 
literature review, Perlmutter and Bennet (1980:16) argue that ‘military officers intervene 
in politics as a result of dramatic events that tend to politicise entire generations’. In the 
period under review, these ‘dramatic events’ were the collapse of most one-party states, 
which marked the end of the Cold War era. It is in this context that this study analyses the 
attempted military coup d’etat in 1990 that forced Zambia’s leaders to replace the one-
party state with a multi-party system.  
6.9 Attempted military coup d’etat, 1990 
Prior to the attempted military coup d’etat on 30 June 1990, the country’s 
economic problems worsened significantly. This mainly stemmed from the government’s 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes prescribed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral lending institutions. In 1986 the government 
increased the price of maize meal, which provoked rioting and looting in the Copperbelt. 
The government controlled the problem by  
imposing a curfew in the province and called upon a combined military and 
police reinforcement to quell the riots. Fifteen people were shot dead by 
security forces, and millions of Kwacha worth of property was lost by 
private companies and government-owned parastatal organisations 
(Malama and Chirambo 1990a:1). 
After the riots had been brought under control, the government decided to place 
more defence intelligence and security personnel in the townships. The excuse given by 
the Defence Council was that because of the lack of accommodation in military camps, 
and in line with the concept of nation-wide defence, certain members of the defence force 
had to live in civilian residential areas such as ‘Chimwemwe, Matero, Chelston, Olympia 
Park, Kanyama compound and others. This tended to destroy the image of a colonial 
soldier and instead enhanced integration with the people in conformity with Party wishes’ 
(Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1986:2). The government argued that the 
‘concentration of forces by way of all living in camps was susceptible to pre-emptive 
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attack. It was known for example that the regime in Guinea, Conakry survived because of 
the defence elements who were not in camp at the time of attack’ (ibid). 
The presence of the army in the townships introduced a substantial shift in the 
focus of defence intelligence and security forces, and broadened their operations 
significantly. Prior to 1986 their activities were limited to strategic, tactical, operational 
and counterintelligence both on Zambia’s borders as well as among military personnel. 
From that year onwards, however, military intelligence collected information 
about anti-party elements across a wider spectrum of society. This involved the activities 
of church organisations such as the Catholic Bishops Conference, as well as the Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions. This further politicised the role of military intelligence-
gathering. 
In 1990, following the collapse of the communist bloc, it became evident that the 
Cold War had ended, and expectations within Zambia rose of a change away from one-
party rule. Under these volatile political conditions, the government increased the  
prices of mealie meal on 20 June 1990. Mealie meal prices were increased 
by over 100 per cent, from K82.30 and K114.50 to K198 and K269 per 25-
kilogramme bag of roller and breakfast meal respectively. Announcing the 
increments in Parliament, Prime Minister General Malimba Masheke 
informed the House and the nation that the increases were necessitated by 
increased milling costs which had risen from K160 to K442 per 90 kg bag 
of maize (Malama and Chirambo 1990b:1). 
On 26 June 1990 students of the University of Zambia organised a demonstration 
at which they planned to match to State House to demonstrate against maize meal price 
increases. They feared that the price of meals in the university cafeteria would be 
increased, which would mean that they could no longer buy three meals a day. 
Intelligence operatives informed the government of the impending demonstration, and 
police blocked the intended route. The students then 
eluded the police encirclement by dividing themselves into small groups 
and attacked UNIP offices in Mtendere, Kalingalinga and Ng’ombe 
compounds markets where Party vigilantes were beaten up and the UNIP 
flags were burnt. The residents of these compounds joined the students and 
spontaneous rioting broke out throughout Lusaka and the Copperbelt and 
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property worth millions of Kwacha was looted (Malama and Chirambo 
1990a:1). 
During these riots, public transport ground to a halt, and thousands of Lusaka 
residents had to walk home after work. The government reacted by imposing a 36-hour 
curfew, from 26 to 28 June. During the curfew all the ‘residents of Lusaka and the 
Copperbelt Provinces were ordered to remain indoors, failure to which they could be 
arrested by security forces and charged with an offence for breaking curfew regulations’ 
(ibid). 
In the meantime, police and military troops rounded up the rioters. During these 
operations security forces ‘killed over 20 people, injured over 130 and detained over 500 
people at Lusaka’s Edwin Imboela stadium that had been set up as a command centre. 
Out of all these, 326 people were charged and arrested for rioting in the Lusaka’s 
Magistrate court’ (ibid). 
During the curfew, numerous reports of human rights violations by military 
personnel and intelligence officers were published. Air force helicopters were used for the 
cordon and search of all locations in support of the army and police on the 
Copperbelt in what was termed ‘Operation Kamusale of 1978’. Similarly, 
in 1981 M1-8 helicopters for anti-poaching operations were effectively 
used in support of the police in the Luangwa valley in what was termed as 
‘Operation Kudu’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1995:1).  
The harsh and unruly behaviour of defence personnel resulted in a ‘loss of 
property that was confiscated, stolen or destroyed and looted during the operation clean-
up that operated under the government declared curfews’ (GRZ 1995:75). Furthermore, 
the involvement of military intelligence officers in joint operations that resulted in 
‘incommunicado detention, interrogations, harassment and torture of political detainees, 
alienated both the citizens and members of the defence force from the party and 
government leadership’ (ibid:74). 
On 30 June 1990 a combined force of civil, defence intelligence and loyal 
government troops foiled an attempted military coup led by Lieut Mwamba Luchembe 
over the atrocities committed by members of the security forces against Zambian citizens 
during the food riots. This attempted coup severed the backbone of the ruling party. It 
took place at a time of worldwide political change prompted by the end of the Cold War. 
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This gave impetus to political pressure groups such as the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD) that advocated the abolition of the one-party state and the 
reintroduction of plural politics. It instilled a sense of insecurity and fear in leading 
government figures, and prompted them to clear the way to plural politics three years 
before their term of office were due to end (Kazembe, interview, 2006). It also 
demonstrated the futility of the government’s continued reliance on the use of military 
intelligence to curb combined military and popular uprisings against the one-party 
system. Political detainees exposed torture and other human rights violations by law 
enforcement and security and military personnel at public meetings. Some of the most 
common methods used were: 
Brutal beatings using all sorts of objects like planks, hose pipes, electric 
cables, batons and iron bars; administration of electric shock using various 
electric gadgets; and burying a person in a shallow grave leaving only his 
head above the ground and driving a motor vehicle close to his head. 
Others were forcing a person to drink or wash one’s face in urine; and 
keeping a person in solitary confinement. Other methods used involved the 
continuous interrogation by different shifts of officers for very long 
periods. Insertion of metal objects into the anus, or penis or any other 
sensitive part of the body and many others incidental thereto (GRZ 
1995:58-60). 
To heal the wounds of hatred and disunity, UNIP’s central committee advised 
President Kaunda to exercise his powers of parole over all political prisoners. On 25 July 
1990 he announced the beginning of a new era of reconciliation. All the soldiers and 
civilians who had been convicted of treason for their involvement in the attempted coups 
in 1980, 1988 and 1990 were pardoned and released unconditionally. This parole 
included people such as the 
late Edward Shamwana, Lt. Gen. Christone Tembo, Lt. Col. Bizwayo 
Nkunika, Lt. Col. Chongo Shula, Major Knight Mulenga and Lt. Mwamba 
Luchembe. All the 34 University of Zambia students and hundreds of 
looters that were held over the June 1990 food riots were also released 
from jail (Malama and Chirambo 1990a:1). 
These steps eased political tensions between the party and government, the 
military elite and defence intelligence on the one hand, and the citizenry on the other. It 
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was also an effective method of maintaining civil control of the military. This was 
because serving military officers and the former coup plotters realised that the most 
effective way of removing Dr Kaunda and his party from government was through the 
ballot box. Former military officers, trade union leaders, church leaders, and 
representatives of non-governmental organisations organised mass rallies where they 
called for the reintroduction of multiparty democracy. Military officers played a key role 
in the transition to plural politics; while they did not actively participate in the democratic 
movement, they understood the national mood and the need for change. In a bid to 
maintain military discipline, the authorities dismissed the few disaffected officers who 
openly identified themselves with the opposition. According to Gen Timothy Kazembe, 
former director of Military Intelligence, 
despite the above, the true mood of the military manifested itself in the 
results of the elections in which, UNIP, the ruling party lost to the 
opposition by obtaining only 14 votes out of all the military cantonments in 
Zambia during the 31 October 1991 presidential and parliamentary 
elections (Kazembe, interview, 2006). 
On 24 September 1990 Dr Kaunda announced the reintroduction of multiparty 
democracy, and directed the Speaker of the National Assembly, Fwanyanga Mulikita, to 
appoint a-45 member special parliamentary committee to ‘study ways of democratising 
the United National Independence Party and the government machinery so that they 
become more responsive to the wishes of the people’ (National Assembly of Zambia 
1990:1). The committee was also instructed to ‘recommend legislation that could give 
effect on whether Zambia could continue as a one-party state or revert to a multi-party 
State’ (ibid). 
After the committee had completed its deliberations, it made comprehensive 
recommendations for changes at the party and executive level. At the party level the 
committee recommended that the: 
principle that the party is supreme be abandoned and accordingly Articles 
2, 7 and 8 of the Party Constitution should be repealed; 
 party functions be separated from government functions. In that regard, 
Article 47(c) of the Republican Constitution and Article 53 of the Party 
Constitution and all other provisions in the Republican and Party 
Constitutions inconsistent with this separation should be repealed; 
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 philosophy of Humanism be maintained but the aspect of achieving 
Humanism through Socialism be abandoned; and 
 tenure of office for both the party president and the Secretary General of 
the party is restricted to two five-year terms; except that the Secretary 
General may contest the Presidency (National Assembly of Zambia 1990: 
13-14). 
At the executive level the committee recommended that: 
Cabinet Ministers be given power to make policy decisions affecting their 
Ministries in accordance with Article 56(2) of the Republican Constitution; 
The President’s tenure of office be restricted to a maximum two-five year 
terms; and 
The Committee expressed their concern at the practice of involving 
defence and security forces in politics. It was the Committee’s view that 
personnel in the Defence and Security forces should be above politics to 
ensure that they owed their loyalty to the nation and not to political parties. 
The Committee then recommended that personnel in the Defence and 
Security forces should not be politicised (National Assembly 1990:21-23). 
On the basis of these recommendations, President Kaunda announced that a 
referendum would be held to determine whether Zambia should remain a one-party state 
or revert to plural politics. However, during the referendum campaign he abandoned this 
decision and announced that Zambia would return to plural politics. In December 1990 
the government tabled legislation in the House that repealed Article 4 of the constitution. 
This legislative amendment abolished the one-party system of government, and reinstated 
a multiparty system. 
In July 1990 the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) was founded. It 
consisted of former labour leaders, businessmen, intellectuals, and other groups and 
operated as a pressure group for the reintroduction of plural politics. In January 1991 the 
MMD was registered as a political party. It then embarked campaigns for the presidential 
and parliamentary elections held on 31 October 1991. The MMD won  
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125 seats in the House out of 150 seats. UNIP got the remaining 25 seats. 
The UNIP President, Dr K.D. Kaunda, got 310,761 votes representing 24 
per cent of the total votes cast as against the MMD President, Mr F.T.J. 
Chiluba’s 997,462 votes representing 76 percent of the total votes cast in 
the Presidential elections. Mr F.T.J. Chiluba became the President of the 
Republic of Zambia and his MMD Party became the ruling party in 
November 1991 (Chibesakunda 2001:49).  
This discussion shows clearly that, under the one-party ‘participatory 
democracy’, the ruling party and the executive were the driving forces of coercive 
measures characterized by behavioural controls over the military. In the next section, we 
examine the role of parliamentary oversight of the military during the one-party era. 
6.10 Parliamentary oversight of defence and national security expenditure 
Under the one-party state, the government decided that its defence and 
intelligence budgets should not be debated in parliament as this would have enabled the 
country’s enemies to assess Zambia’s defence capabilities, thus undermining the 
government’s ability to preserve and defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Therefore, the government continued the policy introduced during the First Republic of 
making undisclosed allocations to the defence and intelligence services without these 
appearing in the national budget, and without them being debated in parliament or 
subjected to other forms of parliamentary oversight. Writing about the experience of 
Commonwealth countries on budgeting for intelligence, Thompson (2000:2-12) notes that 
intelligence security organs were forged by the exigencies of war, both hot 
and cold, and the principle of secrecy, executive command and Jesuitical 
means had militated against parliamentary oversight. This, it was further 
argued, helped to secure the lives of operatives and the success of any 
security operations. 
Before the introduction in 1973 of the one-party state there were a number of 
democratic mechanisms, both formal and otherwise, that subjected the executive and its 
policies to a degree of scrutiny. While, as noted above, the defence and intelligence 
budgets were not formally tabled and debated in parliament, various parliamentary 
procedures and structures indirectly contributed to the supervision of defence and security 
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administration. For example, the House could debate legislation on defence, and the 
opposition could present amendments. After 1973 this form of oversight also came to an 
end as all members of the House belonged to the same party. Under this dispensation, 
therefore, parliament could not effectively oversee defence and security. 
While parliament passed numerous laws related to defence, intelligence and 
emergency powers, the lack of a parliamentary committee on national security and 
defence also contributed to its growing failure to scrutinise the government’s 
management of increased defence expenditure and activities. In 1980 the president 
appointed a board of inquiry to investigate poor conditions in ZNS military training 
camps for Form V school leavers. The board found that the mess facilities in a number of 
camps were inadequate and unhygienic. Kitchens, dining halls and cooks themselves 
were filthy, and the quantity and quality of food left much to be desired. The main cause 
of this problem was over centralisation at ZNS Headquarters that rendered it incapable of 
efficiently supplying material and food to the camps; all supplies came from the Makeni 
Camp in Lusaka. Furthermore, no accounting rules and regulations had been put in place 
for ZNS administrators to follow (UNIP Archives 1974-1989). 
The failure by the Ministry of Defence to improve conditions at the camps 
resulted in the outbreak of typhoid at the girls’ Luamfumu Camp in Mansa in 1980 and 
1981. During subsequent investigations government doctors found that ‘Drinking water in 
the camp was not treated with chlorine, ablution blocks were insufficient, and it was 
important to quarantine the recruits for twenty-one days’ (Times of Zambia 1981:1). The 
team then recommended that the camp be closed. Further investigations of the poor 
conditions in ZNS military training camps revealed that the army was suspicious of the 
government’s motives for allocating more weapons to ZNS camps, and reacted to this 
policy by ‘withholding a number of arms and ammunition, binoculars and compasses 
ordered from former Yugoslavia’ (UNIP Archives 1974-1989). This rivalry – which 
could have resulted into a military coup, as happened in Uganda when Idi Amin 
overthrew the government of Milton Obote – endangered government control of the 
military. Furthermore, the use by camp authorities of unorthodox forms of punishment for 
recruits such as 
leopard crawl, frog jumps, beatings and others instead of productive ones 
like doing actual manual work in the maize fields and vegetable gardens 
contradicted government policy of developing a citizen who would be 
productive during peace times and a soldier during war times (ibid).  
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Consequently, these administrative problems began to breed a negative attitude 
among recruits and the population in general towards the ZNS. This further jeopardised 
the government’s defence policies. 
 As a result of these problems, in 1981 the government was forced to suspend and 
later terminate compulsory national service for Form V school-leavers. This sequence of 
events clearly demonstrated the value of and need for parliamentary oversight of these 
and other defence programmes. In an interview conducted for this study, Lt-Gen 
Christone Tembo, former army commander, stated that: 
The architects of direct Presidential budgetary control over defence 
expenditure among other reasons believed that Presidential control was 
advantageous in that the President had financial control and was privy to 
defence operations which became an important cornerstone in the civil 
control of the military. However, lack of parliamentary scrutiny resulted in 
the underfunding of ZNS camps and overfunding of other defence sectors 
as well as inertia in the performance of personnel in the Ministry of 
Defence, resulting in such disasters like the abandonment of the Form V 
compulsory national service programme in Zambia (Tembo, interview, 
2005). 
The lack of parliamentary oversight of the military during the one-party era 
demonstrated the need to observe the principles of the separation of powers and of checks 
and balances between the executive, parliament and the judiciary. The non-observance of 
these principles exposed the futility of one wing of government trying to oversee the 
effectiveness of other wings, especially the military. It further denied the people’s 
representatives’ opportunities to investigate financial irregularities in the Ministry of 
Defence, and give appropriate advice to the executive. This explains why, under the 
multiparty democracy in the Third Republic, the new government called for strong 
executive and parliamentary oversight over defence and security institutions.  
6.11 Conclusion 
Under the one-party state of the Second Republic, the ruling party and 
government successfully used coercive measures that introduced behavioural controls 
over the military through the use of military and civilian intelligence as well as political 
education. Among other things, the party monitored both disloyal and loyal elements in 
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the military establishment through the use of tactical, operational and counterintelligence 
officers. This information helped the Defence Council to take decisions about the 
promotion, suspension, demotion, or dismissal of military officers. The same methods of 
investigation accompanied by massive budgetary support enabled the government to foil 
the attempted military coups in 1980, 1988, and 1990. This helped to preserve civilian 
rule in Zambia, albeit under a one-party system. The same tactics were used to foil the 
1986 and 1990 maize riots by citizens throughout the country. However, this form of 
control collapsed at the end of the Cold War. Decalo (1992:12) points out that 
the hegemonic one-party state became an autocratic patrimonial state … 
detached from the vital creative energies of the African people and their 
societies. It produced presidential authoritarianism of varying degrees of 
repression, it has been instrumental in plundering the economy, directly or 
indirectly, it resulted in disdain for civic and human rights and … a small 
cabal of influentials have eroded all semblance of accountability, 
legitimacy, democracy and justice … 
During one-party ‘participatory democracy’ in Zambia, various coercive controls 
adopted by the ruling party and government turned into anti-democratic practices that 
resulted in the brutal repression of political opponents by defence and civil intelligence. 
Ultimately, however, this undermined the tenure in power of the ruling party. When the 
Cold War ended, and the communist system gave way to the capitalist system, 
international and local forces overpowered the one-party dictatorship and forced the 
government to reintroduce the multiparty democracy in December 1990. 
The new government reinstated consensual measures characterized by strong 
executive and parliamentary oversight over the Ministry of Defence and the defence force 
as a whole. It also adopted a policy of professionalising the defence force. This was done 
through by revising the good practices developed under consensual and coercive 
measures in respect of the military developed by the first two republics. How these new 
consensual measures suited the new democratic dispensation is the subject of the next 
chapter.  
 
 
7 CIVIL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC, 
1991-2004 
7.1 Introduction 
The Third Republic, characterised by a return to multiparty democracy, did not 
come about merely as a reaction to events surrounding the end of the Cold War in Eastern 
Europe in the late 1980s.  
Pressures for plural politics and economic liberalisation began on the day when 
political leaders began to talk about the imposition of a one-party ‘participatory 
democracy’. The Zambian people’s desire for democracy was reflected in the 1968 
general election when the opposition ANC increased its seats in parliament from 10 to 23. 
The same impulse sparked conflicts within UNIP and led to the formation of splinter 
parties such as the UP and UPP. However, it failed to stop the introduction of a one-party 
state. Decalo (1992:13) states that 
… in those early days of wine and roses, nationalism, patriotism, civic 
idealism did carry some values as the coin of the realm. Democratic 
aspirations could temporarily be put aside, especially since competitive 
elections proved to be little more than ethnic tugs of war.  
However, after the imposition of the coercive one-party rule, the country 
experienced the problems of lack of competitive elections and repeated infringements of 
freedoms of association, speech, and movement. The political economy of the country 
was such that it was in an economic and social crisis. As at 1991, the crisis was 
characterised by a number of factors. The country’s external date stood at USA $7 billion 
dollars. The gross domestic product declined to 0.0%. The country experienced double 
digit inflation rates at 93 percent and very high nominal but negative real interest rates. 
The country’s huge budget deficits averaged close to 14 percent of the gross domestic 
product with declining investments and savings. The current account balance stood at –
USA $447.7 in million dollars. Export earnings were at +USA$1.077 in million dollars 
compared to imports that stood at +USA$801 in million dollars. Government expenditure 
was at +USA$1905 in million dollars and the external debt service ration as a percentage 
of the gross domestic product stood at 47.3 percent (United Nations Development 
Programme 1997:71). Zambia further suffered from a flourishing black market for 
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foreign exchange, shortages of basic goods and services and dilapidated physical and 
social infrastructure. The country had low levels of business and consumer confidence 
and one of the highest levels of capital debt of about USA$1000 as well as poverty 
embracing two thirds of the population (United Nations Development Programme 
1997:10). These economic hardships angered many citizens. As recorded in chapter 6, 
this discontent helped to fuel the unsuccessful coups of 1980 and 1990, as well as the 
food riots of 1986 and 1990. By 1990, boosted by the events in Eastern Europe that 
marked the end of the Cold War, these pro-democracy movements and pressures became 
irresistible. In response, the Zambian government abolished the one-party state by 
amending Article 4 of the 1973 constitution, and reintroduced plural politics. In the 
multiparty elections held on 3 October 1991 after 17 years of one-party rule, UNIP, led 
by Dr Kenneth Kaunda, lost power to the MMD, led by Frederick Chiluba. This 
introduced a new era in Zambian politics, under a new democratic constitution, known as 
the Third Republic. In this period, the MMD government came to power on a promise of 
reform to revive growth in the economy through the economic and financial policy 
framework paper and several other institutional and legislative changes. One of the key 
factors that affected all institutions in the country including the military was the 
introduction of cash based budgeting system in 1993 where by all expenditures were 
supposed to equal total revenue (United Nations Development Programme 1997: 10). The 
government’s new approach to the military noted earlier, as well as economic 
liberalisation, 
 coupled with a rising political consciousness caused by the embracing of 
democratic values … increasingly made defence spending a focal point of 
this debate, breaking with the traditional secrecy which often shrouded 
matters of such nature (Le Roux 2004:V). 
  
The transition to democracy was marked by accusations that the UNIP was 
plotting to overthrow the new MMD government by unconstitutional means. The 
government reacted by passing emergency regulations that empowered the president to 
arrest the suspected coup plotters. The constitution was also amended to prevent Kaunda 
from contesting the 1996 presidential elections. As a result, UNIP boycotted the elections. 
At the end of his maximum second term in office, Chiluba campaigned for a 
constitutional amendment that would allow him to rule for a third term. Countrywide 
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anti-third term campaigns forced the president to abandon these plans and call a 
presidential and parliamentary election on 31 December 2001. 
The election was won by Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, who defeated ten other 
contestants. Therefore, our study of civil control of the military in the Third Republic 
ends in 2004 during the reign of President Mwanawasa, whose main theme in 
government has been that of combating corruption. 
The transition to democracy in the Third Republic called for changes in the 
nature of civil control of the military. Zambia was one of few African countries in which 
civilian governments had survived all attempted military coups d’etat, and had managed 
peaceful transitions from one-party to multiparty states. This was partly due to the 
adoption of effective consensual policies and coercive controls over the military, aimed at 
ensuring that the military would continue to subject itself to the civilian political 
leadership and government of the day during the first and second republics respectively. 
We will now examine policies for control of the military developed by the new 
government during the reintroduction and consolidation of democracy. These mainly 
involved consensual measures through the restructuring of controls over the military 
introduced under the two previous republics, and the reintroduction of parliamentary 
oversight over defence expenditure (Cawthra and Luckham 2002:2-7). We begin by 
examining the reorganisation of the Defence Council after 1991. 
7.2 The restructuring of the Defence Council 
The Defence Act was amended to restructure the Defence Council, which – as 
outlined earlier – advised the president on the control and administration of the Defence 
Force. 
The council was now chaired by the president, instead of the vice-president. 
Other members were appointed by the president and included cabinet ministers, 
permanent secretaries, and the three service chiefs. The chairman of the Defence and 
Security Committee of the MMD was an automatic member. This appointment was on a 
‘personal-to-holder basis as long as the individual continued to exercise the responsibility 
of looking after the Defence and Security portfolio in the MMD’ (Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters 1993). 
Between November 1991 and November 1993 the council became increasingly 
ineffective, as the presence of the president as chairman made it difficult for other 
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members to freely express their opinions and give appropriate advice. ‘This arrangement 
also placed the Council in an awkward position as it became difficult for individuals to 
challenge and appeal against Council decisions where the Commander-in-Chief was the 
Chairman’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1993:1). Furthermore, the Defence 
Council failed to meet regularly because of the president’s multiple commitments. This 
had numerous undesirable consequences. Among other things, a number of officers who 
had applied for retirement remained in the defence force, awaiting a decision from the 
commander-in-chief through the Defence Council. In the meantime, they did not perform 
their duties as diligently as they should have because they had already decided to ‘leave 
employment with the Ministry of Defence. The membership of the ruling party’s 
Chairman of the Defence and Security portfolio to the Defence Council also brought into 
question the sincerity of effective de-linkage of the ruling party from the military’ 
(Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1993:1). 
Also, as part of transition from one-party rule, the Defence Council  
simply met to discuss simple issues of promotions, dismissals, retirements 
and retrenchments of military officers. Specialised important committees 
such as the Strategy, Policy and Development Committee and the 
Administration and Finance Committee were deliberately abandoned and 
disregarded and became non-functional. The result was that the Defence 
Council lacked specialised defence and security advice on national security 
from these committees (Kazembe, interview, 2005). 
 Similarly, even when the committee met  
it became a custom of the Committee not to complete its agenda for a long 
time. Important issues such as the co-ordination of strategies and the 
Defence Policy were left hanging and had not yet been completed and 
passed as at December 2004. Such laxity in the consideration of policy and 
personnel matters was a clear indication that the civil control of the 
military in the Third Republic was deteriorating (ibid). 
Furthermore, the government did not examine the options for changing the roles 
and functions of some of the security structures established under the Second Republic. 
Instead, all the coercive control measures over both the military and civilians via military 
and civil intelligence as defined by Standing Defence and Security Instructions Number 1 
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of 1978 were abolished. This decision was taken because, as argued in chapter 6, these 
measures had become a source of tension between the government and the people. 
However, their abolition deprived the regime of structures for keeping the president 
informed on the state of national security, and therefore endangered the security of the 
country and civil control of the military in the transitional period. 
After November 1993 the minister of defence, after having received advice to this 
effect from his permanent secretary, informed the president that his chairing of meetings 
of the Defence Council had certain negative consequences. The president then delegated 
this responsibility to the minister. Thereafter, the Defence Council met regularly, and its 
recommendations were passed on to the president. 
Besides restructuring the Defence Council, the new government also identified a 
need to depoliticise the military. Steps taken to achieve this will be examined in the next 
section. 
7.3 The Depoliticisation of the military 
In 1991 the Defence Council decided that, in line with values appropriate to a 
multiparty democracy, the military should be politically neutral and be elevated above 
partisan politics. This did not mean that individual members of the defence force would  
lose their civic rights or franchise, but these were to be exercised under a 
duty of restraint. The Council also observed that the loyalty of the armed 
forces lay with the government of the day, parliament, the Constitution and 
the law of the land (Kazembe 2003:26). 
On this basis the Zambian government decided to depoliticise the military via a 
policy of professionalisation. The Department of Political Education and Culture, 
previously run by staunch UNIP military officials, became the Department of Sports, and 
all officials were either ‘forced to retire or retrenched from the military service. Similarly, 
all members of the Defence Force who were appointed to political positions were either 
retired or retrenched from the military service’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 
1991b:2). 
The departments or posts of some of the military officials who were closely 
associated with the torture of former coup plotters, and reported on the views and 
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activities of officers during the one-party era, were abolished, and their staff were either 
forced to retire or retrenched. For instance, the 
 Public Relations Cell in the Sports Department, the Finance Cell in the 
Inspectorate Department and in the Catering Directorate in the 
Quartermaster Department at Army Headquarters were abolished. 
Similarly, the rank of Major in the Finance Cell, the ranks of Staff Captain, 
One Major, One Captain and One Warrant Officer Class 1 at Army 
Headquarters were also abolished. The Officers holding these positions 
were either retired or retrenched (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1991a: 
2). 
In all, hundreds of officers associated with the politics of the one-party era were 
either retired or retrenched.  
More than 90 military officers from the rank of general to second 
lieutenant were purged from the Defence Force. This cost the government 
and the defence force officers who were well trained and had used their 
military experience during the height of the liberation movements in the 
southern central region between 1964 and 1993 (Kazembe, interview, 
2005).  
These mass retrenchments created growing antagonism between the government 
and the military. The retirement packages were meant to be paid by the Pensions Board of 
Zambia, but this did not happen immediately. Officers due to retire stayed on in their 
government houses until they received the last payment of their retirement packages. This 
created a severe shortage of accommodation among newly appointed serving officers. In 
the meantime, the government had introduced a system of school fees, and the slow 
payment of pension benefits to retired officers meant that many of them could no longer 
afford to send their children to school (Central Statistics Office 1997:3). The result was 
that many these officers became disillusioned and regarded government as an uncaring 
one which was neglecting them after they had saved the nation from attacks by minority 
regimes. The widows of deceased military officers who also continued to occupy military 
houses faced a number of hardships, including the loss of free maize meal given to 
serving officers. Some of these widows began to work as prostitutes among serving 
officers, which fuelled the spread of HIV/AIDS in the military (Sinkamba, Chipili and 
Chinyama, interview, 2005). In the meantime, the government continued to argue that 
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under the new democratic dispensation it was ‘important for the Ministry of Defence to 
integrate the needs of the defence force into the nation’s overall priorities, competing for 
resources and ensuring that national objectives were realistically supported by an 
appropriately sized military force’ (Ministry of Defence Headquarters 1994:1).  
The economic hardships faced by retired or retrenched military officers inclined 
them towards intervention in domestic politics. Together with some former leading 
figures in the one-party state who had been defeated at the ballot box, as noted by 
Huntington (1968:194-197), they worked out a political destabilisation plan code-named 
the ‘Zero Option Plan’, to which we now turn. 
7.4 The ‘Zero Option Plan’ of 1993 
Due to the problems described in the previous section, some former military 
officers worked out a ‘scheme code-named the Zero Option Plan with the leaders of the 
former ruling party, UNIP, that centred around a range of activities to destabilise the 
government through riots, thefts, strikes, rumours, and student unrest’ (Phiri 1993d: 1). 
The aim of this group was to ‘wrest power from the MMD government in order to form a 
government responsive to the people’s needs before the 1996 Presidential and 
parliamentary elections’ (ibid). 
The Zero Option Plan targeted four groups of people. The first was former army, 
police, and intelligence officers, senior civil servants, and former heads of parastatals who 
were forcibly retired when the MMD assumed power. Those officers were meant to 
organise demonstrations, which would incite people to riot in towns and cities throughout 
Zambia. Second, trade unions were to be infiltrated by paid agents who would replace 
‘impotent leaders’ and agitate for higher salaries through strikes, sit-ins, riots, and 
roughing up company executives. Third, student organisations from primary school to 
university level as well as teachers would be incited to agitate against high school fees, 
the cost of uniforms, and low salaries. Fourth, youths would be incited to start riots in 
towns throughout the country, and threaten tourism and foreign investment by stealing 
from white tourists (ibid). 
The government reacted by withdrawing UNIP’s status as the official opposition 
in parliament. The president also invoked the provisions of Article 30(1) of the 
constitution to declare a state of public emergency, as had been done during one-party 
rule. On Wednesday 10 March 1993 parliament ratified the emergency regulations as 
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provided for ‘under section 31 of the Emergency Powers Act (Cap. 108) and the inherited 
colonial Preservation of Public Security Act (Cap. 112)’ (National Assembly of Zambia 
1993:105). 
On 6 March 1993 a  
combined team of police, civil and military intelligence raided homes of 
suspects without a police warrant. Two UNIP members of Parliament, 
some former intelligence officers, some former military officers, four 
teachers and some UNIP Members of the Central Committee were arrested 
and detained (Phiri 1993d:1).  
These detainees underwent physical and psychological torture at the hands of 
police and military and civil intelligence officers. As a result, Cuthbert Nguni, member of 
parliament for Chama South, died in detention. The torture involved the use of some of 
the instruments cited in chapters 5 and 6. As was the case during the Second Republic, 
these acts alienated both citizens and members of the defence force from the government. 
The late Baldwin Nkumbula, member of parliament for Namwala, encapsulated this 
sentiment when he condemned parliament’s ratification of the state of emergency. 
Nkumbula stated that: 
When any government chooses to detain people and that government is 
afraid to bring these people before the established court because the 
government knows that those people will be freed if they appeared before a 
Magistrate or Judge and that government chooses to detain them and then 
ask parliament to extend the period for their convenience, that government 
is a dictatorship (National Assembly of Zambia 1993:120). 
 He further stated that: 
When we created the MMD, our ideal was to get rid of dictatorship. The 
ideal has not yet been achieved. By this Instrument that we now wish to 
apply in this land, the hope of ever seeing democracy in this country goes 
away forever … You are about to kill democracy. But I want to register my 
personal stand on this one so that posterity may judge me as it shall judge 
you. I refuse to subscribe to such an obnoxious instrument of legislation 
(ibid). 
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Phiri et al (2004:34) note that ‘despite such wise advice, and using MMD’s 
majority in the House, the executive went ahead and ratified the State of Emergency in 
the House’. This began a process in terms of which the executive used the legislature to 
pass legislation that violated human rights. This changed relations between the ruling 
party, opposition parties, civil society, the citizenry, and the military from harmonious to 
antagonistic. 
While the ‘Zero Option Plan’ did threaten the security of the state, the abuse by 
the president of the Third Republic of security legislation inherited from the Second and 
Third Republics ran counter to sound civil control of the military. It worked against the 
rule of law, transparency, and accountability, and violated citizens’ human rights. During 
his 27 years in office, Dr Kaunda had used these powers to detain or restrict hundreds of 
Zambians whom he perceived to be foes of his government. The government commission 
investigating violations of human rights in Zambia between 1964 and 1995 documented 
‘938 cases of people detained without trial in this period. Some of these people such as 
Nkaka Chisanga Puta, a prominent lawyer and Emmanuel Mwamba, a politician were 
detained for a continuous period of up to five years without charge or trial’ (Ministry of 
Legal Affairs, 1998: 1). The new leaders were aware that these abuses had soured civil-
military relations in the Second Republic. However, they failed to heed these lessons of 
history and once again used this legislation in a way that alienated the military as well as 
the broader population.  
The new government also had to deal with the impact of the privatisation of 
parastatal organisations. How this affected civil control of the military is the subject of 
the next section. 
7.5 The privatisation of parastatals 
Between 1992 and 1996 the ‘government actively pursued policies that facilitated 
a private sector driven economy under the structural adjustment programme supported by 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other collaborating partners’ 
(Central Statistical Office 1997:3). These programmes included the 
privatisation of state-owned companies, including the giant Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines, liberalisation of domestic and international 
trade, liberalisation of the foreign exchange market, a stringent fiscal 
policy which included government operating on a cash budget to reduce 
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inflation, health and education reforms which included the introduction of 
user fees, and transformation of the agriculture and transport sector (ibid).  
In 1992 the Zambia Privatisation Agency began selling parastatals to private 
interests, as provided for by the Privatisation Act Number 21 of 1992 (GRZ 1992:1). By 
October 1997, 187 government-owned companies had been privatised. Nineteen of these 
closed after privatisation – largely because local investors lacked the capital to invest in 
new technology and skills, and some managements were unable to adjust to the new 
competitive economic environment (Zambia Privatisation Agency 2005:3). This led to the 
loss of 7 034 jobs. 
In 1992, under the Structural Adjustment Programme imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the government also suddenly cut all 
subsidies to parastatals (Zambia Privatisation Agency 2005:3). This led to the loss of 
another 51 000 jobs, mainly through liquidations or the downsizing of parastatals such as 
Zambia Airways, Livingstone Motor Assemblies, United Bus of Zambia, Lima Bank, and 
Mansa Batteries.  
The government also failed to account for funds realised from the sale of 
parastatals, including the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited. The hardships 
suffered by people who had lost their jobs angered military personnel who were related to 
them. In the meantime, 
 the price of mealie meal increased from K198 Zambian Kwacha in 
October 1991 to K50 000 in 1996. The HIV/AIDS pandemic took its toll 
on the unemployed who could not afford a meal per day. The problem of 
the street kids whose parents were either unemployed or died from 
HIV/AIDS emerged and the government failed to provide any meaningful 
solutions (Central Statistics Office and Central Board of Health 2003c:1-
10). 
These problems further alienated many Zambians and the military from the 
MMD regime, and relations between the government and the military reached its lowest 
ebb since independence. This resulted in the attempted military coup d’etat of 28 October 
1997, which is examined in the next section. 
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7.6 The attempted military coup d’etat of 28 October 1997 
The attempted coup took place under dramatic circumstances, while government 
mechanisms for controlling the military were at their weakest. Unlike the situation in the 
Second Republic, the intelligence services had been weakened by a lack of funds, and 
neither these services nor the government was aware of the coup plot before the coup was 
actually launched. When asked, in an interview conducted for this study, why the 
government did not foresee this security threat, Brig-Gen Timothy Kazembe, former 
Director of Military Intelligence, observed that 
the MMD government and leadership were wallowing in democracy, 
which made them believe that military coup d’etats belonged to the Cold 
War period. As a result of this attitude very little interaction took place 
between the government leadership and the Defence Force. The only 
meeting that Dr Chiluba, the President addressed involved the Central Joint 
Operations Committee comprising senior Army, Air Force, Zambia 
National Service, Police and Security Intelligence. Apart from calling these 
Commanders, no other visit was recorded other than commissioning 
parades for graduating officer cadets (Kazembe, interview, 2005). 
By contrast, Lt-Gen Christone Tembo, former army commander and vice-
president, observed that 
the process of democratic transition from the one-party state to 
multipartism was not conceived properly by the new government 
leadership. This was because of three reasons. First, the soldiers felt 
betrayed and neglected after President Chiluba won the October 1991 
Presidential elections. This was because while he thanked the civilians for 
having given him over 51 per cent votes, he failed to make even quiet trips 
to thank the soldiers for having equally voted for him and his MMD 
government into office. Second, the Commander-in-Chief suffered from 
the problem of lack of proper understanding in the administration of the 
Zambia Defence Force despite the advice given to him by various 
experienced officers. The result was that he over-delegated his 
responsibilities to the Minister of Defence who was equally not very 
knowledgeable in the administration of defence forces. Third, the process 
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of structural and behavioural reorganisation introduced after 1991 could 
have been done more cautiously so that the operations of the military 
intelligence could not be disrupted. Instead the idea of change for the sake 
of change resulted in the abrupt reduction in experienced personnel and the 
provision of funds for operational intelligence. This caused a loss of morale 
among military intelligence officers to work for a system of government 
that did not appreciate their services nor support them with resources for 
their operations (Tembo, interview, 2005). 
Under these circumstances, the plan to overthrow the government was hatched by 
Captains Jack Chiti and Steven Lungu from August to October (The Post, 18 and 19 
August 2004). During these three months none of the intelligence officers gained any 
inkling of the plans of the coup plotters, 
although speculation on conspiratorial discipline of the senior military 
officers had been drawn to the attention of authorities. However, like in the 
case of the 11th September bombing of the Trade Centre in the United 
States of America, the Intelligence Officers did not pay attention to the 
reports as they were also wallowing in democracy (Kazembe, interview, 
2005).  
On the day of the intended coup, the plotters recruited soldiers deployed on guard 
duties at ‘Quarter Guard Post, Central Ammunition Depot, General Nobby Simbeye’s 
residential plot in Roma Township, and [the] Central Ordinance Depot for the purpose of 
overthrowing by unlawful means the government of Zambia’ (Government of Republic of 
Zambia 2003b:1). Despite the large-scale movement of troops, none of the officers in 
charge of these troops reported these developments to senior military officers, 
intelligence officers, or the government. 
That evening the coup plotters attacked the ‘First Infantry Brigade at Lusaka, in 
Lusaka District and without lawful authority removed eleven armoured military vehicles 
for the purpose of facilitating the overthrow of the Zambian government’ (ibid. In the 
process the coup plotters 
 captured Lt-Co Francis Lombe Mfula and six other senior Officers of the 
First Infantry Brigade and detained them at Arrackan Barracks Guard 
Room. Instead of reporting the arrest of these senior military officers to the 
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military intelligence command or government leadership, the Commander 
and Adjutant of 2nd Zambia Regiment at Arrackan Barracks, Berrington 
Mukoma and Baldwin Kapulu Manase, acquiesced to the said unlawful 
detention by not taking measures to have the said officers released and 
such omission was for the purpose of facilitating the overthrow by 
unlawful means of the government of Zambia (ibid).  
Mukoma further facilitated the coup by 
ordering the war alarm to be raised without lawful authority from the Army 
Commander. Furthermore twenty officers in control of five armoured 
military vehicles, bearing registration numbers AE046, AE091, AE075, 
AE086 and AE095, unlawfully attacked the Army Commander’s residence 
with intent to murder the said Army Commander for the purpose of 
facilitating the overthrow by unlawful means of the Zambian government 
(ibid).  
The first time when civil and military intelligence, the army command, and 
leaders learnt of the attempted coup was when 34 coup plotters entered the Zambia Mass 
Media complex and ‘took control of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation 
studios, and Captain Stephen Lungu announced over the radio the overthrow of the 
government of Zambia’ (GRZ 2003b:1). However, loyal elite commandos captured the 
coup plotters and foiled the attempt. After consulting his cabinet, President Chiluba again 
declared a state of public emergency. These events reveal the weakness of civil control of 
the military under the Third Republic. Unlike the situation in the Second Republic, there 
was very little co-ordination among civil and military intelligence and the government. 
Without the actions of loyal rank-and-file commandos, the coup would probably have 
succeeded. 
Haantobolo and Phiri (2004 38-39) have argued that the 
coup plotters should be understood as some of the many Zambians affected 
by the MMD’s policies that lacked sound economic and social values, 
especially with regard to the boosting of the local industry. Furthermore, 
the failure by the government to address the problem of unemployment as a 
result of the consequences of the privatisation of former Parastatal 
organisations worsened the situation.  
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Besides this, the MMD leaders had failed to address the problems of worsening 
droughts; worsening poverty, which had escalated from 62 per cent of Zambians in 1991 
to 73 per cent in 1997; the collapse of the manufacturing sector; and high levels of 
illiteracy, estimated at no less than 75 per cent (Central Statistics 2003b:2). 
Therefore, the 1997 coup attempt should not be regarded as the act of some 
disgruntled soldiers only but as a barometer of the feelings of many ordinary Zambians 
who wanted peace and food, and not empty assurances. It also reflected a fragile 
democratic transition in a country where the government did not enjoy a high level of 
constitutional and political legitimacy, since UNIP, now the main opposition party, had 
boycotted the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections. This was as a result of the 
inclusion of discriminatory clauses in the  
1996 Constitution (Amendment) Bills. Article 34(3) and (8) of the 
Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act Number 17 of 1996 (GRZ 
1996:52) prevented Dr K D Kaunda from contesting for the position of 
President since both his parents were born in Malawi and not in Zambia 
(GRZ 1996:52). 
The irresponsible behaviour of the MMD government over the economy and the 
constitution – which would provide the framework for all future governments, not just the 
MMD – had eroded its support and the trust and goodwill of most Zambians (Phiri et al 
2004:39). Under these circumstances, neglecting the intelligence agencies was a serious 
error.  
Phiri et al argue that the MMD regime engaged in meaningless ‘zero-sum games 
and overlooked calls for accommodations of people that any government, that wished to 
remain in power could not just aim to be a bargain hunter by opting only to make gains, 
but had to also aim to avoid losses’ (ibid). 
The detention of some of the 1997 coup suspects had local, regional, and 
international consequences – including consequences for civil control of the military – 
which will be briefly explored in the next section. 
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7.7 Consequences of the detention of the coup suspects for civil control of the 
military 
The immediate consequences of the attempted coup was that, as a result of the 
recommendations of the Report of the Human Rights Commission of Inquiry of 6 
September 1995 (GRZ 1995a:76), the government felt uneasy about using military 
intelligence personnel to arrest and torture of the coup suspects. Instead, military 
intelligence was simply asked to ‘identify military personnel that had been involved in the 
coup attempt’ (Kazembe, interview, 2006). This identification exercise resulted in the 
arrest of a number of suspected coup plotters, including Dr Kaunda, now president of 
UNIP; the late Dean Mungomba, president of the Zambia Democratic Congress; and 
Princess Nakatindi Wina, a former cabinet minister and the MMD’s chairperson for 
women. 
Coup suspects were so badly tortured by police and civil intelligence personnel 
that some died, and other suffered permanent injuries. This worsened relations between 
citizens and military personnel sympathetic to the coup plotters on the one hand and the 
government on the other (The Post, 18-19 August 2004). Therefore, the nature of civil 
control of the military now ‘changed from being secretive to dictatorial and being 
exercised by a democratically elected government’ (Wina, interview, 2006). Any officer 
suspected of being disloyal was either fired or retrenched. However, the retrenchment of 
military intelligence officers ceased forthwith. Instead, most of them were sent to military 
colleges for retraining, and were then redeployed at military establishments (Sinkamba et 
al, interview, 2005). This amounted to the reintroduction of some consensual and 
coercive measures for civil control of the military utilised under the First and Second 
Republics respectively. Intelligence budgets were increased in order to avoid these 
services deteriorating as they had done before the 1997 coup attempt. The government 
also sent large numbers of military officers to participate in peace-keeping missions in 
Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and the DRC, leaving behind a small 
number of officers who could be easily monitored. 
The torture of and restrictions placed on opposition leaders, especially Dr 
Kaunda, provoked widespread indignation among Zambians and in the international 
community (Phiri et al 2004:43). Many Zambians felt they had been better off under Dr 
Kaunda’s regime than under Chiluba’s. Phiri et al (2004:43) note that ‘pro-democracy 
and human rights movements, churches, opposition parties organised nation-wide 
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demonstrations against the continued renewal of the State of Public Emergency and the 
detention of Dr K D Kaunda’. 
Dr Kaunda’s support for liberation movements in southern Africa had won him 
lasting support, both from the international community as well as governments in the 
region formed by those former liberation movements. These countries mounted heavy 
diplomatic pressure on President Chiluba to release Dr Kaunda unconditionally. The late 
Dr Julius Nyerere of Tanzania travelled to Zambia to visit Dr Kaunda in prison and urge 
President Chiluba to release him. The Danish government suspended aid worth $34 
million to Zambia, and the World Bank informed the Chiluba administration that a Donor 
Consultative Group (DCG) meeting due to be held in Lusaka would only take place once 
the state of emergency had been lifted, and Dr Kaunda had been released from prison 
(Phiri et al 2004:43). 
As a result, the MMD government released all opposition leaders from prison on 
the basis of nolle proseque. However, it continued to alienate and antagonise prominent 
Zambians and ordinary citizens. Some Zambians resigned from the MMD and joined 
UNIP, the newly formed United Party for National Development (UPND) under 
Anderson Mazoka, the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) under Lt-Gen 
Christone Tembo, and the Heritage Party (HP) of Brig Godfrey Miyanda. Many serving 
and former military officers as well as intelligence officers joined these opposition 
parties, and communicated with their counterparts still serving the government. Under 
these circumstances civil control of the military remained precarious.  
Relations were strained even further when Dr Chiluba announced his intention to 
amend the constitution to allow him to run for a third term of office. This move was again 
thwarted through demonstrations by pro-democracy and human rights movements, 
churches, opposition parties, and a split in the MMD that led to the formation of the FDD 
and HP. 
Faced with all these political, economic and social problems, Dr Chiluba 
continued to respond favourably to UN requests for military contributions to peace-
keeping missions in Sierra Leone. Moreover, the civil war in the DRC and its spillover 
effects along the border with Zambia allowed the government to divert the attention of 
the defence force away from internal political problems. It is also important to note that 
the Zambia Defence Force exhibited high levels of neutrality under provocative political 
circumstances. Unlike their colleagues in Ghana and Nigeria, Zambian officers knew that 
if the ‘re-established democracy was to survive and the goals of governance were to be 
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achieved with minimum interference, military discipline through political neutrality was 
essential’ (Kazembe 2003:27). Furthermore, the military realised that the Chiluba regime 
was on its way out, and decided to facilitate this process in a peaceful way by helping to 
transporting ballot boxes to and from polling stations in remote districts before and after 
the 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections. 
Therefore, under the Third Republic, the government faced serious challenges in 
respect of its control of the military. However, as Larry (1989:24) argues, these problems 
have been typical of democratic transitions in Africa. Fortunately for Zambia, they did 
not result in a successful military coup. On the other hand, parliamentary oversight over 
defence and security did not face serious obstacles. How parliament performed this 
function is examined in the next section. 
7.8  Parliamentary oversight of defence expenditure, 1991-2004 
While, during Zambia’s democratic transition, the executive branch of 
government struggled to maintain effective civil control of the military, the legislative 
branch was far more successful. In line with the recommendations of the 1990 Report of 
the Special Parliamentary Select Committee and the subsequent constitutional 
amendments, parliament regained its control over defence expenditure. This was possible 
because the security threats surrounding the hosting of regional liberation movements no 
longer existed, as all the countries concerned had gained their independence, and South 
Africa was also on the road to the abolition of apartheid and the introduction of majority 
rule.  
Le Roux (2004:V) further notes that this was a period in which government 
planners and others realised that the  
financing of defence and security programmes could not be isolated from 
broader developmental programmes and procedures, which in a liberal 
political dispensation lent themselves to the controls of prioritisation and 
open scrutiny. 
In 1992 parliament debated and approved the defence budget for the first time 
since 1970. Furthermore from 1992 onwards the Public Accounts Committee was 
allowed to consider reports of the Auditor-General’s Office on defence expenditure. The 
committee’s first report on defence expenditure was based on a special auditor-general’s 
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report on the procurement of goods and services for the army and air force from 1992 to 
1998 (GRZ 2003a:1-27). It revealed many irregularities in the way in which the Ministry 
of Defence spent public funds. This included the 
irregular purchase by the Zambia Army of 200 000 metres of African print 
(Chitenge) material from Mulungushi Textiles of Zambia, ordered by the 
African National Congress of South Africa in the run-up to democratic 
elections in 1994, at a cost of K91,950,600. Out of the 200,000 metres 
35,702 metres and 250 kilograms of printed faints were diverted from the 
Central Ordinance Depot to the Minister of Defence’s residence (National 
Assembly of Zambia 2001:2-6).  
There was no evidence that the controlling officer had authorised the diversion of 
the materials from the Central Ordinance Depot to the minister’s residence. There was 
also no evidence that the commander-in-chief of the armed forces had approved the 
procurement and donation of these fabrics. The committee observed that the consignment 
of materials to the MMD through the minister, a senior party official, had undermined the 
policy of de-linking the party from government activities. The committee directed ‘the 
Ministry of Defence to recover the K91 950 600; institute disciplinary action against all 
offenders in the purchase of the African print; and recommended for improvements in 
record-keeping in the Zambia Army’ (ibid). 
The auditor-general’s report also recorded irregularities in expenditure by the 
Ministry of Defence on material for uniforms and the tailoring of uniforms; belts and 
vehicle stickers; tents and transport; the procurement of the VIP presidential aircraft; and 
aircraft refurbishment and training services (ibid:7-29). A private company had also been 
irregularly involved in defence procurement and other projects (ibid). 
In considering the committee’s report, the House deplored the fact that the army 
command seemed to regard itself as being above the law, and was therefore not obliged to 
adhere to financial procedures. The House directed that this should cease forthwith and 
that the service commands be compelled to comply with all established financial 
procedures and regulations. The House also directed the strengthening of the 
Ministerial Tender Committee through which all purchases were to be 
channelled for appropriate scrutiny and advice before execution. The 
House felt that this Parliamentary directive was imperative to avoid the 
negligence and the loss of public resources that had been brought up to the 
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fore in the Auditor-General’s Report (National Assembly of Zambia 
2001:30). 
The House directed that all funds paid to suppliers were to be recovered 
immediately, especially if the goods and services had not been received. It ruled that 
immediate disciplinary steps be taken against all officers and others involved in the 
irregular transactions that had resulted in the loss of public funds. 
It recommended stern disciplinary action against all officials in the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development who had connived with defence personnel in the 
irregular expenditure of public resources (ibid:30-31). The House urged the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Development to re-establish close links with the Ministry of 
Defence and advise it on how to improve its operations (ibid). Finally, the House 
recommended the introduction of strict financial controls over the armed services, and 
that the ‘Defence Act (CAP 106) be reconsidered and amended to provide for a clear 
chain of authority in the handling of public funds in the services’ (ibid). 
These actions showed clearly that the Public Accounts Committee had assumed 
the role of and responsibility for scrutinising the expenditure of public funds by the 
Ministry of Defence. Between 1964 and 2003 the executive, in its Treasury minutes or 
public accounts reports for the previous year, simply ‘noted or explained that action had 
been taken on the various recommendations of all the parliamentary Committees’ (GRZ 
1964 to 2003). On Friday 10 January 2003 the executive stopped this practice. As part of 
a drive to curb corruption, President Mwanawasa’s government directed that  
all the people implicated in the misappropriation of government resources 
in the 16 Public Accounts Committee Reports for the years 1991 to 2003 
that were approved by Parliament including those from the Ministry of 
Defence were to be arrested and prosecuted by the courts of law for 
corruption. In accordance with this directive the government directed the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to proceed with the prosecutions of 
all those named in the Public Accounts Committee Reports (The Post, 
2003). 
By 2004 the task force investigating the plunder of national resources under the 
Chiluba regime had arrested two former commandants of the Zambia National Service 
and Zambia Army, who were prosecuted in civil courts. All the other officers implicated 
in the dubious procurement of military hardware, both in the Ministry of Defence and 
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Ministry of Finance, and named in the report of the Public Accounts Committee, were 
also arrested and prosecuted. There is no doubt that these steps raised civil control of the 
military under the Mwanawasa government to a higher level than during the First and 
Second Republics, as well as under the Chiluba regime. 
Parliamentary oversight over defence and security was further enhanced by 
creating a committee on national security and foreign affairs. How this committee set 
about fulfilling its function is examined in the next section. 
7.9 Creation of the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 
In 1999, to complement the role of the Public Accounts Committee in overseeing 
the activities of the executive in general and the Ministry of Defence in particular, 
parliament also empowered the Committee on Foreign Affairs to play an oversight role. 
As a result, the committee changed its name to the Committee on National Security and 
Foreign Affairs, thus allowing it to scrutinise the activities of the ministries of Defence 
and of Home Affairs. 
Every year since 1999 the Speaker has appointed members of parliament to the 
National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee for the duration of every session. Its 
functions are to 
study, report and make recommendations to the government through the 
House on the mandate, management and operations of the Ministries of 
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs, departments and/or agencies 
under their portfolio; 
carry out detailed scrutiny of certain activities being undertaken by the 
Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Departments and 
Agencies under their portfolio and make appropriate recommendations to 
the House for ultimate consideration by the government; 
make, if seems necessary, recommendations to the government on the need 
to review certain policies and/or certain existing Legislation; 
consider any Bills that may be referred to them by the House; 
undertake tours of selected projects and security institutions to make on-
the-spot examination of their operations; 
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While on tour the Committee is not allowed to accept gifts given to 
members during their normal course of duty. This measure enables 
members avoid compromising the work of the Committee with the gifts 
they would receive; and 
appointments of members to this Committee take into consideration the 
following: 
(i) the Constitutional obligation to have representation of all parties on the 
Committee as in the House; 
(ii) gender sensitivity in terms of balance and for representation; and 
(iii) Member’s qualifications, experiences and preferences (National 
Assembly of Zambia 2001:1). 
When the committee uncovers financial irregularities in the Ministry of Defence, 
it refers them to the Public Accounts Committee for further scrutiny. Some of the issues it 
considers are the status of Zambia’s borders, Zambian troops serving in United Nations 
peace-keeping operations, Zambia’s security concerns and their impact on the country’s 
foreign policy, and the welfare of defence personnel.  
While these two committees play an important role in monitoring the 
implementation of defence policy, they have never been involved in defence pre-budget 
consultations, a very important component of the budgeting process. Even when the 
defence budget is presented to parliament for scrutiny and approval, it has never been 
referred to the two committees for comment and input. They are not empowered to 
scrutinise the operations of the defence force, as it is believed that this may compromise 
national security. Also, until 2005 they did not have a mandate to scrutinise the budgets 
and operations of the civil and defence intelligence services. This led to the intelligence 
services being used during the Chiluba regime to plunder national resources (Sichalwe 
2006:1). However, the effectiveness of the executive and parliament was again 
demonstrated when, on Tuesday 16 July 2002, the latter passed a motion authorising the 
executive to lift the immunity that prevented former President Chiluba from being 
prosecuted for the alleged plunder of national resources.  
Therefore, one can safely argue that during the Third Republic – and especially 
under President Mwanawasa’s leadership – consensual measures through parliamentary 
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and executive control of the military were restored. Their effectiveness has been 
demonstrated by the establishment of the Committee on National Security and Foreign 
Affairs, and the arrest, prosecution and to a great extent the sentencing of people 
implicated in the plunder of national resources by the Public Accounts Committee 
between 1991 and 2003. 
7.10 Conclusion 
Larry (1989:24) notes that 
it is unrealistic to think that countries can suddenly reverse course and 
institutionalize stable democratic government simply by changing leaders, 
constitutions and/or public mentalities. If progress is made towards 
developing democratic government, it is likely to be gradual, messy, fitful 
and slow, with many imperfections along the way (cited in Decalo 
1992:35). 
In the case of Zambia’s Third Republic, the reassertion of consensual measures of 
civil control of the military, including parliamentary oversight over defence expenditure, 
faced many legal and administrative obstacles introduced during the two previous 
republics. This resulted in the retirement and retrenchment of many military officers 
associated with the coercive one-party era. The failure by defence intelligence officers to 
infiltrate the 1997 coup plot demonstrated that civil control of the military in Zambia had 
reached its weakest point since 1964.  
The abuse of emergency provisions to declare states of emergency and the torture 
and violation of human rights of political prisoners created antagonism between the 
citizenry, the government, and the military. It also changed the character of the Chiluba 
regime from a democracy to a civilian dictatorship. This imbalance in civil control of the 
military was reversed by the Mwanawasa government, which strengthened parliamentary 
and judiciary oversight of defence and security expenditure. In 2004, the end of the 
period under review, these bold executive steps, as well as a campaign to fight corruption 
even among members of the defence force, seemed set to cement successful and 
harmonious civil control over the military in Zambia. 
 
 
8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters, this study examined measures adopted by various 
governments to maintain civil control over the military in Zambia in four distinct periods 
in the country’s history. Against this background we can now finally set out to answer the 
core question: why civil control of the military in Zambia was such that - in contrast with 
many other African countries after independence – the military in Zambia consistently 
supported the ruling elite. This continued to be the case despite major transitions in 
regimes and systems of governance from the colonial system to a multiparty system at 
independence, a one-party ‘participatory democracy’, and a renewed multiparty 
democracy. Any deviation from this model by military dissenters in the form of attempted 
military coups d’etat was consistently exposed by military or civil intelligence, and 
crushed by loyal troops. As a result, during the period under review the country 
experienced relatively harmonious civil-military relations compared to other former 
British colonies in Africa. Why was this the case? The answer to this question is that: 
Politically, during the colonial period, 1900 to 1964, British colonial rule in 
Northern Rhodesia was characterised by the unequal distribution of authority and income 
between the white settler community and the Africans. Economically, the colonial 
economy was founded on exploitation of the country’s agricultural and mineral resources 
for the benefit of the commercial and mining centres in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa 
and Britain, using the African population as a reservoir of cheap labour. The system of 
taxing all adult males and the movement of people from crown land, mining areas and 
other commercial centres as argued in chapter 4, led to high levels of migration both 
within the country and Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In order to maximize the 
economic exploitation of the African population, British colonial rule in Northern 
Rhodesia also promoted separate cultures and divergent interests between the white 
settlers and the Africans. The study, then, provides an answer to how and why civil 
control of the military in colonial Northern Rhodesia remained stable by explaining that 
the maintenance of the above oppressive system of governance was mostly managed 
through the enforcement of coercive measures using what Welch (1978: 159) terms as the 
‘apolitical colonial army’. Force through the use of the Northern Rhodesia regiment 
legitimised the economic, political and cultural vices of the policy of racial discrimination 
as promulgated by the British colonial authorities and settlers that occupied racially 
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structured governance institutions such as the executive, legislative council and the 
judiciary. Hence the relations between the white settlers, military and government elite 
were stable and harmonious. This again explains why Welch remarked that ‘The 
apolitical character of the colonial army in fact served a profoundly political purpose: 
maintenance of British rule in its genesis and continuation’ (1978: 159). However, the 
study also demonstrated that if the colonial white settlers, military and government elite 
were fortunate to develop a consensus, resentment through the nationalist struggle for 
independence, emerged from the majority of the Africans who faced the blunt of 
economic exploitation manifested through the coercive measures of racial discriminatory 
structures of governance. Hence, this study characterises civil control of the military 
between the Africans, government elite and the military as being antagonistic. Despite 
this antagonistic situation, the answer to the core question on why stable civil control of 
the military continued during the colonial period up to the time of independence lies in 
the ‘apolitical nature’ of the Northern Rhodesia colonial army that continued to respect 
the directives of the colonial authorities, strict adherence to the rule of law and British 
military ethics.  
In the immediate post independence period, 1964 to 1972, civil control of the 
military in Zambia remained stable because of the introduction of new methods of 
governance that promoted consensual democratic measures. These involved the 
replacement of the undemocratic colonial system of government with one elected on the 
basis of ‘one man one vote’. The replacement of the colonial elite in the governance 
institution of parliament, executive and judiciary with people appointed by democratically 
elected authorities was matched by the repeal and replacement of all laws that promoted 
the use of coercive measures through the policies of racial discrimination. The fraternal 
unity of all the 73 ethnic groups was also achieved through the policy of ‘One Zambia 
One Nation’.  Effective use was made of the abundant financial resources from buoyant 
copper prices to develop the missing social, physical and economic infrastructure in 
education, health and military institutions. The development of these public services was 
an essential step that helped Zambia to overcome the legacy of colonial neglect and 
realised the maximum potential of its people. The Zambianisation of many positions and 
the rewards and facilities that accompanied them including those in the military 
contributed significantly to the development of a degree of consensus among its people. 
When the country faced both internal and external threats in form of the Lenshina 
uprisings and military attacks from mainly Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the 
legitimacy of governance institutions and the incumbents who occupied them obliged the 
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military to continue protecting the sovereignty of the country and its people. Therefore, 
taking into consideration the above holistic picture, the answer to why Zambia had a 
stable civil control over the military in the first republic, 1964 to 1972, lay mainly in the 
development of the consensual measures in the governance of the country. These 
involved the careful use of recruitment, training, promotion, retirement and budgetary 
policies which resulted in the development of a military culture that bred loyal and trusted 
officers. This, as argued in chapter 5, was supported by the use of effective structures 
such as the executive, parliament, Office of the Commander-In-Chief, Ministry of 
Defence, Defence Council and Office of the Command Secretary.  
Why did Zambia achieve this consensus in comparison to Zimbabwe, Nigeria and 
Ghana? This study has argued in chapter 3 that despite the fact that all the three countries 
experienced similar challenges in civil control of the military, the Zambian case was 
slightly different. We demonstrate that Mandaza’s (1996) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003)’s 
theory on the African ‘challenges of construction a nation state from people of diverse 
ethnic.. backgrounds’ does not apply to Zambia but may be relevant to the Zimbabwean 
situation. In our comparison of the two countries, we have demonstrated that, first, 
whereas Zambia introduced consensual measures in this period, Zimbabwe continued 
with the use of colonial coercive measures in the management of its country’s affairs. 
Second, while consensual measures integrated the 73 ethnic groups in Zambia under the 
motto ‘One Zambia One Nation’ the continued use of coercive measures in Zimbabwe 
brought antagonism between the Shona dominated government with the Ndebele and the 
white settlers over ethnic superiority and land redistribution policies respectively. In the 
case of Nigeria, the dominance of the northern ethnic group in the military and 
government was largely responsible for the Biafran civil war and the 1966 coup d’etat. 
Zambia solved this problem by allowing all the 73 ethnic groups access to recruitment 
into the Zambia Defence Force. In the case of Ghana, we argue that the differences in 
adhering to national policies and commands between the new nationalist leaders and the 
pro-Sandhurst Western-oriented military officers caused military take-overs of civil 
governments in that country. In the case of Zambia, consensual measures facilitated 
respect for promulgated commands, distribution of roles and execution of directives 
which helped to contain the onslaught of racist regimes against Zambia for giving bases 
to liberation movements fighting for independence.  
  In the second republic, under the one party state system of governance, 1973 to 
December 1990, the answer to the core question above is that stability of the military was 
achieved through mostly coercive measures. These measures changed their nature from 
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those influenced by the policies of racial discrimination under the colonial period to the 
embedding of intelligence officers in military units, surveillance, punitive patterns of 
recruitment, promotion and dismissals in the military establishments. Why were these 
coercive measures introduced in this period? This study argues in chapter 6 that the 
political economy of the country degenerated from bad to worse because of a number of 
political and economic reasons. 
Politically, the intra-party rivalry within UNIP became a major problem as the 
emergence of the UPP under Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe threatened the disintegration of 
the ruling party, UNIP, and government. The inter-party rivalries between UNIP and the 
ANC under Harry Mwanga Nkumbula also promoted division along tribal lines. Since 
these developments threatened national unity, we argue in chapter 6 that President 
Kaunda decided to impose the one party system of government. The consequences of the 
creation of this system of government was that it suppressed political opposition and 
criticism, and the distinction between the ruling party and the apparatus of the state 
ceased to exist. Freedom to vote for a political party of ones choice no longer existed.  
Economically, the government to a large extent failed to sustain the public 
service program initiated shortly after independence because of lack of financial 
resources. As argued in chapter 6, copper prices at the London Metal Exchange declined 
to their lowest levels in the mid-1970’s and reduced the country’s earnings from its single 
major export commodity. At the same time the oil import bills on the international market 
skyrocketed to the highest levels. The country’s commitments to the liberation struggles 
in Southern Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa made it a target for military attacks and 
economic destabilisation. The country also suffered economic hardships because of 
international sanctions against Southern Rhodesia’s declaration of UDI and South 
Africa’s practice of the apartheid system. We state in chapter 7 that ‘these regional 
conflicts served to reduce Zambia’s scope for manoeuvre both economically and 
politically. Because of Zambia’s geographical location many of these problems were 
unavoidable’ (GRZ 1996: 21). At the international level, the antagonisms that existed 
between the capitalist and communist states during the cold war era created fertile 
grounds for opportunists both military and civil to organise civil wars and coup d’etats . 
Under these local, regional and international political and economic pressures, the leaders 
in Zambia’s one party state government used coercive measures as the most appropriate 
methods of civil control of the military. These measures as argued in chapter 6 helped to 
avert the 1980, 1988 and 1990 attempted military coup d’etats. The use of coercive 
measures in civil control of the military in this period is similar to Welch’s (1976: 1-38) 
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argument that we advance in chapter 3, that one of the five means of civilian control of 
the military that have been devised and successively utilised by various states is the 
utilisation of party controls, by creating parallel hierarchies of command in the military 
establishments. Similarly, in chapter 3, using Kolkowicz (1967: 21) we also argue that the 
use of coercive measures along the lines employed by the Soviet Union to put down 
challenges to the party’s hegemony is relevant to the study of Zambia’s one party state 
period. In view of the foregoing, we can safely argue that the answer to why civil control 
of the military was maintained in Zambia under the one party state period was largely due 
to the effective use of coercive measures as defined during this era. 
 In the Third Republic, under the reintroduced multi party democratic system of 
government, December 1990 to 2004, Zambia’s civil control of the military was largely 
through the use of consensual measures. We argue in chapter 7, that the new consensual 
measures were slightly different from those introduced in the immediate post 
independence period that were limited to constitutional change and constrained by the 
country’s burdens of supporting liberation movements from colonial states in 
neighbouring countries. The new consensual measures introduced in the Third Republic 
embraced all the good legal and practical experiences inherited from the previous three 
regimes. Most important of them all, the new measures provided a strong combination of 
parliamentary oversight over defence budgetary allocations and programmes, executive 
and judicial powers as well as the loyalty of the military intelligence to the government of 
the day. The government also operated under a free international atmosphere that was 
characterised by the end of the cold war era and regional conflicts associated with 
colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa. Unlike in Tanzania where the old Chama 
Chama Pinduzi Party and its leaders were returned in government under multi-party 
conditions and continued with one party state measures of civil control of the military, as 
argued by Omari (2003) in chapter 3, in Zambia the new leaders’ methods of civil control 
of the military were largely influenced by the market-oriented  economic system that 
promoted policies of privatisation and economic liberalism as opposed to centralised 
planning and state participation. Under this new economic system, an economic and 
financial policy framework programme was introduced that emphasised the ‘fiscal and 
monetary reforms to reduce the government’s fiscal deficit as well as monetary expansion 
with a view of containing inflation’ UNDP 1997: 10. The new measures that also 
included privatisation and a cash-based budgeting system resulted in the introduction of 
military professionalism and a formal separation of party structures from the military 
establishments. Despite the hardships associated with retrenchments that the military 
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personnel went through, consensual measures were largely embraced as the most 
appropriate methods of civil control of the military in Zambia. These measures were in 
line with Cawthra and Luckhams’ (2002: 2) observation on the challenges of security 
sector reform in the transition from authoritarianism. Some of these include the 
depoliticisation of the military and its subordination to civilian authority, establishment of 
an effective defence ministry and parliamentary oversight, reorienting and 
reprofessionalising the military, demilitarisation of public order policing and balancing 
the demands of the national defence with those of development (Cawthra and Luckham 
2002: 2). Given the above analysis, one can safely argue that in the Third Republic, the 
answer to why civil control of the military in Zambia remained stable in comparison to 
traumatic transitions of those of Congo DR was largely due to effective use and 
manipulation of consensual measures .  
      In conclusion, this study has demonstrated that all the political regimes in 
Zambia in the 20th century managed to stave off successful coups with a mixture of 
coercive and consensual measures and as argued in the literature review in chapter 3, this 
sets Zambia apart from many African countries. However, despite the fact that these 
measures worked as a solution for Zambia, upon closer scrutiny, events in Zambia 
especially during the colonial and one party state eras, also demonstrate that civil control 
of the military cannot be indefinitely secured by coercive means. The most likely 
sustainable way of securing civil control of the military is to maintain consensual 
relations between the core ‘triumvirate’ namely, the political 
authorities/government/ruling elite; the military and military elite; and the citizenry. This 
is because political institutions of democratic states should guard against disadvantaging 
other ethnic groups or subaltern classes nor reinforcing their social and economic 
marginalisation, which in turn would discourage them to mobilise militarily as well as 
politically against the state (Cawthra and Luckham 2003:20). 
8.2 Recommendations 
In view of these findings, and to help ensure that Zambia does not take the 
relative domestic peace that its people have experienced for the past 41 years for granted, 
some recommendations follow for maintaining and improving civil control of the military 
in that country. 
1) In the event of any change of government, or change of president after the 
maximum two terms in office, the new government or president should never 
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ignore the advice to examine how consensual measures and other good practices 
inherited from the previous governments have facilitated civil control. Instead 
continuous interaction with the defence force should be promoted from an early 
stage onwards, in order to inspire confidence, trust, and loyalty in and to the 
government of the day. 
2) Sound and effective policies and structures for maintaining civil control of the 
military introduced by previous regimes should not be arbitrarly abolished, but 
should be retained and improved where necessary. The Zambian experience 
clearly demonstrates that the arbitrary abolition of previous policies and 
structures creates major discontinuities which may detract from political and 
social stability. Civil control of the military in Zambia has largely been premised 
on the ability of its leaders to identify and implement sound policies in respect of 
its defence and security forces. When such sound policies are ignored in favour 
of coercive measures, as in the colonial period, which did not receive appropriate 
affirmation from the majority of the Africans who were in the peripheral of 
political and economic development, the measures were vigorously opposed by 
the people. Neverthless, despite these antagonistic circumstances, the thesis 
argues that the military remained relatively apolitical and facilitated a smooth 
transition of governance systems and leadership. This facilitated continued civil 
control of the military in the country. This study has shown that, when Zambia 
attained independence in 1964, its new leadership retained some major 
institutions introduced by the colonial government, including a written 
constitution, a parliament, executive, and judiciary; and, more specific to civil 
control of the military, a Ministry of Defence and a Defence Council. Retaining 
these institutions and adapting them to the new consensual democratic 
dispensation ensured a degree of continuity in civil control of the military. During 
the Second Republic the same approach of ‘change with continuity’ resulted in 
the introduction of largely coercive measures in civil control of the military. This 
study illustrates that the temporary neglect of some aspects of civil control of the 
military by the leaders of the Third Republic resulted in the near-success of the 
attempted military coup on 28 October 1997. This helped government leaders to 
realise the dangers of radical changes in policies in respect of the defence and 
security forces during the transitional period from a coercive system of 
government to one that promotes consensual measures. Their corrective action – 
the gradual reintroduction of strong executive and parliamentary oversight over 
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defence and security – saved the country from domestic military intervention. It 
is the failure of governments in Ghana and Uganda to use these sorts of 
management techniques in transitional periods that led to the military coup 
d’etats in those countries. Therefore, as explained by Decalo (1991:72-74), 
Zambia’s methods of maintaining political stability, defusing religious and ethnic 
tensions, and avoiding military coup d’etats should serve as an example for other 
African countries, and should be studied and adopted by the African Union in its 
initiatives to resolve ethnic and religious uprisings such as those of Darfur in 
Sudan. 
3) New governments should not arbitrary dismiss qualified and experienced officers 
for petty political reasons at the expense of national security. This should only be 
done after other officers have been adequately trained on the cons and pros of 
using coercive or consensual methods of civil control of the military and have 
gained adequate experience to take their place. This becomes more fundamental 
given the failure of civil and military intelligence to learn about the attempted 
coup d’etat of 28 October 1997, largely as a result of inadequate funding for 
operational intelligence. This is because democracy and democratic governance 
must always be protected by maintaining a reasonable mixture of both coercive 
and consensual measures in the control of the armed forces. This would help to 
ensure smooth transitions in political power. In this way, democratic 
governments would ensure that civil control of the military in Zambia continues 
to improve.  
4) If consensual measures in civil control of the military are to continue to be used 
by civil governments in Zambia, there is need to budget and continuously release 
funds for operational intelligence. However, in order to prevent such funds from 
being abused for personal gain, as happened in 1969 and in the period 1996 to 
2001 when funds were misused by the Director-General of Civil Intelligence, 
military and civil intelligence organs must acknowledge and internalise the 
concepts of accountability and transparency. Military intelligence should 
subscribe to a public mission statement in which it outlines the normative 
framework within which it operates. This should be supplemented by a more 
extensive network of legislative and structural ‘checks and balances’ to ensure 
the accountability of the military intelligence community. The adoption of an 
Intelligence Code of Conduct could also play a valuable role. A code of conduct 
for military intelligence officers and a general code for all members of the armed 
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forces could inhibit the emergence of praetorian and interventionist tendencies 
(Williams 1993:25). 
5) As part of effective parliamentary oversight over defence and security the 
Zambian parliament established a Committee on Foreign Affairs and National 
Security under the parliamentary reform programme. However, in order to further 
strengthen the use of consensual measures in civil control of the military another 
committee similar to the South African Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight 
Committee needs to be established. This is necessary because the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and National Security currently does not cover the intelligence 
services. The Intelligence Oversight Committee should be established by 
legislation, which should provide for the establishment of the committee, its 
functions and powers, access to information and documentation, secrecy, its 
obligations to report to parliament, and regulations. This would significantly 
strengthen parliamentary oversight over the military. 
6) It is important to note that the study of civil control of the military in Zambia, 
using the analytical concepts of coercive and consensual measures in the four 
different periods has not been very exhaustive. In order that further research is 
carried out any new researcher in the field of civil-military relations in Zambia 
must obtain permission to begin his or her studies from civil and security 
government agencies - otherwise they could face ‘sanctions, political threat, and 
even physical threats’ (Scheurich 1995: 1-17). In our case permission to 
commence the research was obtained by taking three prolonged approaches. First, 
the author of this study realised that a gap existed in the literature as no one had 
produced a comprehensive study of civil control of the military in Zambia. 
Second, the author took advantage as an officer of parliament to lobby for 
permission to undertake the study through the Office of the Speaker of 
Parliament and the Clerk of the National Assembly. These offices provided 
legitimacy for the study as parliament was implementing reforms aimed at 
improving its oversight over defence and security institutions. These reforms 
were prompted by the massive misuse of public funds by government leaders 
between 1991 and 2001, partly via the departments of civil and military 
intelligence. Third, the author took advantage of relationships formed in the 
executive courses offered to senior Zambian military officers by the Southern 
African Defence and Security Network, for which he acted as resource person. 
The interaction with these officers and the exchanges of views with them on the 
C I V I L  C O N T R O L  O F  T H E  M I L I T A R Y  I N  Z A M B I A  
 
 230
relationship between parliamentary oversight, the ministry of defence and other 
security organisations led to the Ministry of Defence appreciating the need for the 
study. As a result, the permanent secretary of defence gave permission for the 
study to proceed on condition that a copy of the thesis be deposited with the 
ministry. It would be important for any other researcher of security issues in 
Zambia or perhaps any other country to follow these or similar networks – 
otherwise, permission to access security files both at the Ministry of Defence 
Headquarters and in the National Archives of Zambia would probably not be 
granted. 
7) Last but not the least, it is this researcher’s view that an understanding is still 
lacking of how various Zambian governments have manipulated ethnicity in the 
Zambia Defence Force as a means of exerting civil control of the military. 
Research should also be undertaken on managing the military budgeting process; 
integrating the defence sector into government-wide processes; and the 
consequences of parliamentary oversight.  
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Appendix 1 
Interview Schedule 
General Information 
1. Age in years: 
2. Gender: Male / Female 
3. Marital status: Widow / Divorces / Married / Single / Other 
4. Main income and source of living: 
What was the nature and character of the relationship between the colonial army 
and the government, Africans and white settlers up to 1964? 
What role did parliament, the executive and the judiciary play in ensuring that the 
restructuring policies of all the military establishments in the First and Third Republics 
enhanced the relationship between the military, government leadership and the citizenry? 
In your own view, why is it that the Zambian military personnel did not follow 
the behaviour of their counterparts in Ghana and Uganda of overthrowing their nationalist 
leaders? 
What are some of the behavioural controls that were put in place by government 
that ensured that the military remained loyal to the government leadership? 
What impact did the budgetary control of the Ministry of Defence either by the 
President or parliament has on the relationship between the military, government and the 
citizenry? 
What impact did the reorganisation measures on the military structures and 
behavioural controls that took place in the Third Republic as a result of the new 
democratic dispensation have on the relationship between the military, government 
leadership and the citizenry? 
What roles have the following institutions continued to play in civil control of the 
military in Zambia: 
8) the Defence Council; 
9) the Military Intelligence; and 
10) the Ruling Party’s Office of the Chairman of National Security?  
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Duration of the interview: 
Name of the Informant / s: 
Name of the interviewer: 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Consent Form 
Dear Sir / Madam 
I wish to introduce myself as a student with the University of Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, South Africa. I am carrying out a research study entitled: ‘Civil Control of 
the military in Zambia’. The study is undertaken towards the fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Literature and Philosophy. 
Data for the study will be collected from primary documents at the National 
archives of Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Defence Headquarters, who have 
given a clearance for the study on condition that a copy of the thesis be handed in person 
to Defence Headquarters on completion of the study, and the National Assembly of 
Zambia who are the Employers of the Researcher. Secondary data will be collected from 
authorities like books, journals and magazines where articles related to the civil control of 
the military by various governments in the world have been published. It is the intention 
of the study to corroborate primary and secondary data with data collected through 
individual interviews of a few people that were responsible for the implementation of 
policies related to the civil control of the military in the periods under study. The 
interviews may last about 60 minutes. The interview will be conducted in a place and 
time most suitable to you, sir. Your participation in the study is voluntary, and you may 
stop your participation at any time during the interview. The interview will be transcribed 
verbatim as well as tape-recorded. The researcher promises to handle all information 
collected with utmost confidentiality. 
Your consent to participate in the study will be highly appreciated as the results 
of the study will assist in understanding why the civil control of the military in Zambia 
revolves around the thesis that despite the two faced nature of the colonial army and 
various constitutional regime changes and systems of governance from multi party to one 
party and back to multiparty, the Zambian military consistently worked to support the 
economic, political and social ideals of the ruling elite. Any deviation from this ideal by 
the military resisters through attempted military coup d’etats or the people through food 
riots was consistently exposed by the military intelligence and crushed by the loyal 
troops. This made the country experience relatively harmonious civil- military relations 
as compared to other former British colonies in the three distinct periods under study. 
Hence the need by this study to examine the nature, character and degree of the civil 
control of the military in each epoch of history in Zambia which explains the methods 
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used by the Zambian government in the successful management of the civil control of the 
the military. 
I wish to sincerely thank you in advance for your participation in the study. 
Your Faithfully 
 
Haantobolo Godfrey H. N. 
   
Thank you. 
I accept Participation. 
Respondent’s Signature: _____________________ 
Date: ____________________________________ 
Respondent’s thumb print: ___________________ 
Date: ____________________________________ 
 
(Researcher)
 
 
Appendix 3  
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA 
RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
  
 
Telephone: 260-1-256067     Ridgeway Campus 
Telegrams: UNZA, LUSAKA     P.O.Box 50110 
Telex: UNZALU ZA 44370 Fax: + 260-1-250753   Lusaka, Zambia 
E-mail: unzarec@zamtel.zm  
 
 
Assurance No. FW A00000338 
IRB00001131 of IORG0000774  
 
22 December, 2005 
Ref.: 005-11-05  
 
Mr Haantobolo Godfrey H. N. 
National Assembly  
P.O. Box 31299  
LUSAKA  
 
 
Dear Mr Haantobolo  
 
RE: SUBMITTED RESEARCH PROPOSAL  
 
The following research proposal was presented to the Research Ethics Committee 
meeting held on 7 December, 2005 where changes were recommended. We would like to 
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acknowledge receipt of the corrected version with clarifications. The proposal has now 
been approved. Congratulations!  
Title of proposal: ‘ Civil Control of the Military in Zambia: 1964 to 2004’  
 
CONDITIONS:  
 
• This approval is based strictly on your submitted proposal. Should there be need for 
you to modify or change the study design or methodology, you will need to seek 
clearance from the Research Ethics Committee.  
• If you have need for further clarification please consult this office. Please note that it 
is mandatory that you submit a detailed progress report of your study to this 
Committee every six months and a final copy of your report at the end of the study .  
• Any serious adverse events must be reported at once to this Committee .  
• Please note that when your approval expires you may need to request for renewal. 
The request should be accompanied by J!. Progress Report (Progress Report Forms 
can be obtained from the Secretariat).  
 
 
 
Prof. I. T. Karashani, MB, 
ChB, PhD CHAIRMAN  
Date of approval: 22 December, 2005 
Date of expiry: 21 December, 2006  
 
 
 
Appendix 4 
 
Telephone: 228610/11 
Telegrams: f)/:FSfC I-(/x: UU2{'OJ-264/i/i6  
MOD/10/14  
 
 REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA 
 
 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
 
PRIVATE BAG RW 17X, LUSAKA  
27 July, 2005  
 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN  
 
Dear Sir/Madam  
 
CLEARANCE MR GODFREY H N HAANTOBOLO, PhD 
STUDENT WHO IS UNDERTAKING FIELD WORK 
 
11) The above mentioned person is a Deputy Chief of Research Officer at Parliament 
and is currently a student at the University of Witwatersrand under the auspices 
of the Southern African Defence and Security Management, Department of 
History at the University of Zambia, studying for a phD on the topic Civil 
Control of the Military in Zambia 1964 - 2004.  
12) Mr Godfrey H N HAANTOBOLO has been cleared to access to documents 
pertaining to his study on a few selected officers on the subject of his study.  
13) Kindly assist the officer.  
 
T C YAMUKWENDA, psc 
Colonel for Permanent Secretary 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 
 
 
Appendix 5 
Oral Sources 
Because of a lack of space, the twenty most useful sources only are listed below. 
1. Name: Sister Bernard Nkando 
 Place: Lusaka  
 Date: 10th September 2002 
 Position: Former Catholic Chaplain of prisoners including former detainees at 
Mukobeko maximum prison 1980-1991 and now Chaplain at the Lusaka 
International Airport. 
2. Name: Mr Berts Mushala 
 Place: Wroxton College, England 
 Date: 15th August 2002 
 Position: Former Member of Parliament, former Minister in charge of North-
Western Province and son of the former rebel leader Adamson Mushala. 
3. Name: Col Geofrey Munalula 
  Place: Arusha, Tanzania 
 Date: 5th September 2003 
 Position: Wing Commander, Army School of Education, Kabwe. Participant in 
the project on the civil military relations for Southern African countries co-
ordinated by Prof. Abillah Omari of Tanzania. 
4. Name: Brig. General Timothy Kazembe 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 24th April 2005 
 Position: Former Army Secretary, former Director of Military Intelligence, 
Former Deputy High Commissioner to Zaire and former Chairman of the United 
Nations Joint Peace Keeping Mission on Congo D R.  
5. Name: Captain Dennis Sinkamba 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 2nd October 2005 
 Position: Secondary school teacher at the Army School of Education, Kabwe and 
a Masters Degree student at the University of Zambia. 
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6. Name: Captain Jehro Chipili 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 2nd October 2005 
 Position: Secondary School teacher at the Army School of Education, Lusaka and 
student at the University of Zambia. 
7. Name: Lt. Jonathan Chinyama 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 2nd October 2005 
 Position: Solwezi Military clinic doctor. 
8. Name: Mr Alexander Grey Zulu 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 5th October 2005 
  Position: Former Minister of Local government, Former Minister of Defence, 
Member of the Central Committee in charge of the Committee on Defence and 
Security, the longest serving Secretary General of the Party and government 
under the One-Party State and the last Vice-President before the introduction of 
the Third Republic. He was also the longest serving Chairman of the Defence 
Council and the National Committee on Defence and Security. 
9. Name: Lt. General Christone Tembo 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 10th October 2005 
 Position: Former Army Commander, Former Zambia’s Ambassador to the 
Federal Republic of Germany and former coup detainee 1988-1991. In the Third 
Republic he became Member of Parliament, Minister of Tourism, and Vice-
President and ended up as leader of the opposition party the Forum for 
Democracy and Development. 
10. Name: General Malimba Masheke 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 11th October 2005 
 Position: First Director of the Department of Military Intelligence, Former Army 
Commander, Former Minister of Defence and the last Prime Minister under the 
One-Party State in Zambia. 
11. Name: Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 5th December 2005 
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 Position: First President of Zambia: 1964-31st October 1991. 
12. Name: Princess Nakatindi Wina 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 2nd January 2006 
13. Position: Former Member of Parliament, former Women’s Chair Person under the 
MMD and former suspected coup detainee after the 1997 attempted military 
coupd’etat. 
14. Name: Mr Sikota Wina 
 Place: Lusaka 
 Date: 2nd January 2006 
 Position: Editor of the UNIP magazine during the nationalist struggle, First 
Minister of Information and Broadcasting after Independence and former Deputy 
Speaker. 
15. Name: Seargent Chripin Milimo 
 Place: Mikango Barracks 
 Date: 8th June 2006 
 Position: One of the commandos in Mikango barracks that foiled the 1997 
attempted military coup d’etat. 
16. Name: Nicholas Katanekwa 
 Place: Livingstone 
 Date: 15th June 2006 
 Position: Former Director of the National Heritage Commission in Livingstone. 
17. Name: Mr William Chipango  
 Place: Livingstone 
 Date: 16th June 2006 
 Position: First Mayor of the Livingstone Council after Independence and 
suspected rebel leader during the Chipango rebellion before 1973. 
18. Name: Mr Fredrick Mwiya Anene Maswabile 
 Place: Sesheke 
 Date: 17th June 2006 
 Position: Induna, Litunga’s representative in Nalisa village, Sesheke. One of the 
most bombed border village by the apartheid government in Zambia.  
19. Name: Wellington Mubita Mandu 
 Place: Seheke 
 Date: 17th June 2006 
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 Position: Member of the royal establishment sent to the Litunga of Western 
Province to inform him about the suspected plans by the South African Defence 
Force to bomb Sesheke. The litunga in turn informed President Kaunda who 
called for a press conference that temporary stopped the South African 
government from authorizing the attack in 1983. 
20. Name: George Siyumbwa 
 Place: Sesheke 
 Date: 17th June 2006 
 Position: One of the former soldiers of the South African Defence Force in 
Namibia, who informed his uncle Kangumu Mwambwa in Sesheke about the 
South African intended attacks on some areas of Western Province. This 
information was either sent directly to the Litunga or through civil or military 
intelligence and filtered through all the security organs at District, Provincial and 
National level to the President. 
 
21 Name: Mr George Samulela 
 Place: Sesheke 
 Date: 18th June 2006 
 Position: Resident of Sesheke during apartheid troops bombings, and my Lozito 
English interpreter during field interviews. 
 
 
